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A trip to the zoo: colonial sightseeing and spectacle in Sudan (1901–1933)

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ABSTRACT

During the early years of British colonial rule in Sudan, 'notables' from the colony's southern provinces travelled to Khartoum on diplomatic missions and to visit friends and family. Sightseeing became a regular part of these diplomatic visits, which helped to establish and maintain colonial relations. By the late 1920s, tourism practices in Sudan offered British officials a way to reassert colonial distinctions and place more distance between themselves and their subjects. Tourism in Khartoum, with its characteristic way of focusing on difference and authenticity, offered officials a way to simplify relationships and to rewrite history by staging and restaging 'first encounters'. Drawing on contemporary sources, this paper examines sightseeing tours organised for chiefs from places like Nasir, Bor, and Yambio (in what is today South Sudan) in the 1920s and 1930s, and how these visits contributed to the construction of images of the remoteness of South Sudan.

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Introduction

In August, 1933, twenty-eight Nuer chiefs from the borderlands of South Sudan and Ethiopia, together with some of their wives, a 'Leopard Skin Chief', and four chiefs' police, visited the Khartoum zoological gardens, where they fed sugar to Rudolph, the hippopotamus, and saw the lion and the kangaroo.[1] 'The kangaroo completely defeated them',

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[1]For simplicity, this paper uses two anachronisms. South Sudan is used to refer to the region that is today, roughly, South Sudan; 'chief' is used to encompass forms of authority held by a variety of people and located in the engagement of people with state power. This essay is primarily based on archival research carried out in the South Sudan National Archive in Juba in 2010, before the cataloguing of these documents, and in 2014–2015, after cleaning and cataloguing made it possible to more easily locate records related to these visits. While many records are incomplete, (many were lost or seriously damaged during the 1983–2005 civil war), the archives in Juba also contain correspondence related to the safaris organised by the Khartoum Tourist Agency (UNP/65-B-33, 1952–1972). In 2009–2010, I carried out ethnographic research in Bor, where I spoke with the grandson of one of the chiefs who had travelled to Khartoum in 1928, and whose own father had worked as a Game Ranger in Bor, collecting animals for the zoo in Khartoum. In February 2014, I carried out oral history research among grandchildren and other relations of the chiefs who had travelled to Khartoum in August 1933. (Though these visits were remembered, in a way, this essay focuses on just one side of the encounters.) The Sudan Archive at the University of Durham holds the Intelligence Report, Egypt (IRE) published by the Egyptian Army from 1891 to 1898, and the Sudan Intelligence Report (SIR) from 1892 to 1903. The SIR was compiled from various sources by Wingate. A full set is located in the National Records Office, Khartoum, which also holds Corfield's account of the visit mentioned by Court-Treatt (D.H. Johnson, *per. comm.*). While I visited Khartoum and Omdurman several times in 2014–2015, and saw the conventional tourist sites there, time did not permit archival research.

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F. D. Corfield, who accompanied the chiefs, wrote; 'one chief came up to me and said that he was certain it was not an animal although he could not explain what it was'. The trip to the zoo ended the first day of their three-day sightseeing itinerary, which included a 'grand tour' of Khartoum and Omdurman and visits to a model dairy farm, the Sudan Light and Power Company's Power House and water treatment plant, the armoury, the aerodrome, and the palace.[2]

The itinerary had been planned by the Assistant Civil Secretary, who modelled the tour on tourist guide-books and the places that new colonial officials were taken to see as an 'introduction to life in Khartoum'.[3] Corfield, District Commissioner for the Eastern Nuer and a friend of the anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard, acted as their guide. This was nothing out of the ordinary. Chiefs were prominent individuals. Their position depended on their place within the colonial government. What was out of the ordinary, strange even, was that this sightseeing tour was designed to terrify and demoralise. In her account of filming *Stampede* (1929) in Darfur and southern Kordofan, Stella Court-Treatt provided a description of a punitive tour related to her by an official serving in Sudan: after an attack on the police post at Duk Fayuil in 1928, he told her,

> the Government had fifty of the most truculent [Nuer chiefs] taken up to Khartoum, where a proper respect for the Government was instilled into their souls by taking them round, pointing out to them aeroplanes, fort, and armoury, and the strength and majesty of the Government generally.[4]

If the itinerary in 1933 borrowed from Cook and Baedeker, and visited many attractions, this did not mean it was without intimidation and experiences meant to provoke terror. Instilling 'a proper respect for the Government' meant making the threat of colonial violence credible and compelling.

This essay tells the story of diplomatic sightseeing in colonial Sudan, beginning in 1901 with the arrival in Omdurman of an envoy sent by a prominent Malual Dinka chief, which tied Northern Bahr el-Ghazal to the colonial centre, and ending in 1933 with a sightseeing visit to Khartoum and a colony that was tangled in ways that colonial administrators were anxious to detach and separate. Two histories are traced here: First is one by which the colony was made through practices of diplomatic travel, alliance and exchange. The other is the gradual expansion of tourist practice in colonial Sudan. This paper examines how these two styles of travel were brought together.

During Sudan's Turco-Egyptian or Turkiyya period (1821 – c.1885) the Khedive of Egypt and Sudan, Isma'il Pasha, recruited Charles Gordon, whose role in the Taiping Civil War had made him a household name, to help extend his empire. Drawing, in 1874, on a tradition of dealing with 'hostile little chiefs' ('*les petits sultans qui se montrent*

[2]F. D. Corfield, 'Note on visit of Eastern Jekang [Gaajak and Gaajok] Chiefs to Khartoum, August, 1933', dated 22 August 1933, Juba Archive, UNP/66.G.1/3. The party also included two interpreters and an interpreter's wife, four wives of chiefs, 'and three wives of one interpreter travelling to Omdurman to visit [a] Doctor'. Corfield, 1933, UNP/66.G.1/3, 39. Liom Yat, an earth-master (or 'Leopard Skin Chief', in Corfield's report), is discussed by Douglas Johnson, 'On Disciples and Magicians', *Journal of Religion in Africa* 22, no. 1 (1992): 15.

[3]See, for example, J. P. S. Daniell, *diary*, Sudan Archive Durham (SAD), 777/13/26-28.

[4]S. Court Treatt, *Sudan Sand: filming the Baggara Arabs* (London: George G. Harrap, 1930), 122–3. The visit in 1928 was meant to restore 'government prestige' among chiefs from the vicinity of the Lou patrol, which officials considered to have had an adequate 'morale effect'; the killing of two men, two women, two children, and three hundred cattle with machine guns and aeroplanes was not felt to have been terrifying enough. D. H. Johnson, 'Colonial Policy and Prophets; the "Nuer Settlement," 1929–1930', *Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford* 10, no. 1 (1979).

hostiles') in colonial India, Gordon sent a chief from southernmost South Sudan to Khartoum, he wrote, 'to realize the strength of the government'.[5] During the 1920s and 1930s, British officials drew on this history to stage sightseeing tours to Khartoum. There is an important literature about experiences of travel under colonial rule, and how frequent movement helped to define how colonial encounters were understood and represented.[6] But historians have paid little attention to the sightseeing tours organised for (South) Sudanese chiefs. This is perhaps because they were hybrid forms of travel, undertaken by colonial subjects and part diplomacy and administration, part leisure travel and part intimidation, but also enticing with attractions, ice cream and snuff, and thus falling between the categories of analysis that scholars often use. Boundary cases can be useful. This paper examines how practices of tourism and the aesthetic sensibilities of sightseeing supplied colonial officials with a way to construct the distinctions and distance of colonial hierarchy. To examine what was done with tourism, then, this paper draws on three main bodies of work: the literature of brokerage, tourism and imperialism, and colonial spectacle.[7]

This paper proceeds chronologically and falls into three parts. The first part begins with early diplomatic visits to Khartoum in 1901–02, during a time when colonial officials relied on Sudanese 'notables' to help them to reckon with long-established patterns of international diplomacy. The second section concerns the colony in 1920–30, and argues that officials tried to put this history of 'Afro-European diplomacy' behind them.[8] It sketches out a brief background on Native Administration and the parallel development of European tourism in Khartoum, its 'propaganda value' and characteristic emphasis on 'difference' and the exotic. The third section examines a single visit to Khartoum in August 1933, during which chiefs from the vicinity of Nasir were taken on a sightseeing tour of the city. (Figure 1).

1901–1902: early diplomatic travel & exchange

Administrative histories of South Sudan that focus on policy and administrative decisions tend to conceal the ways that the early Anglo-Egyptian state (1899–1956) was not so much a single administration (which was gradually extended) as a patchwork of alliances and

[5]Gordon to Khairi pacha, 1–9 October 1874. Georges Douin, *Histoire du règne du khédive Ismail* (Le Caire: Société royale de géographie d'Egypte, 1936), no. 3, 82–3; Simone Simonse, *Kings of Disaster* (Kampala: Fountain, 2017), 107, 101. The Savoyard trader, Brun-Rollet, had taken Nyiggilo, a young son of a Bari king named Logunu to Khartoum in 1844. The visit was made at Nyiggilo's request, and helped him to secure a central position in the trade from Khartoum.

[6]M. L. Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (Routledge, 1992); G. Gowans, 'Travelling Home: British women Sailing from India, 1940–1947', *Women's Studies International Forum* 29, no. 1 (2006): 81–95; G. Kearns, 'The Imperial Subject: Geography and Travel in the Work of Mary Kingsley and Halford Mackinder', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 22, no. 4 (1997): 450–72; K. Fullagar, *The Savage Visit: New World People and Popular Imperial Culture in Britain, 1710–1795* (University of California Press, 2012); Coll Thrush, 'The Iceberg and the Cathedral: Encounter, Entanglement, and Isuma in Inuit', *Journal of British Studies* 53 (2014): 59–79.

[7]Cherry Leonardi, *Dealing with Government in South Sudan: Histories of Chiefship, Community, and State* (Boydell & Brewer, 2015); F. Robert Hunter, 'Tourism and Empire: The Thomas Cook & Son Enterprise on the Nile, 1868–1914', *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 5 (2004): 28–54; Shelley Baranowski, et al., 'Tourism and Empire', *Journal of Tourism History* 7, no. 1–2 (2015): 100–130; Derek Gregory, 'Scripting Egypt: Orientalism and the Cultures of Travel', in *Writes of Passage: Reading Travel Writing*, ed. J. Duncan and D. Gregory (Liverpool University Press, 1999), 114–50; Justin Willis, 'Tribal Gatherings: Colonial Spectacle, Native Administration and Local Government in Condominium Sudan', *Past and Present* 211, no. 1 (2011): 243–68.

[8]Graham W. Irwin, 'Precolonial African Diplomacy: The Example of Asante', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 8, no. 1 (1975): 81–96.



