Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

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Articulated sovereignty: Extending Mozambican state power through the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park[☆,1]

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ABSTRACT

Since its inception in 2001 and subsequent integration into the tri-national Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP), Mozambique's Limpopo National Park (LNP) has been progressively transformed into a functioning wildlife park. Standing behind this transformation has been a profound expansion of Mozambican state power over and through the park. While this reinforces predictions in the early transfrontier conservation literature, it stands in tension with observations that these projects threaten state power. I address this tension by developing the concept of articulated sovereignty, which understands sovereignty as a heterogenous set of powers that are produced through often unequal interactions with other actors, including foreign or extra-territorial actors. In short, sovereignty is articulated through these interactions. I draw from this to show that the same partnerships that seem to threaten sovereignty in some respects in fact shore up the power of the Mozambican state in other respects. I focus in particular on the foreign-assistance-enabled extension of state power through the development of legal and technical capacity, park administration and infrastructure, a ranger force, and the relocation of communities beyond park borders. I additionally draw on articulated sovereignty to show that the state and territory, like sovereignty, are built through various articulations with extra-territorial partners, thus drawing into question the sovereignty-state-territory triad. I close by reflecting on the utility of articulated sovereignty beyond the realm of conservation. In short, articulated sovereignty sheds light on both the sovereignty complexities of transfrontier conservation projects like the LNP/GLTP and how sovereignty actually plays out in the world.

In 2008, seven years after the opening of Mozambique's Limpopo National Park (LNP), Vicente sat down to describe how the park had been impacting his village of Massingir Velho, now encompassed within park borders. He began by describing the damage caused to the community's farms by elephants, which had only recently been reintroduced into the area. Translocated from South Africa's Kruger National Park, elephants and other large game were brought in to restock the LNP given the ecological destruction of the country's "civil" war. The combined effect of the weakness and policies of the postcolonial state, Apartheid South Africa's project of regional destabilization, and the larger geopolitical context of the Cold War, from 1977 until 1992 Mozambique was embroiled in a brutal conflict. It had left over a million people dead,

destroyed state capacity at a harrowing level, and devastated much of the country's wildlife (Hatton, Couto, & Oglethorpe, 2001; Lunstrum, 2009; Minter, 1994). In addition to helping rehabilitate wildlife in the LNP, this reintroduction of elephants was a much-celebrated event tied to the creation of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP), which built in 2002, unites the LNP with Kruger and Zimbabwe's Gonarezhou National Park into a 35,000 km^2 mega-park (Fig. 1). After expressing his concerns over the elephants, Vicente redirected his critique to the Mozambican state. He strongly objected to the fact that killing wildlife, including invading elephants, translated into fines or jail time and even beatings by park police. And he should know. Vicente, himself, had been beaten and arrested for killing an animal and for suspicion of harboring an illegal firearm. Furthermore, the park administration was planning on relocating villages like Massingir Velho beyond park borders. Vicente uttered with more than a hint of resignation, "[the park administration] said we should leave the park... We are not going to stay here because this place has been sold." His experience made clear, especially set against the lack of national state power in the aftermath of the war, that the state by means of

the park had consolidated its power over this area and had done so at an unprecedented level. It had not only sold the land from Vicente's perspective, forcing the village to relocate. It had fundamentally rewritten the purpose of this space as it becomes a functioning national park: more precisely, a protected home to wildlife, a site of tourist consumption and economic development, a key piece of the larger transfrontier park, and no longer a site of village life.

In many ways, this extension of state power fits into a well-established pattern of state institutions securing control over a space in the name of conservation and development. It also reflects early predictions that transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs) like the GLTP would indeed consolidate state sovereignty over these spaces. It nonetheless stands in tension with suggestions that foreign or extra-territorial actors backing these projects have the potential to threaten if not erode state sovereignty. In light of such suggestions, how do we explain this apparent firming up of state power? Put differently, how do we explain the tension in which these initiatives seem to both strengthen and threaten state power? More concretely, set against both the evisceration of the state during the war and the undeniable influence of powerful extra-territorial actors, how has the Mozambican state been able to consolidate its power at such an unprecedented scale? More broadly, what insight does such a case awash in sovereignty complexities shed on the very concept of sovereignty and how it actually plays out in the world?