Figure 1. 'British officials feeding a hippopotamus at Khartoum zoo' (courtesy of Durham University Library, SAD.D9/34).

relationships. Many individuals who would later be recognised as chiefs by British authorities had come to prominence during the violence of the early years of the Ottoman slave-and-ivory trade, which was brought under some measure of control not by South Sudanese submission or insurrection, but by the slow creation of social contracts. During the first decades of dealing with slave and ivory traders, those with a talent for travel, trade, and translation gained status as brokers who claimed rights, protections and trade-goods in exchange for labour, food, and cooperation. These agreements made further claims and obligations and further exchanges possible. Both foreign traders and South Sudanese were anxious to put an end to the unpredictable violence: the traders because they desperately needed carriers, translators, and provisions, and the South Sudanese because they knew that they could best resist the merchants' most violent excesses by accommodating them.[9]

This section examines two trips during the early years of Anglo-Egyptian rule, when social contracts formed during previous regimes were renegotiated. The first is an envoy from the Malual Dinka chief, Dengdit Awutiek in 1901, the second, one sent by the Zande prince Tembura in 1902. The Sudan Intelligence department recorded several visits from southern provinces during the same period. These included a visit in November 1901 of the Shilluk king (or *reth*), Kur Nyidhok, and 150 retainers,[10] who

[9]Leonardi, *Dealing with Government in South Sudan*, 33.

[10]'Kur Wad Nedok' in contemporary sources. Sudan Intelligence Report (SIR) 88, 1st to 30th November 1901, 2. Kur had earlier signed a treaty with Marchland's French expedition after having been appointed *reth* in 1892 in Omdurman by Khalifa Abdullahi as a reward for Kur's support against the previous *reth*, Yor Akoj, whom the Mahdi had appointed in El Obeid. Yor's predecessor, Ajang Nyidok, had in turn gained his position through an alliance with Ali Bey Kurdi, the Turco-Egyptian Governor in Fashoda (now, Kodok). W. Arens, 'The Divine Kingship of the Shilluk: A Contemporary Reevaluation', *Ethnos* 44, no. 3–4 (1979): 167–81; M. E. C. Pumphrey, 'The Shilluk Tribe', *Sudan Notes and Records* 24 (1941): 1–45.

arrived on a steamer in the company of Oweir Areng, ‘the head Sheikh at Renk’, and ‘about 40 Dinkas’, sent by the Administrator at Fashoda to avoid complications during Oweir’s removal from office.[11] Kur Nyidhok’s nephew, ‘Sheikh Akwakwang … of the Sobat section of the Shilluk’, visited Khartoum in December, 1902, ‘to see the Head-quarters of the new Government, and to express personally the loyalty of himself and tribe’, a short note in a monthly intelligence report said: ‘they are at present spending their time in sightseeing and receiving visits from the Shilluks in Khartoum’. Akwakwang married a Shilluk woman staying in Omdurman, who returned with him to Sobat. His tour of Khartoum followed the itinerary of diplomatic tours of earlier visitors. ‘He seemed thoroughly pleased with his reception and all he saw in Khartoum, and greatly enjoyed witnessing ceremonial parades, games of polo, &c., and being taken for a short trip on the Sudan Government Railway’, Reginald Wingate, who compiled the report, wrote.[12] Wingate, the commander-in-chief (Sirdār) of the Egyptian Army and Governor-General of the Sudan, received the delegation, which presented him with a tusk ‘and received suitable presents in exchange’. Akwakwang’s uncle, Kur Nyidhok returned to Khartoum (with fifteen retainers) in February 1903. After an interval there he was sent on by train to visit government stations, at Berber and Halfa, ‘to study the ways of the Government’. The tour was organised to remedy some ‘misconduct’ attributed by the Administrator at Fashoda to Kur Nyidhok’s ‘evil advisers, and to his own ignorance of the intentions of the Government’.[13]

Visits made by Sudanese ‘notables’ (*sheikhs, sultans, reths*, chiefs, kings, and notables, in contemporary documents) played an important role in making the colony, which was constructed as much by travel and alliances, meetings, agreements and exchanges as by violent conquest. In the early years of the Anglo-Egyptian regime the practice of showing chiefs around Khartoum was taken up partly at the insistence of the envoys who began arriving there soon after the ‘re-conquest’. Sightseeing tours of Khartoum’s ‘large permanent buildings and excellent housing’ were a significant part of the construction of colonial authority, meant ‘to show that the new government had come to stay’, and a valuable source of information for officials.[14] The practice of organising trips to Khartoum also linked the history of touristic practice in Sudan to the history of colonial rule.

April, 1901: Awutiek’ envoy

The first South Sudanese envoy to visit the new government in Omdurman arrived there in April 1901. It consisted of 21 ‘Dinkas and Fertitawis’ and was led by the son of a prominent Malual Dinka chief, Dengdit Awutiek Awutiek, from a village roughly sixty kilometres west of the present town of Aweil, South Sudan.[15] The envoy brought two French

[11]‘Aweir Wad El Rung’ (Oweir Areng, of the Abialang Dinka) had been appointed a month earlier, and was dismissed soon after his arrival in Khartoum; his exile was accomplished by conscription into the army. SIR 88, 1st to 30th November, 1901; Edward Gleichen, ed., *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Vol.2* (London: Harrison & Sons, 1905), 76; C. A. Willis and Douglas Johnson, eds., *The Upper Nile Province Handbook* (Oxford University Press, [1933]1995), 145, 413.

[12]SIR 102, 1st to 31st January 1903, 3.

[13]SIR 101, 1st to 31st December 1902, 2.

[14]H. C. Jackson, *Sudan Days and Ways* (London: Macmillan, 1954), 22; Sudan Intelligence Report 88, 1 November 1901 – 30 November 1901. In addition to various ambassadors, hundreds of pilgrims also passed through Omdurman and Khartoum on the way to Mecca.

[15]SIR 81, 1st to 30th April 1901, 2 & Appendix E, ‘Visit of Sultan Chek Chek’s Representatives to Omdurman’, 12–13. This visit is mentioned in passing by Santandrea. Santandrea, *A Tribal History of the Western Bahr El Ghazal* (Bologna: Editrice Nigrizia, 1964), 290.

flags, a bundle of letters and a treaty signed by Armentier, a French commander, containing a border agreement, which stated which places lay under Awutiek's diplomatic authority.[16] Awutiek's son's instructions were to 'hand over to the Sudan Government the administration and protection of his county' and to return to his father with a full report. The envoy presented a spear belonging to Awutiek's grandfather to the Governor-General – understood by the British to be 'a token of submission', but probably by Awutiek as a sign of friendly alliance and his ability to mobilise men –, a rhino horn, and a number of leopard skins.[17] The composition of the envoy and the written treaty underscored Awutiek's established position as an intermediary and were evidence both of his standing and his ability to be a useful ally who could be of service to the new Government by providing labour and information. His gifts were evidence of trade, and an effort to establish a relationship on terms that caused British officials misgivings, because they acknowledged the government's reliance on Awutiek's powers of organisation. Awutiek's son also 'brought a bundle of small sticks', Wingate wrote,

> a certain number of which are intended to represent the number of soldiers the Sultan required sent to him, others represented the rifles, elephant guns, pistols, mules, donkeys, &c., which he seemed to expect the Government would certainly give him.[18]

The delegation also requested eight flags to be raised, staking out a swathe of country running six-days'-walk east, from Awutiek's home in Chek Chek (or Areyo), to Awan, and south to Deim Zubayr, an old slave-and-ivory station in Bahr al-Ghazal about 130 kilometres to the south. Reading Awutiek's motives through British records is chancy, but his request suggests that he hoped to use his influence on the British to ensure his place at the centre of a broad polyglot confederation.[19] Awutiek had established himself as an important diplomatic broker when the region came under Turco-Egyptian rule in 1879, during intervals of Mahdist (1884–1899) and French (1897–1898) occupation, and again when Anglo-Egyptian power was 'restored' there in the summer of 1901.[20] He had built a substantial following by offering refuge from the advance of prince Tembura (about whom, more below) from Deim Zubayr to the south and the predations of the slave merchants from the north. Encountering the new forces, Awutiek sent his envoy to open up diplomatic relations with the new government and to incorporate the British into the web of Bahr al Ghazal politics. He included a French Treaty as evidence of his usefulness and prior claims, and to consolidate his position and maintain some measure of autonomy with the help of a powerful ally. At the same time, these efforts to secure some autonomy drew the region further into the empire.

[16]Article 2 of the treaty recognised the chiefs who signed the treaty as the leaders of a wide territory: '*A l'Ouest par la Riviere Kourou depuis son affluent le Biri et jusqu'au Bahr el Arab par le Meridien du confluent du Thiel et du Borou. Au Nord par le Bahr el Arab*' divided by the Bahr el Arab, where it separated the Malual from those under the authority of Ayak Komdet, the Sultan at Akoll. It designated Chek Chek as responsible for any 'questions politiques, civiles ou judicaires, avec les Etats voisins et les puissances etrangères', and was signed by Armentier, five chiefs and two interpreters. Traité avec le Sultan Atektek, Appendix C, Sudan Intelligence Report 80, 9th to 31st March 1901. Captain Armentier was a part of the Roulet Mission, which provided a rear-guard to the Marchand Mission and the French Occupation of Bahr el Gazal (1898–1899). See (A.P.) Paluel-Marmont, ed., *La mission Roulet: la France sur le Haut-Nil (1898–1900)* (Paris: L. Fournier, 1933).
[17]SIR 81, 1st to 30th April 1901, 2 & Appendix E, 'Visit of Sultan Chek Chek's Representatives to Omdurman', 12.
[18]SIR 81, 1901, 2 & 12–13.
[19]SIR 81, 1901, 12–13.
[20]Kuyok Abol Kuyok, *South Sudan: The Notable Firsts* (AuthorHouse, Kindle Edition, 2015), 1547.

British officials wished to mark a new era and distinguish themselves from earlier regimes. Many chiefs were keen to remind them that they were not entering terra nullius, but into an already-established field of international diplomatic relationships formed by slave and ivory traders, and Sudanese, Ottoman, Egyptian, French, and Belgian administrators and soldiers. Comparisons between the terms of alliances offered by the British and earlier forces were a continual source of 'annoyance' to the new regime. In 1901, chiefs opposed to the demands for labour levied by the new government were citing French diplomatic precedence for their argument, partly to instruct officials in established practices of diplomacy and exchange; reported an Egyptian major: 'the Sheikh of [Meshra Er Renk] … said "that when the French came to his country they did not ask for carriers, but made him presents, but the first thing the [Anglo-]Egyptian Government did was ask him to provide carriers"'.[21] Others, like an envoy from the southern borderlands of Darfur, (which met Awutiek's en-route), cited the new government's own humanitarian claim to have 'suppressed the slave trade' and offered their consent to live under Anglo-Egyptian protection (by displaying the flags that they were given) provided the new Government return from Omdurman those earlier taken captive by Mahdist armies.[22]

February, 1902: Tembura Rewe's envoy

Khartoum was built in the shape of an argument for imperialism. It was constructed more quickly and at a scale much larger than the colony's own resources could support. In February 1899, Field Marshal Horatio Herbert Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener, then Commander of the Egyptian Army, had put five thousand men – mostly Mahdist prisoners – to work clearing streets and making bricks in Khartoum; the rectilinear grid had been laid out and seven thousand trees had been ordered to plant along its spacious avenues. The great priority given to building indicates that officials considered the symbolic sphere of ceremonies and imagery to be intrinsic to their exercise of power.[23]

Kitchener's successor, Wingate, recognised the propaganda value of making Khartoum accessible to potential investors, journalists, European tourists, and chiefs. By 1902, the Anglo-Egyptian government was inviting diplomatic visits to Khartoum from the southern provinces. Sightseeing became a regular part of their reception, which was meant to exhibit the power, organisation, and positive benefits of the new government to potential allies, and sceptics, of Anglo-Egyptian power. The trips were intended to be memorable, recounted and narrated to other people afterward. 'Should any of your relatives desire to come to Khartoum', Reginald Wingate wrote to Gbudwe, the Zande king in Yambio,

> … the commandant of Bahr El Ghazal … will facilitate his journey here, where he will see the building up of the country and the peace which reigns amongst natives, and will return and inform you of what he has seen and heard.[24]

[21]SIR 80, 9th to 31st March 1901, 3–4. This was a common comparison and complaint: '(Chief) Nasr Angal annoyed me greatly by comparing his present position and that he held when Marchland was in possession. Then his monthly allowance was £3, two dozen cognac, besides occasional rifles and ammunition, and a proportionate amount of wine and spirits for his relations'. (Comyn, at Deim Zubayr in 1905), Santandrea, 1964, 52–3.
[22]SIR 80, 9th to 31st March 1901, 4.
[23]Marina d'Errico, *The Tropical Utopia* (Terra Ferma, 2015); M. W. Daly and Jane Hogan, *Images of Empire: Photographic Sources for the British in the Sudan* (Brill, 2005).
[24]'Copy of letter from his Excellency the Sirdar to Sultan Yambio', SIR 92, 1st to 31st March 1902, Appendix C, 7.

Wingate's letter to Gbudwe was carried south by a returning Zande envoy, which had been sent to Khartoum by prince Tembura Rewe ('Sultan Tembura') and prompted by a meeting with Colonel W. S. Sparkes Bey, who led the Bahr el Ghazel reoccupation force. The delegation arrived in Khartoum in February 1902, and brought letters claiming that two of the Tembura's rivals, king Gbudwe and prince Andram, were 'against Government' and planning an insurrection: 'because we are loyal to Government, [they are] therefore our enemies', Tembura wrote.[25] Tembura controlled an important border area on the dividing range between the Congo and Nile rivers where his father, Liwa, had established himself in the 1860s. Tembura had used his position to extend his father's former territory by supplying soldiers and provisions to (Jean-Baptiste) Marchand's expedition, which he accompanied to the Jur River. His further advance north was prevented by Awutiek, whose treaty with the French had confronted Tembura with the awkward prospect of raiding people who were under the protection of his principle ally. Tembura, like Awutiek, saw an alliance with the new Government as an opportunity to secure his position over his own territory against his rivals and subjects.[26]

Tembura's young son, Shakabra, his brother and sixteen others arrived in Khartoum on February 17, 1902, where they were 'ceremoniously received by his Excellency the Sirdar, and received many presents'.[27] The delegation brought twenty tusks of ivory, a rhino horn, and several letters addressed to the Sirdar. In these letters Tembura offered his services to the Government for their mutual benefit.

> The elephant is found in numbers in our country, but we are short of arms. So we beg of you to send us the 'Khushkhan' such as formerly used by the dervishes to shoot the elephant with, and to be thereby useful to Government.

He asked that a certain Zande chief and his men who had been captured by 'wicked dervishes' and taken to Omdurman be released and allowed to return south with his envoy. His letters also outlined the hostility toward the Government of his principle rivals for power, Gbudwe and Andram, and included a list of gifts that he would be happy to receive.[28] 'Care' and 'friendship' were the main theme of Tembura's letters: 'Best friend we are loyal to you, and have refuge in you'. Asking for protection against hostile rivals was an effective way of enlisting British support. He placed his most important request in a postscript: 'Best Friend, please write me officially saying that the Government acknowledges my rule over my people'.[29]

By the time of the visit of Tembura's envoy, the seat of government had been transferred from Omdurman (where departments had been located until early 1901) to Khartoum. During their stay they were lodged in a house in Khartoum at the Government's expense and officers were put at their disposal – a practice associated with the guided tours provided to distinguished European tourists since the first winter of the

[25]'Copy of letter from Sultan Tambura to his Excellency the Sirdar and Governor-General of the Sudan', 18th December 1902, SIR 91, 1st to 28th February, Appendix B, 7–8.

[26]Robert O. Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers* (Yale University Press, 1971), 84–5.

[27]SIR 92, 1st to 30th March 1902, 3.

[28]Among other things he requested: '2 native swords (as curios)', a 'small harmonium', and a waterproof tent. SIR 91, 1st to 28th February, 1902, Appendix 'B', 7. His envoy departed Khartoum on March 30th with 'numerous presents', including a coffee service, fabric and clothing, an inscribed drum and gold watch, several guns, ammunition, a tent, and a music box. SIR 92, 1st to 30th March 1902, 3, 'G' 20–21.

[29]'Copy of letter from Sultan Tembura to his Excellency the Sirdar and Governor-General of the Sudan, dated 18th December, 1901', Appendix B. Sudan Intelligence Report 91, 1st to 28th February 1902, 6.

re-occupation. They were 'shown all the sights of Khartoum and Omdurman, witnessed parades, &c., and made a journey on the railway from Halfaya [Khartoum North] to Wad Banaga [Wad Ben Naga] and back', a roundtrip of about 150 miles.[30]

In 1902 Khartoum was a sprawling construction site: four of the main east–west streets had been laid out and cleared, but not yet macadamised or lined with pavements and shade trees. ('One ploughed one's way about, ankle-deep in sand'[31]). They were shown the Governor's Palace, a great three-story mass of arcaded verandas and loggia erected in 1899 on the ruined foundations of Gordon's palace and, by 1905, opened by the Governor-General to tourists on Mondays and Fridays, when 'permission was given to … take photographs of Gordon's death-place'.[32] Its main building formed three sides of a large quadrangle, the forth a garden courtyard opening south onto Khedive Avenue with a view (along Victoria Avenue) of Abbas Square (the southern extent of the city in 1902). It was no accident that the palace was so big and white, for it was meant to represent colonial order and stability. During the time of the visit, the palace was the city's only residence equipped with running water, and its operation was demonstrated to chiefs who were invited there to see the power of the new government.[33]

The area encompassed by Khartoum's municipal limits was established in November 1901. A roughly triangular, southward-pointed space edged with the old city's fortifications, it extended about two miles along the banks of the Blue Nile and one mile and a quarter to the south.[34] Even in its unfinished state, the hierarchy of colonial society was plainly visible in the stratification of the city. Along the riverfront 'esplanade' were the red-brick verandahed residences of high-ranking British officials, with their shaded gardens and trim lawns, the post office (later the war office), the Governor's Palace, with a garden and small parade ground in front, Gordon College, Slatin Pasha's House, and the British Barracks. To the south were the government offices and a few 'European shops' on diagonal streets radiating from the intersections of the main avenues where subordinate British officials (between Sirdar and Abbas Avenue) and Egyptians (below Abbas Avenue) would soon occupy smaller second- and third-class houses in the 'dusty back parts' of the city[35]; then the expanse of the race course and parade grounds to the west of Khedive Avenue; and farther south, past the line of old fortifications and garrisons marking the city's limits, 'the native population' was quartered in the Native Lodging Area: 'neat and cleanly villages' – a quarantine officer on holiday, wrote; their segregation there was justified as a sanitary measure – 'the huts are of various styles characteristic of the tribes, who live separate one from the other', each under their own 'sheikh' in square cantons laid out beside the golf links.[36]

[30]SIR 92, 1st to 31st March 1902, 3.
[31]D. C. E. F. Comyn, *Service and Sport* (London: John Lane, 1911), 5.
[32]Collie Knox, *It Might Have Been You* (Chapman & Hall, 1938), 202.
[33]H. C. Jackson, *Sudan Days and Ways* (MacMillan, 1954), 23.
[34]W. H. McLean, 'The Planning of Khartoum and Omdurman', *The Transactions of the Town Planning Conference* (October 1910, London), 583.
[35]M. W. Daly, *Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898–1934* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 357.
[36]Walter F. Mieville, 'From a Khartum Window', *The Daily Mail*, April 19, 1907, 3. Henrika Kuklick has written about how advances in tropical medicine made at the Wellcome Tropical Research Laboratories in Khartoum played an important role in anthropology's transformation from the study of antiquities and mission memoirs to a discipline based on direct observation and more akin to the work of naturalists. Kuklick, 'Salubrious Khartoum', *Histories of Anthropology* 4 (2008): 205–219. By 1910, the 'sanitary conditions' and near complete eradication of malaria from Khartoum had made it an attractive tourist destination and, said Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener in 1910, 'demonstrate to the thorough efficiency of the administration of the country'. W. H. McLean, 'The Planning of Khartoum and Omdurman', *Royal Institute of*

Douglas Sladen, a travel-writer and author of *Egypt and the English, … with chapters on the success of the Sudan and the delights of travel* (1908), visited Khartoum during the winter season of 1907–8 and went to the 'Native Lodging Area' to take photographs. He could find, he wrote, no other purpose for them but 'to give pleasure to tourists'.[37] For Sladen there was nothing in Khartoum that was not for tourists. The division into tribes separated by broad open spaces made it convenient to photograph each ethnographic 'type'.

> It is a great privilege to visit them living under their own conditions; the fierce Baggara Arabs, who were the backbone of the Mahdi's army; the Jaalin, who were the special objects of his wrath; the tall Shilluks and Dinkas; the cannibal Nyam–Nyams and others.[38]

Ex-slaves formed the core of the quarter's residents and provided the government with a source of inexpensive labour. Reginald Wingate explained that

> in order to keep the city of Khartoum clean, I have had all the natives who are not either house holders or living with their employers turned out and made to live in the large native village outside the line of fortifications'[39]

– Hence the nickname given to the quarter by residents, Tardona ('they expelled us').[40]

Envoys visiting from elsewhere in Sudan went to the Native Lodging Area to visit friends and relatives, exchange news and gifts, and to take part in life-cycle rites (marriages, funerals). For European tourists who visited there the ability to stroll among 'fierce Baggara Arabs' and 'cannibal Nyam-Nyams' underlined and supported larger structures of colonial rule. A conventional episode which appears in almost every Khartoum travel narrative written during the two decades after re-conquest is an encounter with a former Mahdist soldier, whom the British called dervishes. These were a fixture of popular British literature, a set-piece brought out whenever 'shrinking, snarling savages' were needed to provide excitement or move a story forward.[41] After the re-conquest, former Mahdist soldiers (usually depicted as close to the Khalifa: servants, lieutenants or generals) appear in tourist narratives as hotel porters, tour guides, donkey handlers, and table servants. F. A. Dickinson, for instance, whose route from Omdurman to Gebel Surkab, which provides a prospect of the Battlefield of Kerreri, led him past a marble obelisk commemorating 'the brave 21st [Lancers] who fell in that bold hand-to-hand smack of the vastly larger pack of Dervishes', paused there to remark:

> Strangely enough, the nice old man who was in charge of the camels we rode on this picnic had been in the battle himself, one of the Khalifa's right-hand men, and he told us, amongst other things, that he himself had been one of the keenest in the hot pursuit of Slatin in his

British Architects, Transactions of the Town Planning Conference, London, October 10–15, 1910 (London: Royal Institute of British Architects), 596. This was made possible in large part by the patronage of Henry Wellcome, the pharmaceutical magnate and philanthropist after whom the Wellcome Laboratories were named. Wellcome arrived in Khartoum on a Cooks & Son steamer in the company of some tourists in 1900, during the first season after the 're-conquest'. During a visit to the Battlefield of Kerreri he made a collection of 'dervish' skulls, which he presented to to St. Bartholomew's Hospital, Oxford, Cambridge, and Edinburgh Universities, the Smithsonian Institution and London's Natural History Museum, and Royal College of Surgeons. Frances Larson, *An Infinity of Things* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 49.