I address these questions by developing the concept of *articulated sovereignty*. It shows that sovereignty, rather than an abstract concept that a state clearly possesses or lacks, is better understood as a set of attributes, competencies, and powers that are actively and routinely produced through a series of unequal interactions and negotiations with other actors, including other state and extra-state actors. In other words, sovereignty is articulated through these connections. What we see in practice is that the competencies or powers that do get articulated via these interactions are multiple, contingent, have different targets and spatialities, can potentially threaten one another, and may be gained by compromising other powers. Such an understanding of sovereignty helps us make sense of the complexity of the extension of Mozambican power through the LNP/GLTP and particularly the tension in which state power is seemingly both threatened and strengthened through such projects. More specifically, articulated sovereignty helps us grasp that the extra-territorial partnerships through which the park is created may simultaneously threaten sovereignty on some registers, especially the ability to exclude foreign influence, and shore up the power of the Mozambican state on other registers, including the power over territory, as well as populations, and ultimately the ability to (re)invent territory. By delving into these

Fig. 1. Southern Africa's Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP).

complexities, we see that the sovereignty tension of the LNP/GLTP rests not merely in transfrontier conservation or state practices more broadly; it lies in the heart of the concept of sovereignty. We also see that not only is sovereignty articulated through these extra-territorial negotiations, so too are state and territory.

After drawing from the sovereignty debates to develop the concept of articulated sovereignty, I explore the question of state power in the transfrontier conservation literature, examining seemingly contradictory claims that these projects threaten and consolidate state control. Drawing on the concept of articulated sovereignty, I then examine how Mozambican state power over the LNP is largely articulated through the very partnerships that are thought to threaten it. I illustrate this through an examination of the development of national institutional capacity, park infrastructure, the creation of a ranger force, and the resettlement of communities beyond park borders. Finally, I draw from this case to reflect more broadly on the concept of sovereignty and the related concepts of state and territory. In the process, I offer a glimpse into a (trans)national park in the making.

Articulated sovereignty

Much of the mainstream international relations literature and many popular understandings of sovereignty posit it as primarily a legal concept, or *de jure* sovereignty, that refers to a state's unlimited and indivisible rule over its territory. A growing body of critical scholarship has shown that *de facto* or effective sovereignty—that is, the actual ability to exercise power—is far messier and less containable than this juridical definition allows. By opening up the concept to include the ability to exercise power, scholars have shown that sovereignty is a heterogenous collection of practices, concepts, and discourses (Elden, 2006; Krasner, 2001; Kuus, 2002; McConnell, 2009; Sidaway, 2003). Krasner (2001, p. 21) adds that, even from a contemporary perspective, sovereignty is a decisively inconsistent concept, "a basket of goods that do not necessarily go together." In fact, he locates four distinct meanings of the term (pp. 19–21): interdependence sovereignty, which "refers to the ability of states to control movement across their borders"; domestic sovereignty, which "refers to the authority structures within states and of the ability of these structures to effectively regulate behavior"; Vattelian sovereignty, more commonly known as Westphalian sovereignty, which "refers to the exclusion of external sources of authority"[2]; and international legal sovereignty, which "refers to mutual recognition." While not his intention, Krasner's distinctions help us see that sovereignty in practice is comprised of different and not always consistent powers with different targets, ranging from excluding foreign influence to maintaining internal order. Hence, building from Krasner's distinctions, articulated sovereignty understands sovereignty not merely as a heterogenous set of powers to make and enforce decisions. It also recognizes that these powers have different targets and spatialities and are not necessarily reducible to or consistent with one another.

But in what sense is sovereignty articulated? To grasp this, it is useful to disaggregate sovereignty from the closely related concepts of state and territory. While scholars have tended to assume that sovereignty is necessarily territorial and exercised by central state authorities (Agnew, 1994, 2005; Biersteker, 2002), others have questioned the seemingly necessary sovereignty-state-territory relation. McConnell (2009), for instance, insightfully shows that the exiled Tibetan state exercises forms of sovereignty that are not territorial in any straightforward sense, with Jones (2009) examining sovereignty in extra-territorial political enclaves along the India–Bangladesh border. Agnew (2005) and Appadurai (1996), in addition, suggest that sovereignty functions in a networked fashion, disrupting the idea it only works across tightly bound

territories. Ong (2000), moreover, develops the concept of graduated sovereignty to make sense of instances where state institutions temporarily cede power to foreign corporations within special economic zones. Her work highlights both the ways in which non-state actors exercise sovereignty and how power relations produce differentiated types of territory—sub-territories—defined by different modes of control. Together, these analyses offer important insights into non-straightforwardly-territorial and non- or ambiguously-state-based forms of sovereignty.

This unhinging of sovereignty from the state and territory provides important grounding for articulated sovereignty. Working from the premise that sovereignty is a set of competencies or powers, what enables or hinders these is a larger arrangement of negotiations and interactions among various actors: intra-state, extra-state, and non-state. Sovereignty as a set of powers or abilities is, simply put, *articulated* through these interactions. Hence actually-existing sovereignty does not pre-exist this extra-territorial network of interactions and connections (Bayart, 2000; Biersteker, 2002; Sidaway, 2003). It is created through them. Articulated sovereignty thus gives both a better understanding of how effective sovereignty functions and how and where it is constituted in the first place, a constitution that takes us beyond the state. Building from here, articulated sovereignty lays bare other important features of sovereignty. First, all sovereignty is contingent on how these actors, their interests, and larger sets of laws, discourses, etc. come together (c.f., Elden, 2006).[3] Second, because these negotiations are ongoing, sovereignty is never a complete project and must be constantly negotiated and reconsolidated through these negotiations; sovereignty is, in short, an articulation-in-motion. Third, not all actors in these negotiations are equal, and hence sovereignty negotiations are shot through with power disparities. These inequities along with the fact that actors do not come with identical interests means that the powers that get articulated are not necessarily reducible to or consistent with one another. More than this though, as the case of the LNP/GLTP illustrates, these powers can be gained by negotiating or even compromising other powers with the different actors. So while we may clump these powers together as "sovereignty," this only gives the aura of singularity and internal consistency.

The case of the LNP/GLTP, however, seems somewhat at odds with these investigations working to disaggregate sovereignty from state and territory. Simply put, I want to relocate sovereignty in the Mozambican state and in a given (semi)bounded, sub-national territory: a (trans)national park. Again, by understanding sovereignty as a set of powers articulated through interactions among various actors located within and beyond the state, I show how these interactions actually produce a new state in the realm of conservation, that is, a greatly empowered Mozambican state and one nearly unrecognizable from its predecessor left shattered by the war. In addition, these extra-territorial interactions produce new types of territory, in this case a (trans)national park. Hence, while I ultimately relocate sovereignty in the Mozambican state and over national territory, I draw into question the sovereignty-state-territory triad by showing how all three elements are articulated in part through extra-territorial interactions.

Sovereignty and the LNP/GLTP

Background to the LNP and GLTP

While the idea of creating a transnational conservation area in south-eastern Africa emerged in the 1920s, it was not until the 1990s that the idea regained traction. In 1990 a South African delegation began discussing with Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano the possibility of linking Kruger National Park to

Mozambique's Coutada 16 (a largely defunct colonial-era hunting reserve) and later Zimbabwe's Gonarezhou National Park. Growing out of these meetings, a working group submitted a proposal to the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), affiliated with the World Bank, to further study the feasibility of the project. The final report determined that conservation should indeed be a high priority for Mozambique especially given the ecological destruction of the war. The project was further assisted by the end of the war in 1992, followed shortly by the fall of Apartheid in South Africa and the semi-privatization of land in Mozambique, seen as essential to attracting private investment (Lunstrum, 2008; World Bank, 1996, 2006). After further negotiations, in 2001 the Mozambican government gazetted Coutada 16 into the Limpopo National Park (LNP), which was soon followed by the inauguration of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP). Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) across sub-Saharan Africa, of which the GLTP is the flagship project, have garnered significant support given that they promise to secure multiple goals simultaneously. These range from large-scale conservation and economic development, including community-based development and opportunities for private investors, to the promotion of cooperation and peaceful relations between member countries (Peace Parks Foundation, 2012a; Ramutsindela, 2007; Wolmer, 2003).

TFCAs, the GLTP, and threats to state sovereignty

While still a young body of scholarship, a central concern permeating the TFCA literature is how these projects reorganize power relations at various scales—from the community, to the state, to the transnational realm—and with what impact. In this respect, a tension has emerged, with some critics suggesting these projects violate or otherwise threaten sovereignty of the member states, and others arguing the seeming opposite: that they shore up state power. Building from both perspectives and the concept of articulated sovereignty, I show that it is precisely through many of the partnerships that are thought to threaten state power that the Mozambican state has been able to extend its control over the LNP and, more broadly, reinvent itself and territory, i.e., a national park.