[37]Sladen, *Egypt and the English* (1908), 242.

[38]Sladen, 1908, 242.

[39]Annual Reports of the Governor General on the finances, administration and condition of the Sudan, 1902, 312.

[40]Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, *Slaves into Workers* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 77.

[41]Arthur Conan Doyle, *The Tragedy of the Korosko* (1898), 48. Doyle has his dervishes capture a group of tourists sightseeing at the Egypt-Sudan border.

> thrilling escape from thirteen years' captivity in the Dervish camp. Now he serves the British flag with unswerving loyalty.[42]

Descriptions of sightseers' encounters with 'dervishes' remind the reader how recently the Khalifa had been defeated and make descriptions of Khartoum's 'European order' appear more extraordinary, precisely because familiar domestic images – Dickinson was on a picnic – come with startling asides: 'I could not dismiss the thought that these pleasant, English-seeming apartments, with their quiet home-like air of comfort, were in fact those in which [the Khalifa] Abdullah had carried on his orgies and taken council with his trembling satellites'.[43] Or: 'One of the Bishop's suffragis [table servants], by the way, was the Khalifa's water-carrier'.[44] These images were presented as supporting evidence for the necessity (and success) of the civilising force of colonial government; by suggesting that Sudanese were fickle and incapable of having legitimate socio-economic grievances, these passages argued that the uprising had been a kind of madness.

If the Bishop's servant or H. C. Jackson's groom could evoke a larger historical and political world, it was not only because 'the nice old man' in charge of the camels earned his living by telling a good story, but also because of the repetition of a single account across tourist guides and guide-books, pamphlets, travellers' accounts, and official sources.[45] In the fifteen years between the Hick's Expedition and the re-conquest of Sudan, the genres through which British popular literature explored the encounter between 'Civilization' and 'Savagery' diversified. A popular image of this encounter was the Mahdist war. This 'Sudan Sensation' coincided with the birth of tabloid newspapers and illustrated magazines and provided material for foreign-correspondents and artists, memoirists, biographers, novelists, pamphleteers, poets, *Punch* cartoonists, and advertisers.[46] The sixth edition of *With Kitchener to Khartum* – an account of the war written by a correspondent for the *Daily Mail*, G. W. Steevens, who accompanied Anglo-Egyptian forces to Omdurman – was released only twenty-two days after its initial publication in 1898. Charles Neufeld, author of *A Prisoner of the Khaleefa* (1899), thrilled audience with his 'penetrating blue eyes' and public lectures about his twelve-years' captivity in Omdurman. Six thousand copies of Slatin's captivity memoir, *Fire and Sword in the Sudan* (1896), were printed within its first four months of publication. There was even a popular board game, *The New*

[42]F. A. Dickinson, *Lake Victoria to Khartoum, with Rifle & Camera* (London: J. Lane, 1910), 132–3.
[43]Sidney Low, *Egypt in Transition* (Macmillan, 1914), 35–6.
[44]Ethel S. Stevens, *My Sudan Year* (London: Mills & Boon, 1912), 32.
[45]This uniformity was partly because Wingate, then the Director of Intelligence, had co-authored and edited the era's two most popular captivity narratives: Fr. Ohrwalder and Wingate's *Ten Years' Captivity in the Mahdi's Camp* (1892), and Slatin's *Fire and Sword in the Sudan* (1896). These served the propaganda purposes of keeping Sudan at the centre of popular British attention and earned Wingate a lot of money from royalties. Guide-book images of Khartoum, in turn, were made from a collage of scenes already-familiar from these popular narratives. M. W. Daly, 'The soldier as historian: F.R. Wingate and the Sudanese Mahdia', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 17, no. 1 (1988): 99–106; P. M. Holt, 'The Sudanese Mahdia and the Outside World: 1881–9', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 21 (1958): 276–90; Douglas H. Johnson, 'The Death of Gordon: A Victorian Myth', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 10, no. 3 (1982): 285–310. For a readable, English-language account of these events from the perspective of a veteran of the Mahdist army, who was present at Omdurman, see Babikr Bedri, *Memoirs*. Yusuf Bedri and George Scott, trans. (London: Oxford University Press, 1969). Bedri founded Sudan's first secular school for girls, and describes the rise and fall of the Mahdist State and life in Omdurman in the first volume of his memoirs. Space does not permit an examination of orientalist constructions of Islamic societies and the relations between rulers and subjects, or on ethnographic images of consensual relations between South Sudanese rulers and subjects. Talal Asad, 'Two European Images of Non-European Rule', *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*, T. Asad, ed. (London: Ithaca Press, 1975), 103–20. The present Sudan-South Sudan border was made not only with divisions on maps and between academic disciplines, but also through contrasting practices of tourism (antiquities, safaris).
[46]Richard Fulton, 'The Sudan Sensation of 1898', *Victorian Periodicals Review* 42, no. 1 (2009): 37–63.

Military Game of Gordon-Kitchener, or the Conquest of the Soudan, which allowed children to follow the British advance up the Nile with little toy soldiers through a series of Anglo-Egyptian victories (and defeats) from 1883 and the Battle of El Obeid, through Kitchener's campaigns, to the Battle of Omdurman at Kerreri in 1898. By the turn of the century, the major events and locations of the war provided a ready-made script for tourist itineraries and the guide-books published by MacMillan (1905), Cook (1906), Murray (1907), and Baedeker (1908). Each begins with conventional accounts of Gordon's death and repetitive descriptions of the Khalifa's rule: 'one long, orgy of cruel massacres and every abomination of oriental tyranny exercised by an oriental'.[47] In Khartoum, guide-books invited the tourist not to hop from one site to the next, but to stroll along the River Esplanade, past the zoological gardens, and through the 'orderly streets' laid out by Kitchener, to become a part of imperial order, and absorb the values of the 'rightness and righteousness of imperialism' at the spot where Gordon died, the museum at Gordon Memorial College, and the Statue of Gordon.[48] The programme for Omdurman, the Khalifa's capital city, in contrast, circled around places familiar to readers of Ohrwalder's, Slatin's and Neufeld's macabre captivity narratives. Omdurman was seen through Slatin's eyes: 'The buildings of the Buga are of great interest as the scene of many of the episodes of the dominion of "Fire and Sword" in the Sudan', Murry's guide-book says, and provides page numbers corresponding to each episode for reference.[49] These sites were darkly staged: the market-place ('extremely picturesque … and near … a pit into which the dismembered bodies were thrown'[50]), the Mahdi's tomb, the Khalifa's House, Emir Yakub's House, Slatin Pasha's House, and the slave market. A visit to Omdurman conventionally ended with an excursion to Kerreri, the site of the final battle of the Anglo-Egyptian 're-conquest', where Mahdist causalities were 11,000 dead and 16,000 wounded. Anglo-Egyptian casualties were 49 dead and 382 wounded, a contrast Winston Churchill described as 'the most signal triumph ever gained by the arms of science over barbarians'.[51] The contrast between Khartoum ('a civilized town, summoned up out of nothing, as it were, by an enchanter's wand') and Omdurman ('a real Central African city, with nothing European about it'[52]) provided a kind of microcosm of a larger mythical confrontation, or a relation that could stand for other relations, helping tourists to imagine themselves, and the people they met, as figures on a larger stage. Everywhere a tourist turned, then, the city's different sites and narratives and characters confirmed each other, and supported a mythic idea of a dramatic encounter between 'Civilization' and 'Savagery' (Figure 2).

Whatever Tembura's envoy reported to him upon their return has not been recorded. It is unlikely that they would have seen the earlier career of the Bishop's table servant as an example of colonial success; Tembura had, after all, written to request the release of those Azande whom the Khalifa had captured and made into water carriers, and that were subsequently employed by British officials as servants and subordinates.

[47]H. R. Hall, ed., *Murray's Handbook for Egypt and the Sudan*, 11th ed. (London: Edward Stanford, 1907), 564.
[48]Johnson, 'The Death of Gordon', 301.
[49]*Murray's*, 1907, 567.
[50]*MacMillan's Guide to Egypt and the Sudan* (London: MacMillan & Co., 1905), 160. Ohrwalder's account of the market-place in Omdurman contains this memorable line: 'It was never safe for children to appear in the streets at night, for they would certainly have been seized by the starving people'. Ohrwalder and Wingate, 1892, 289.
[51]Winston Churchill, *The River War*, Vol. II (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1899), 164.
[52]Sidney Peel, *The Binding of the Nile and the New Soudan* (London: Edward Arnold, 1904), 179.

Figure 2. Khartum and Omdurman. Karl Baedeker, *Egypt and the Sudan: Handbook for Travellers* (Leipzig: Karl Baedeker, 1908).

From the palace, Tembura's envoy was taken south along Khedive Avenue through Abbas Square to the parade grounds to witness a review. This was an ordinary part of tourist itineraries in those days and a regular feature the sightseeing tours organised for chiefs and visiting dignitaries. The city's main attractions were martial. 'I was never so much impressed in my life as I was on being present at a review of some four thousand troops the morning after our arrival in Khartoum', Captain F. A. Dickinson wrote of his visit there:

> Cavalry, galloping Maxim brigades, mounted infantry, the two infantry brigades were on parade. The precision and exactitude with which they performed their different and varied evolutions, like so many machines, as they marched and countermarched, was little short of marvellous … The men moved exactly like so many clockwork automatons.[53]

Tembura's envoy would no doubt have been impressed by the spectacle they witnessed there, but it would not have been unfamiliar. Performances of authority in colonial Sudan had long combined elements of Sudanese, British, Egyptian, and Ottoman display.[54] Tembura had been prompted to send his envoy to Khartoum by Colonel Sparkes' visit to his residence near Fort Hossinger in 1901. Sparkes described how unfavourably his own show of force compared to the spectacle that Tembura staged. '[D]ressed in a white shirt and trousers, blue frock coat and Terai hat', Tembura met Sparke's force three

[53]Dickinson, *Lake Victoria to Khartoum*, 131.
[54]Willis, 'Tribal Gatherings', 9.

miles from his palace 'with a flourish of trumpets and much powder'.[55] He produced sixty-seven carriers (Sparkes made a count) laden with 'food of all sorts for men and beasts'. After making introductions he left Sparkes to rest, promising to return the following morning.

> Tembura arrives at 8.30 am with his band, three French horns very well played, three Ombeyas [elephant horns], and two side drums, and we go with him to his city, though for the last few miles yesterday we marched through a continuous line of scattered huts … After going about 2 ½ miles, arrive at Tembura's compound, an enormous place, some 300 yards by 200, and surrounded by wooden palisading covered with matting some 12 feet high; outside there is a big open space on which his bodyguard is drawn up, some 300 men all with rifles and two flags [25th June, 1901].

> 'Review' in the morning, Tembura's bodyguard 300 strong, and mine 20 strong. His men all march properly in step, slope and carry their rifles and do simple manoeuvers as well, all taught them by the French. His buglers, three of them, also sound 'Reveillé' every morning, the same as the Egyptian Reveillém, and also 'Tattoo,' a French call, every night; all his people, whether Niam Niam [Azande] or Bongos, Bellandas or other slaves, seem cheerful and contented. He appears to feed the greater part of his bodyguard daily from the Royal Kitchen [26th June, 1901].[56]

Sparkes was impressed. Tembura recognised that the British would understand his ability to produce food, porters, and a military display as a representation of his capacity to govern and provide labour. Tembura staged the event, and invited other chiefs, to display his position as a useful intermediary in the knowledge that Sparkes' would convey an account of his influence and organising power back to the new government in Khartoum. Tembura presented a gift of 80 tusks (and one hundred carriers to take them to Wau) and took Sparkes to see the 'excellent garden' that he had maintained at Fort Hossinger, which Marchand had established about 2 ½ miles to the south in 1896. From Tembura's perspective Sparkes Bey left with the right impression: 'the Niam Niams generally seem a much superior race to anything else in the Bahr El Ghazal', Sparkes wrote. 'I think he wishes to keep on friendly terms with Government, or as he always says, "the English"', a distinction from the 'Turks' that the British welcomed.[57]

1920–1930: confusions, paranoia and tourism

Imperialism was built on the idea that colonisers and colonial subjects could be easily distinguished. But administrators depended on chiefs and other leaders like Tembura for labour and information, to hoist flags to secure territory, and to supervise colonial subjects and carry out government directives. During the early 1900s, the new regime, with its armies and habit of believing rumours and sorting people into 'loyal' (tax- and labour-providing) and 'disloyal' subjects, had been incorporated into webs of regional politics. 'Loyal' groups were enrolled in punitive raids against 'disloyal' ones, and canny brokers bought British support for their aims, with taxes or tribute, and by spreading around rumours.[58] For 'loyal groups', these alliances afforded an opportunity to raid antagonists,

[55]'Dairy of El Miralai Sparkes Bey on Niam Niam Patrol, 4th June to 27th July, 1901', SIR 86, 1st to 30th September 1901.
[56]'Dairy of Sparkes Bey', 1901, 10–11.
[57]'Dairy of Sparkes Bey', 1901, 11.
[58]Noting 'several alarmist' reports that turned out to be false, a short note in SIR commented: 'They are evidently agitating for the Government to undertake another expedition to given them an excuse for looting'. SIR 105, 1st to 30th April, 1903, 2.

or foil competitors. For others a show of loyalty helped to hold unwanted authority at arm's length; by complying with demands for tribute, people could go on living as if the incident had never happened. Still others readily agreed to have their disputes solved by colonial officials and in this way so tangled them up in relations of exchange and alliance that officials were immobilised in webs of personalised obligations.

In these ways administrators were caught up in a constant, shifting play of alliances and ambitions; their letters and reports are full of rumours about agitators, potential revolutionaries, secret societies and secret agents, and speculation about the motivations and plans of chiefs and kings and French, Belgian, Italian, and Ethiopian agents.[59] Officials complied detailed 'personality reports', and a 'Who's Who' of notables and anyone else thought to have any influence over others whatsoever, and complained about the use of third-hand, unreliable information from 'secret agents' and personal contacts.[60] It was all very complicated and made British officials paranoid and obsessed. Even copies of primary school magazines written by schoolchildren were carefully filed away under 'intelligence'.[61]

Officials particularly feared an organised rising against colonial rule. The 1924 Revolution of the White Flag League with its mass demonstrations in Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman made a deep impression. It was led by 'Ali 'Abd al-Latif, an army officer of slave ancestry, whose family had come from the south and who was joined by trusted government employees who worked together with British officials in their offices. Elena Vezzadini has brilliantly described how British understandings of anti-colonial protest broke down as activists, clerks, and intellectuals drew on the Wilsonian idiom of 'self-government' and claimed their right, as colonial citizens, to petition the League of Nations. Accustomed to disparaging resistance to colonial rule as 'religious fanaticism' or 'primitive tribalism', British officials were ill-equipped to respond to anti-colonial activists who articulated their protest in a secular, international language, citing Woodrow Wilson for evidence that self-determination was 'a natural right of nations'.[62] Colonial rule was built on the idea that the boundaries separating colonisers and colonial subjects were self-evident. The White Flag League very visibly threatened those boundaries. In *Devolutionary Principles in Native Administration* (1935), John Almeric de Courcy Hamilton, a member of the Sudan Political Service, wrote that '[a] realisation of the interdependence of the modern world, the growth of communications and the annihilation of distance render impracticable any idea of leaving the "native" races to work out their own salvation, uncontaminated by contact with the "whites"'.[63] British efforts to impose colonial order on the situation, in turn, involved efforts to re-establish familiar

[59]Douglas H. Johnson, 'Criminal Secrecy: The Case of the Zande "Secret Societies"', *Past & Present* 130, no. 1 (1991): 170–200; G. N. Sanderson, 'Emir Suleyman Ibn Inger Abdullah', *Sudan Notes and Records* 35, no. 1 (1954): 22–74; Elena Vezzadini, 'Spies, Secrets, and a Story Waiting to Be (Re)Told: Memories of the 1924 Revolution and the Racialization of Sudanese History', *Northeast African Studies* 13, no. 2 (2013): 53–92.

[60]Douglas H. Johnson, 'C.A. Willis and the "Cult of Deng": A Falsification of the Ethnographic Record', *History in Africa* 12 (1985): 131–50.

[61]See, for instance, the JUB.19/8/48, *Melut School Magazine, "I live for Jesus,"* No. 1, August 1948, UNP.36.F.11 (Juba Archives, Intelligence, Press & Broadcasts).

[62]Elena Vezzadini, *Lost Nationalism: Revolution, Memory and Anti-colonial Resistance in Sudan* (James Currey, 2015); Vezzadini, 'Setting the Scene of the Crime: The Colonial Archive, History, and Racialisation of the 1924 Revolution in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan', *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 49, no. 1 (2015): 67–93.

[63]Hamilton, 'Devolutionary Principles', in *The Anglo Egyptian Sudan From Within*, Hamilton, ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1935), 182.

categories by dividing the population up into a neat 'series of self-contained racial and tribal units' and limiting the influence of 'alien customs' by restricting movement.[64] The 'interdependence of the modern world', Hamilton argued, required the firm hand of imperial management, meaning greater separation and oppression.

In the 1920s, the introduction of Native Administration, with its hierarchies of chiefs and chiefs' courts, the registration of subjects and tax-assessments, the recording of court cases and efforts to codify customary law, and the mapping and demarcation of 'tribal boundaries' were efforts to re-organise Sudanese society, to put some distance between British officials and their subjects, and to cut through the complexity of alliances and personalities and draw everyone under a single, centralised chain of command that could be neatly diagrammed. The 'Native Lodging Area' at the edge of Khartoum (that Douglas Sladen visited in 1907) offered a way to make sense of this confusing situation.[65] How much easier it would be to have a people divided into tribes and separated by broad open spaces, where they could be conveniently monitored.

By the 1920s, the relationships that had tied the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan together had made a colony that was tangled and knotted in ways that colonial administrators were anxious to simplify. Reorganising South Sudanese society along the lines of Khartoum's Native Lodging Area involved the forcible relocation of villages along roads built by corvée labour. 'Pacification' was the name given to the practice of bombing settlements and forcing people to leave their homes and farms, (often by burning villages so that they could not return), and resettling them along roads, where they could be more easily supervised.[66] Establishing new relations between vision, knowledge, and power involved a great deal of force.

The next section examines sightseeing trips to Khartoum organised for South Sudanese chiefs and designed, in part, to put this machinery of violence on display. It draws heavily on an account of a trip organised in 1933 and described by Frank Derek Corfield, the District Commissioner for the Eastern Nuer, who accompanied the chiefs as a guide.[67] The records held at the archive in Juba concerning 'visits of tribal chiefs' are incomplete. Seven visits between 1926 and 1935 are recorded in the Upper Nile Province folder on 'Chiefs Visits'. These were made to Khartoum from Nasir (in 1926 and 1933), Abwong (1926), Yambio (1928), and Bor (1928). One visit from Pibor to Khartoum is undated. One visit was made to Gambela from Fashoda (by the Shilluk Reth in 1927) and one to Malakal from Akobo (1935). One visit from Waat to Khartoum, made in 1955 to provide 'a chance of seeing what is running in the Sudan', is also listed (Figure 3). These trips each brought about thirty individuals to Khartoum, where the visitors'

[64]Mawut, 1995, p. 206 n.4; Vezzadini, 2013.

[65]R. O. Collins, *Shadows in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918–1956* (Yale University Press, 1983), 54; Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, *Slaves into Workers* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 92–4.

[66]D. H. Johnson, 'Colonial Policy and Prophets', 1979.

[67]Frank Derek Corfield served in the Sudan Political Service from 1926 to 1952 as an Assistant District Commissioner, District Commissioner, Governor of the Upper Nile Province, and, then, Governor of Khartoum. He was typical of other members of the Sudan Political Service in his education, ideology, and prejudices. After an interval in Palestine and his retirement from Sudan, Corfield settled in Kenya, where he was commissioned by the colonial Kenyan government to write its official account of origins and growth of Mau Mau. Corfield's idea, in 'the Corfield Report', based on his long association with 'primitive societies', he wrote, was that the positive benefits brought by colonial rule had come so fast that they had produced 'a schizophrenic tendency in the African mind – the extraordinary facility to live two separate lives with one foot in this century and the other in witchcraft and savagery. A Kikuyu leading an apparently normal life would, in one moment, become a being that was barely human'. F. Corfield, *The Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau* (1960), 9.



Figure 3. Map of locations mentioned in the text (contemporary borders, drawn by author).

itineraries followed the same pattern. Apart from the visit in 1955, most were expressly organised to correct some perceived challenge to colonial authority.[68] In purpose, then, the visits very much recall punitive patrols, which, to achieve the greatest 'morale effect' possible, often involved aerial bombardment and machine gunning, burning houses, killing livestock, and burning or taking grain. Officials even used similar language: 'I know the many difficulties in the way', C. A. Willis wrote during budget preparations for a visit of Bor chiefs to Khartoum in 1928, to justify the expenditure; 'at the sametime [*sic*] I feel it is a pity to leave out any means of impressing these people with their incapacity to cope with the Government'.[69] Spectacle was how colonial officials discouraged rebellion.

Anglo-Egyptian officials had encouraged visits to Khartoum from the start of the nineteenth-century. In all periods, officials aimed to show off their imperial success. But during the first thirty years of colonial rule, the tone of these visits changed. Where accounts of early visits tended to cast visitors as individuals in diplomatic roles, by the late 1920s, sightseeing visits seem to have been calculated to evoke the violence of punitive patrols. Why did this style of sightseeing so quickly become popular during these years?

There is an obvious historical explanation. Thomas Cook & Son had transported soldiers and supplies for the Gordon relief expedition in 1884 and the 're-conquest' in

[68]Juba Archives, Upper Nile Province, 66/B/4.

[69]Dinka Chiefs – Proposed visit to Khartoum. Willis to Civil Secretary, Sudan Government, Khartoum. Juba Archive UNP/66-F-7. Malakal, 18-4-1929.

1898. The firm's rapid growth was made possible by profits from these imperial commissions.[70] In the period between 1904 and 1914 tourist infrastructure saw great expansion in Khartoum. The city became a popular station on Cook's Nile Tour, where 'the more adventurous could even visit battle sites and the Mahdi's tomb, and view the bones of his soldiers, bleaching in the desert sands'.[71] Khartoum was accessible to wealthy Europeans wintering in Egypt from the early 1900s onward, and saw a steady increase in tourist traffic. During the 1901–1902 season, the Railway Department's Tourist Service operated at a loss, carrying only fifty passengers, and the first hotel for tourists opened.[72] In 1904, 480 tourists passed through Khartoum; the first regatta was held, steam-trams run by the government were opened to passenger traffic, a rickshaw service was begun, and the Sudan Government Museum was opened. By 1930, the 'Bordein', a steamer that had sailed during the siege of Khartoum, had been 'refloated and reconstructed so that in outline she looked as she had done in January 1885', when Charles Wilson set out in it to try to rescue Gordon.[73] Many new roads and sights and tennis courts were built, and old museums and gardens expanded. And since colonial officials, (like everyone else), tend to get their ideas from the places that they inhabit and visit, it is not surprising that these surroundings encouraged the use of Baedeker's and Cook's guidebooks for programming 'tribal visits'.

But there is another reason why tourism appealed as a genre of travel to officials. Tourism offered a ready-made mode of encounter. Tours for South Sudanese chiefs were modelled after the fashion of the dark tourism popular among those who visited Omdurman and the battlefields of Kerreri and collected souvenirs before returning to Khartoum to stroll along the riverfront esplanade. Sightseeing tours for chiefs shared this basic feature with much tourism: a heightened attention to *difference*, whether between the tourist trip and ordinary life, between there and here or work and leisure, or between hosts and guests. Khartoum's early tourist scene drew on Orientalist tropes and was organised around the contrast between Omdurman and Khartoum. The trips

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[70]Hunter, 'Tourism and Empire', 39–42.

[71]Peter Lyth, 'Carry on Up the Nile', in *The British Abroad Since the Eighteenth Century, Vol. 1*, ed. Martin Farr and Xavier Guégan (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). On the practice of collecting war souvenirs in Sudan, and the soldier as tourist, see: Paul Fox, 'Severed Heads: The Spoils of War in the Egyptian Sudan', *Making War, Mapping Europe*, lectures (Trinity College, Dublin, October 29, 2015); P. Fox, 'An unprecedented wartime practice: Kodaking the Egyptian Sudan', *Media, War & Conflict* 11, no. 33 (2017): 309–35.

[72]Annual Reports of the Governor General on the finances, administration and condition of the Sudan. 1902. Railways Department, 172; M. W. Daly, *Empire on the Nile* (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 28. By 1904, G.E. Matthews, the Governor of Upper Nile Province, was complaining that tourist steamers were 'burn[ing] every stick of wood available'. Daly, 1986, 77. By 1914, the jarring trivialization that came with the growth of commercial tourism provided older English male travellers with a mode of establishing the authority and authenticity of their travel accounts:

> KHARTUM! It is a name which many Englishmen cannot hear, even when it is prosaically called at a railway station, without a certain thrill. To some, indeed, of my fellow-travellers … it may have meant little '*Also sind wir zuletzt am Ende!*' says the stout German … . For him, coming into the Sudan with strictly commercial aims, Khartum is only a town like any other. So it is to the American lady tourist … ; to the good-looking young Briton, bound for Gondokoro and the pursuit of big game, it is merely the starting point of a sporting expedition. (Low, 1914, 9)

All this was perhaps inevitable; the Turner Brothers had already brought out a 'Sirdar' stainless reversible carpet in 1898. For a discussion of authenticity and dark tourism, see Richard Sharpley and Philip Stone, '(Re)presenting the Macabre: Interpretation, Kitschification and Authenticity', in *The Darker Side of Travel*, ed. Sharpley and Stone (Toronto: Channel View, 2009), 109–28; on 'dissonance' and dark tourism, see Craig Wright, 'Contested National Tragedies', 129–44.

[73]Annual Reports of the Governor General. 1930, 129. The gunboats used during the re-conquest had been preserved at the Khartoum Yacht Club. The Korda brothers used these boats in filming their 1939 version of Four Feathers. 'In Fuzzy-Wuzzy Land', *New York Times*, August 6, 1939, D4. The Nile steamers were so compelling that, in addition to the popular and scholarly works that they have inspired, a website is now devoted to the Melik and Bordein (https://www.melik.org.uk/).

of the 1920s shared much with earlier visits but drew on primitivist imagery. The 'primitivist tourism' that Rupert Stasch describes is organised around the encounter of the civilised and the primitive and, with a kind of dull predictability, always evokes scenes of 'first contact'.[74] This was nostalgic colonial theatre played on an endless loop. In Khartoum, drawing on tourist scripts and images of modernity (ice and electricity, scientific dairy farming, exotic zoo animals, clothing, telephones, and aeroplanes), which were counterpoised to features of life in South Sudan, British officials carefully staged theatrical 'first encounters' between chiefs and Government power. The performance of this dichotomy was meant, in no small part, to make representations of the colonial Government as an entity standing firmly over *and apart* from its subjects persuasive.[75]

For sightseers from Europe, tourist sites in Khartoum were designed to provide support for the colonial enterprise in Sudan by continually evoking the 'fiendish atrocities' of the previous regime. Since the nineteenth-century, colonial empires have been justified as 'humanitarian interventions'. The abolition of the slave trade and defeat of tyrants and despots were held out to justify colonial annexations. In 1930, one thousand tourists visited the Khalifa's house, which had been converted into a museum. 'The little museum at Omdurman plunges the visitor straightway, by evocation, into one of the blackest, most cruel and lawless chapters of African history', Odette Keun wrote in *A Foreigner Looks at the British Sudan* (1930).

> The weapons – the thickset clumsy guns, the deadly barbed spears – the chain armour, the flags, the robes and seats of the chieftains, the old gala carriages, so carefully preserved in the small grey rooms, bear witness to a period of fiendish atrocities a living generation can still remember: the domination of the Mahdi and the worse tyranny of the Khalifa, his successor.[76]

The 'clumsy guns' displayed in the museum's dimly lighted rooms were meant to supply a stark contrast to Khartoum's wide, bright, chess-board-straight streets and the machine-like military parades described by Dickinson.

Sightseeing tours for South Sudanese chiefs were modelled on tourist itineraries for Khartoum and designed not merely to impress and entice, but to bewilder and demoralise. Chiefs were taken on a city tour with stops at sites calculated to invite comparisons with experiences in South Sudan, and to evoke a much larger imperial world. These itineraries drew heavily on what Stasch has called 'primitivist tourism'; each station was carefully staged to create a kind of 'first encounter' between 'archaicness' and 'modernity', in Stasch's terms, or provincialism or remoteness and 'the world', in the hope that the visitors from the South would come to see themselves as remote and backwards.[77]

[74]Stasch, 'Textual iconicity and the primitivist cosmos: Chronotopes of desire in travel writing about Korowai of West Papua', *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 21, no. 1 (2011): 1–21; Stasch, 'Primitivist Tourism and Romantic Individualism: On the Values in Exotic Stereotypy about Cultural Others', *Anthropological Theory* 14, no. 3 (2014): 191–214; Stasch, 'Dramas of Otherness: "First Contact" Tourism in New Guinea', *Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory* 6, no. 3 (2016): 7–27.

[75]Cherry Leonardi, 'Points of Order? Local Government Meetings as Negotiation Tables in South Sudanese History', *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 9, no. 4 (2015): 650–68.

[76]Keun, 1930, 6.

[77]Wrote Willis: 'Major Wyld Asst. District Commissioner Duk and Bor, would like to take some of his chiefs to Khartoum to go the usual round and see the world'. Dinka Chiefs – Proposed visit to Khartoum. Juba archive UNP./66-F-7. Malakal, 18-4-1929, Willis to Civil Secretary, Sudan Government, Khartoum.

August, 1933 – a trip to the zoo

The trip in August, 1933 was prompted by competition for colonial subjects between Sudan and Ethiopia and 'the need to counteract the doings of Majid Abud', who was then the Ethiopian frontier agent along the Baro.[78] Majid's provinces included Jikaany Nuer who lived part of the year in Sudan but grazed their cattle in Ethiopia for part of the year. In Sudan, Nuer were taxed and compelled to live under the authority of government-appointed chiefs. To the great frustration of Sudanese officials, Majid had been encouraging Nuer to settle permanently in Ethiopia. He handed out Ethiopian clothing and appointed at least two men to official posts.[79]

The chiefs departed Nasir on the evening of August 9th and passed under the Omdurman Bridge at Khartoum early on the morning of the 16th, seven-days later. They travelled on a small barge with cabins at the stern of the top deck for 'native passengers', which was fastened alongside a large stern-wheel steamboat named 'Kerreri'. For the journey they received a per diem of grain, beer, milk, and tobacco. Bulls were provided for meat. The barge was moored opposite the Museum at the Mogren Quays and served as their hotel for the visit.

On the afternoon of August 16th, the chiefs and their wives were given a 'grand tour' of Khartoum and Omdurman. They were taken around to see the public buildings and markets, squares, the 'grand promenade', bridges and trains and trams, gardens, statues, polo grounds and other sites. They ended the day at the zoo. The Khartoum Zoological Gardens were established in 1901, mainly to accommodate 'animals accepted by … the Governor General as complimentary presents from native personages of import', and partly to house animals caught for sale to zoos in Europe, Congo, South Africa, and elsewhere.[80] 'The time for forming a large Zoo in Khartoum has not yet come', A. L. Butler, the Superintendent of the Game Preservation Department, wrote in 1903 when the zoo was moved into the Mogren gardens, 'nor is a big establishment to rival the Cairo Gardens contemplated'. Instead, Butler recommended the collection of 'an excellent and typical small collection of local animals and birds'. Between 1903 and 1930, however, the zoo was expanded on account of its popularly among 'all classes of residents and with tourists' and because of the importance of game safaris and the wild animal trade to Sudan's economy.[81]

Like Khartoum's museums, which housed spears and drums and other gifts presented to colonial officials (or collected as grisly war souvenirs after battles), the zoo lifted animals out of circuits of diplomatic exchange and exhibited them as examples of 'characteristic local animals and birds', shorn of their histories and social entanglements. Museums, likewise, exhibited 'Natives' weapons, household utensils, musical instruments, and ornaments' as objects typical of this or that people (Shilluk, Nuer, &c.)[82] and, by doing so,

[78]Telegram from Dakhlia, Khartoum, to Governor, Malakal. (URGENT), 26.7.33. Juba Archive, 66.G.1/3, 81.

[79]Johnson, 1992; Douglas H. Johnson, 'On the Nilotic Frontier: imperial Ethiopia in the southern Sudan, 1898–1936', In *The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia: Essays in History and Social Anthropology*. Donham, D., et al., eds. (Cambridge University Press, 1986). Koryom Tut, was appointed a *fitawrari* by Majid and in 1935 taken to Addis Ababa, where he was 'presented to the emperor, and returned to his home with presents of money, arms, and ammunition'. Johnson, 1986, 230.

[80]Annual Reports of the Governor General. 1902, 109; H. J. Sharkey, 'La Belle Africaine: The Sudanese Giraffe Who Went to France', *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 49, no 1 (2015): 39–65.

[81]Annual Reports of the Governor General. 1903, 68.

[82]Annual Reports of the Governor General. 1904, 92; for an excellent discussion of how the acquisition of objects was entangled with the construction and expansion of the state and commercial networks, see Zoe Cormack, '"An Infinity

erased their histories of entanglements in diplomatic exchange. Museum displays also supported racial hierarchies and justified imperial relations by transforming evidence of diplomatic alliances into tokens of types of things. For visitors, residents, and tourists, this made it easier to imagine Sudan as a collection of 'tribal people', each with their own sort of spoon or spear, which could be arranged according to their place on a scale starting with savagery and ending with civilisation. Residents of Khartoum became used to seeing once hidden spears revealed in transparent cases, and carefully arranged royal furniture and objects, like Ali Dinar's drum, placed on public view for inspection. Tangible evidence of diplomatic exchange among allies was mostly erased, and an earlier era rooted in alliances could be forgotten.

For southern chiefs, the trip to the zoo was meant to provide a model of imperial reach in miniature. Harriet Ritvo has written about how the study of captive wild animals in zoos, 'simultaneous emblems of human mastery over the natural world and of English domination over remote territories, offered an especially vivid rhetorical means of enacting and extending the work of empire'.[83] For the chiefs, some of whom had helped to organise the capture and transportation of animals for the zoo in Khartoum from their own areas, the zoo would have been immediately legible; strange and unfamiliar animals there had been collected by others like themselves: government functionaries in *other* parts of the world under British rule.[84]

Early the following morning (Thursday, August 17th, 1933) the chiefs were collected by their lorry (leaving their wives behind on the barge) and driven to the Palace to witness a Route March and March Past 'with full band' performed by the Rifle Brigade Battalion. '[T]he March Past was a great success', Corfield wrote, 'so much so that there was a general demand that the battalion should do an About Turn and come past again'. The Rifle Brigade's display was followed by a short tour of the Palace, during which some of the objects that the British had collected in the course of conquest were shown, including 'the old drums of Sultan Ali Dinar' of Darfur, which had been annexed by a British campaign in 1916. '[N]o sooner did someone start beating these drums than a dance started. But 40 chiefs jumping up and down on the balcony was obviously more than it could stand [and] the drums were quickly stopped'. The party moved to the roof, which afforded a prospect view of Khartoum, before leaving for the armoury.

They were taken through the workshops at the armoury, where

> they were all eager to put their hands into the sparks that flew from the grind-stone in an endeavor to catch 'the fire that does not burn' [and] showed their appreciation of the

of Curious Things": unpacking collections in Italy' (South Sudan Museum Network, https://southsudanmuseumnetwork.com/2017/06/23/an-infinity-of-curious-things/).

[83]Harriet Ritvo, *The Animal Estate* (Harvard University Press, 1989), 205.

[84]The travel of chiefs from places like Nasir or Bor or Yambio, through a series of provincial headquarters, to Khartoum also recalls the 'bureaucratic pilgrimages' described by Benedict Anderson to argue that functionaries' travel from outposts to centres helped to foster a 'consciousness of connectedness' among officials as they encountered 'colleagues, from places and families he has scarcely heard of'. Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (1983), 55–6. By 1902, the zoo housed a 'Nuer bull' that had been presented to H. H. Kitchener. Annual Reports of the Governor General. 1902, 109. By July 1946, Lieut.-Col Arthur Forbes, the Game Warden, had sold more than £E.4000 worth of animals to zoological gardens, and hoped to reach £E.8000 by the end of the year (GPD/1-H-P, Game Preservation Department, Khartoum, 20th July 1946. See Juba Archive, UNP, BD131G-1, 'Animals for Zoo'. These animals were sold to zoological gardens in Congo, Antwerp, London, and elsewhere. Pre-colonial diplomatic exchanges of animals are described in Lidwien Kapteijns and Jay Spaulding, 'Pre-colonial Trade between States in the Eastern Sudan, ca 1700 – ca 1900', *African Economic History* 11 (1982): 29–62.

> stacks and stacks of rifles and ammunition with appropriate expressions of surprise and respect, Corfield reported.

This was followed by a demonstration of machine gunning at close range, 'which duly impressed them. As the Eastern Jekang possess a large number of firearms which they purchase from Abyssinia', Corfield wrote, 'they consider themselves connoisseurs of firearms so this visit was a great success'.

After the armoury, they went to the Sudan Light and Power Company's Power House in Burri (built in 1908). 'We first went into the main Power House but the machine that "made the fire that travels by wire" rather defeated them'. They were taken through the ice room and then the water treatment plant (built, 1924) to see bubbles and pipes. 'As a finale the more adventurous spirits climbed the water tower and when they arrived on the platform broke into song to the effect that the "Briton has a strong foot"', Corfield happily reported.

Then they returned to the Palace, where the party 'adjourned to the Secretariat offices for a little intercommunication telephoning'.

> They were divided up into four parties and sent to four different offices, and proceeded to telephone each other. This was a great success although one or two chiefs were quite indignant because they considered they had not heard properly.[85]

Each stop on the tour was carefully staged to create a kind of encounter between provincialism and 'the world', 'archaicness' and 'modernity' or weakness and power, all to invite comparisons between outdated Nuer firearms and the 'stacks and stacks of rifles and ammunition' held at the armoury. Displays of military and technological prowess (machine guns, electricity, telephones) were particularly popular among colonial administrators. Not surprisingly, airpower figured prominently in these tours.

Early the next morning (Friday, August 18, 1933) the chiefs were picked up and driven to the aerodrome. A pilot stationed in Khartoum, Flight-Lieutenant C. K. J. Coggle, described how chiefs were brought to Khartoum to see the armaments and aeroplanes. British officers carefully planned an 'intimidation display' that included flying in squadron formation and targeted bombing and demonstrations ('by our most accurate shots') of the Vickers and Lewis guns.[86] 'Every available man was to be turned out, including the clerks and medical orderlies, to make as imposing a show as possible', Coggle wrote.[87] The chiefs were even persuaded to climb into Fairey IIIFs and flown around above Khartoum to frighten them.

During the visit in August, 1933, a wire release broke and the bombs dangled uselessly. Annoyed, Flight-Lieutenant Poole, who was stage-managing the display, radioed another flight, which swooped over and dropped their bombs 'with considerable accuracy'. The bombing was followed up by machine gunning. 'This was in many ways more impressive as the targets were only some 100 yards away', Corfield wrote; 'although the chiefs maintained a phlegmatic exterior they were undoubtedly impressed'.

The squadron flight, targeted bombing, and machine-gun demonstrations would have had a very specific resonance for the chiefs assembled at the aerodrome. In 1928, four

[85]Corfield, 'Note … August, 1933', 46.
[86]Coggle, 'The Nuer Chiefs at Khartoum', *Royal Air Force Quarterly* 3 (1932): 177.
[87]Coggle, 1932, 174.

bi-planes had been sent to attack the prophet Gwek Ngundeng at Weideang, after Gwek refused to provide labour for a road-building scheme and his rivals spread around rumours that he meant to raise a rebellion. Weideang was the site of Ngundeng's Mound, a huge earth shrine that was the focal point of Nuer, Anuak, and Dinka religious activity in the area. On the theory that Gwek Ngundeng's authority was rooted in 'wizardry' it was thought that a flight of R. A. F. aeroplanes would provide visible proof that the Government held a greater power. Two elderly men and two-hundred cattle were killed in the attack, but the spectacle came up short. The bombs had little effect. Feeling that the residents of Weideang had not been sufficiently terrorised, Percy Coriat, the Political Officer on the patrol, sent troops to loot cattle and burn villages and fields and to gather the chiefs together to witness the demolition of the pyramid with dynamite.[88]

The next attraction was Aziz Kfouri's model farm, the former Belgravia Dairy, which Aziz had bought from the Government in 1932. The farm in Khartoum North was a popular destination for tourists, business travellers, and newly arrived colonial officials. The chiefs passed the boxy horse-drawn vans that delivered milk to hotels and British customers twice each day in glass bottles sealed with foil, enclosures of stippled Sudanese cattle and the varied offspring of English Jerseys, Red Devons and a Holstein Friesian imported by the American Mission, and finally arrived at the corral containing one of the farm's 'Thousand Galloners' that Gabriel Kfouri had kept back from the usual three a.m. milking. 'She was duly milked in front of an admiring party and the half bucket of milk she produced was passed round for them to drink'. Like other displays, this one was meant to display Nuer lives at a disadvantage: 'Although it is rich in cream the milk from a Nuer cow rarely exceeds four-five rotls', Corfield wrote.[89]

They were taken that evening to the Palace Gardens for a garden party. 'Sir Harold MacMichael who was Acting Governor General had agreed to accept from the chiefs a shield and a wedding stick with full ceremony'. He arrived at the top of the steps, where he was 'preceded by the two Standard bearers and accompanied by officials of the Civil Secretary's Office, Officers of Headquarters, Staff of Sudan Defense Force and Officers of the British Battalions'. The chiefs and their police were lined up at the bottom of the steps and, after the band had played 'God Save the King', 'Deng Dul representing Gaajak with the shield and Nyang Monyyong representing Gaajok with the Dancing stick came forward and presented them to the Acting Governor General'. MacMichael 'touched' each man, thanked them for visiting, and wished them a safe journey home. After a short dance, the chiefs returned to their barge. They left the following morning (Saturday, August 19, 1933) by the 11 am Post Boat.[90]

[88]Guek Ngundeng first attracted the attention of officials in 1920–21 when it was reported that people were coming from far afield and 'circumventing the inspector at Nasir to have their disputes settled' at Weideang by Guek. This raised government suspicions, placing him in competition with officials over the authority to issue judgements and settle disputes. D. H. Johnson, 'Judicial Regulation and Administrative Control', *The Journal of African History* 27, no. 1 (1986): 59–78; Corfield later published his account of the 1928 patrol against Guek. Coriat later published an account of the patrol. Coriat, 'Gwek, the Witch-Doctor and the Pyramid of Denkgur', *Sudan Notes and Records* 22, no. 2 (1939): 221–37. The first plans to use folding-wing seaplanes in swampy parts of South Sudan, (which were out of the range of gunboats and where the soft ground impeded patrols on horseback), were drawn up by the Royal Air Corps in 1916 after the use of airpower against Ali Dinar in Darfur (SAD 200/3/92). In 1920, two infantry columns and two D.H.9 aeroplanes were taken up the Nile River to Nasir on barges and used to strafe and machine gun Garjak Nuer villages and cattle camps of the Sobat District. David Killingray, '"A Swift Agent of Government"': Air Power in British Colonial Africa, 1916–1939', *The Journal of African History* 25, no. 4 (1984): 432; Richard Barltrop, 'Lessons from the Past? Approaches to Conflict and Peace in Sudan, 1899–1955', Working Paper (University of Durham, 2015).

[89]Corfield, 'Note … August, 1933', 46.

[90]Corfield, 'Note … August, 1933', 47.

Conclusion

When I first encountered an itinerary and telegrams related to budgeting for a 'tribal visit' in the archives in Juba in 2009, I was struck by the great effort that had been put into representing the Upper Nile plains as remote, and how the visits not only primitivised and romanticised but also simply normalised this view Nuer country. This was quite a turnaround from only two decades earlier when colonial documents stressed the problem of the region's striking interconnectedness. Early colonial reports were full of named individuals and focused on the lively trade in guns and ivory, and the international intrigues of Russians, French, and Ethiopians, and rumours of 'secret agents'.[91] In 1912, returning from Sobat, Bimbashi G. B. Wauhope, wrote to the Governor of the Upper Nile Province about how '[r]egular depots have again been formed in GARJAK where rifles and cattle are exchanged for ivory … . [I] myself saw Dinkas from AGEIR, Shulluks, Nuers from the Zeraf, Dinkas from DUNJOL, [and] Twi and BOR Dinkas come here to trade'.[92] A network of rural roads and tracks cut across the region in every direction. These paths were the arteries that integrally linked the Upper Nile plains and moved cattle, grain, salt, copper, brass, ornaments, cloth, tobacco, ivory, guns, ammunition, and other materials along routes older than living memory, connecting distant places like Gondokoro – near the contemporary city of Juba in southernmost South Sudan – and Bor to the Ethiopian highlands, Fazogli, Sennar and more distant places: India, Egypt, France, and England.[93] By 1933, roughly seventy percent of Sudan's imports from Ethiopia passed through Nasir on steamboats carrying rubber, coffee, and beeswax from Gambella during the Ethiopian rainy season (June to October) when the river was high enough for steamer transport.[94]

During good harvest years in Nasir, most people's food was grown within walking distance. But during bad years, people relied on networks of reciprocity and obligation, far flung ties of marriage and friendship that enabled people to obtain cattle and grain during times of shortage. The ivory and gun trades were different, but followed the same paths worn by mutual aid. Both trades were restricted in the early 1930s by violent pacification campaigns during which officials duly divided up multilingual communities into a series of rigid tribal administrative units; large numbers of Dinka, who had settled in areas designated by colonial authorities as Lou Nuer, were forcibly relocated and marched west to join Ghol and Nyarweng Dinka near Duk Fayuil.[95] A wide 'No-

[91]Juba Archive UNP/SCR/5/5, gun running, illicit, 1910; SIR 106, May 1903, 3; Sanderson, 'Emir Suleyman Ibn Inger Abdullah', 22–74.

[92]'Gun Running', Bimbashi G.B. Wauhope to Governor, Upper Nile Province, Abwong, 4.5.1912, (UNP/SCR/5/5), unpaginated.

[93]Eisei Kurimoto, 'Trade Relations between Western Ethiopia and the Nile Valley during the Nineteenth Century', *Journal of Ethiopian Studies*, 28, no. 1 (1995): 53–68.

[94]Bahru Zewde, 'An Overview and Assessment of Gambella Trade (1904–1935)', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 20, no. 1 (1987): 77. Indeed, I suspect that for officials, new forms of connection (the post boat, telegraph lines, air travel) afforded new experiences of 'remoteness' each time the mail was delayed, or telegraph lines disrupted, or an aeroplane was unable to land on a sodden airfield.

[95]The region around Weideang was designated as Lou Nuer. To the west, the country lying between the Bahr al Jabal and Bahr al Zaraf was designated as Gaawar Nuer. These Nuer settlements were interspersed and intermarried with older Dinka communities, whose members often adopted the Nuer language and patterns of scarification, which were forcibly relocated to Ghol and Nyarweng areas near Duk Fayuil. John Winder, the Deputy Governor of the Upper Nile Province, later wrote that '[h]ad it not been for the present Government there would have been no Dinka-Nuer boundary in this area – as I have often heard stated by both sides'. J. Winder, 'Local Government Set up for Gaweir-Nyarwend and Ghol and Lau', Juba Archive, UNP/1-A-38/3 (20 January 1951), 31; Douglas H. Johnson, 'Tribal Boundaries and Border Wars: Nuer–Dinka Relations in the Sobat and Zaraf Valleys, c. 1860–1976', *The Journal of African History* 23 (1982): 183–203.

Man's Land' was cut between them, and for a time severed the ties that had been maintained for many years. These actions made it possible for anthropologists like Evans-Pritchard to picture the region as isolated and composed of sharply defined ethnic groups whose relations were sporadic and violent.[96]

This 'artificial isolation'[97] of the south also made it possible to see South Sudan as a place without a history and to represent Khartoum as a microcosm of the larger 'world', a sort of miniature colonial metropole, with its own distinctive architecture, society, characters, rituals and displays, where the relations between the centre and its hinterland could be re-defined and put on view for visitors. The remoteness of South Sudan was something that had to be made. The great effort that went into doing so provides a useful lesson about 'the isolation of South Sudan' and the idea that isolation was the natural condition of 'traditional' societies, as though the interactions between them were exceptional – a series of sudden intrusions for which they were wholly unprepared, and for this reason required the guidance of colonial management.[98] Like images of the remoteness of South Sudan (still) popular in the international press, static models of 'traditional tribal authority' were only available to colonial officials by the 1920s; this vision was a creation of colonial power, rather than something which preceded it.[99]

Also threaded through Corfield's account of the visit is a desire for the chiefs to gawp at British things. Writing about colonial Sudan is full of speculation about the impression made by machines and machine-like order: the 'square' and military review, machine guns, mechanical toys, clocks and trains. This is empathy without sympathy. Partly it was practical. 'Government prestige' was mainly a matter of maintaining a credible threat of violence. The crucial thing was not just that heavily armed men would show up wherever there was any sort of open challenge to colonial authority, but that everyone knew that they would, indeed, arrive quickly. Comyn, an administrator in Wau in 1906, for example, wrote about how, 'by way of impressing them', he had sent 'two cannibal sheikhs of importance, Bazimbi and Bokoti, … to Khartum. On their return they swaggered more than if they had discovered the North Pole'. 'Imagine', Comyn wrote,

> the workings of a mind to whom a riding animal is unknown, a gun one of less than an inch in bore, a straw hut a palace, and the British race four or five officers, being allowed to travel on a steamer in unknown comfort and speed for days, passing post after post, to arrive in Khartum to see the cavalry exercising, the, to him, monster buildings, to hear cannons roaring salutes, and to lose count of the white faces that pass him. Will a man with this experience go back to his people, jeer at our makeshifts at Wau, sacrifice a chicken, and say, 'there are but five white men to lead the men whose fathers have been our slaves for generations.'?[100]

It is not hard to understand why the officials of a regime that periodically machine-gunned and burned villages would fear for their safety and wish to impress people with the

[96]Douglas H. Johnson, 'Political Ecology in the Upper Nile: The Twentieth Century Expansion of the Pastoral "Common Economy"', *Journal of African History* 30 (1989): 463–86.
[97]Johnson, 1989, 481.
[98]Douglas H. Johnson, 'The Future of the Southern Sudan's Past', *Africa Today* 28, no. 2 (1981): 33–41.
[99]This view very much recalls much contemporary post-conflict reconstruction. Naseem Badiey, *The State of Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Rochester, NY: James Curry, 2014). By the 1930s, South Sudan's interconnections and polyglot settlements could be reimagined as 'tribal confusion', as if prior social institutions had been erased by the dislocations of the slave trade.
[100]Comyn, *Service and Sport*, 270.

repercussions of doing them harm. But the spectacle of Nuer chiefs in Khartoum touched deeper anxieties. Ideas about the naturalness of hierarchy, difference and racial supremacy were crucial to colonial rule, because otherwise European claims to colonial possessions had little foundation. In colonial Sudan, as in other similar places elsewhere, technological expertise was held out to justify British rule. British administrators were thus anxious for colonial subjects to gawp and wonder at mechanical innovations, so that by doing so they could be seen to consent to British rule by seeming to acknowledge the superiority of their technological things.

Why restage the ‘colonial encounter’ in this fashion? The consistency and popular appeal of orientalist representations of the Mahdist war and primitivist images of South Sudan suggest more than just a fascination with the macabre and the exotic. These performances of the colonial encounter suggest deeper insecurities about the integrity of colonial rule. During the early years of colonial rule, the ‘notables’ who arrived in Omdurman and Khartoum had some power to shape the course of empire. With the end of the last ‘pacification’ campaigns in 1927–30, officials were much less obliged to concern themselves with individual colonial subjects. By the late 1920s, the city afforded new forms of display. The tour of 1933 did not merely bring people from one place to another, it was also very much about the relationship between the colonial centre and the colony’s outermost edges. The ways that empire was the outcome of alliances and exchanges was reinvented. Material evidence of earlier diplomacy was placed in museums and zoos, where, like the ancient ruins that tourists visited outside of Khartoum, a more tangled-up history could be forgotten. For the officials who staged such displays the image of encounter provided reassurance that they had put a disturbing past behind them and moved into a more ‘modern’ condition, where they did not require the assistance of Sudanese allies.

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