One of the most acute anxieties underlying the creation of TFCAs is that they have the potential to impinge upon national autonomy, leaving some countries reluctant to sign on to such projects (van Amerom, 2002; Duffy, 1997; van der Linde, Oglethorpe, Sandwith, Snelson, & Tessema, 2001). In fact, such fears shaped project negotiations as far back as the 1920s, with apprehensions resurfacing in the 1990s (Interview with former GLTP official, 2012; Duffy, 1997; Mavhunga & Spierenburg, 2009; Spierenburg, Steenkamp, & Wels, 2008). As a result, the 2002 treaty establishing the GLTP is resolute that the signatories "recogniz[e] the principle of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of their states" (Preamble) and that the "sovereign rights of each [state] shall be respected, and no [state] shall impose decisions on another" (Article 5, §1).

Despite such guarantees, critics point out that TFCAs like the GLTP have the potential to threaten national sovereignty—particularly the state's ability to make its own decisions over its national territory—through several practices. These range from the need to cede a certain degree of decision-making capacity to a supra-national decision-making body (such as the GLTP's Joint Management Board) and harmonize laws and policies at the supra-national level, to more general negotiations with other member states and project funders. In terms of the latter, the LNP/GLTP has been funded almost entirely by international donors, including the German Development Bank (KfW), French Development Agency (AFD), and World Bank. Reflecting broader concerns over the impact of international donors on state power, the worry is that donor assistance inevitably comes with strings attached or conditionalities that impinge upon the decision-making capacity of the national government. Indeed, this is a concern voiced by scholars and Mozambican conservation officials alike (van Amerom, 2002; van Amerom & Büscher, 2005; Duffy, 2006; Interviews, 2004, 2005) and is reflective of a deeper unease that sovereignty has lost much of its meaning for a profoundly aid-dependent country like Mozambique (Batley, 2005; Plank, 1993).

In the context of TFCAs in southern Africa, there is an even greater concern regarding South Africa's presumed dominance, in terms of both state offices and NGOs, especially the highly-influential Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) (van Amerom & Büscher, 2005; Ramutsindela, 2007; Wolmer, 2003). Several critics have argued that such domination translates into a threat to the sovereignty of other member states, suggesting a "partnership" of unequals. van Amerom (2002), for instance, is explicit that South African dominance is likely to compromise the GLTP treaty provision that "no [state] shall impose decisions on another." More concretely and arguably the most compelling and well-cited example, critics point to how the South African Department of Environment and Tourism (DEAT) backed by the PPF (and German funders) essentially forced Mozambique to accept a quite restrictive transfrontier park and, related, demanded communities be relocated outside the LNP. This is despite the fact that GLTP member countries initially agreed to create a multi-use conservation area that would allow human habitation and the sustainable use of resources (van Amerom & Büscher, 2005; Büscher & Schoon, 2009; Interview with LNP funder, 2012; RRP-UW, 2002; Spierenburg et al., 2008). In addition, critics point to the fact that the PPF, through its links with DEAT, forced the Mozambican government to open the LNP before the country was ready, essentially interfering with its ability to decide what would happen within the park and when (Groenewald, 2002; RRP-UW, 2002). Duffy (2006) offers the most well-developed of these arguments. Charting more general trends in how NGOs are transforming power relations through transfrontier conservation negotiations, she argues that NGOs like the PPF "are part of a process of shifting responsibility for conservation *out of state hands* and into the hands of non-state entities and complex, non-territorial networks of governance" (p. 96; emphasis added). Taken together, these investigations leave us with an understanding of (Mozambican) state power left threatened or eroded by foreign "partners."

Such critiques raise the question of what exactly is understood to be producing this reorganization of authority that threatens or displaces state power. Some critics locate the answer partially in the rise of multi-national governing bodies and the dominance of the South African state as we saw above. A more substantial answer rests in a larger shift toward neoliberal conservation in which non-state actors—especially NGOs, international financial organizations, and private interests—have proliferated and taken on roles once held more centrally by state actors (see especially van Amerom, 2002; van Amerom & Büscher, 2005; Duffy, 2006; also see Büscher, 2010; Igoe & Brockington, 2007; Ramutsindela, 2007; Wolmer, 2003). None of these critics, however, suggest that state power is fully extinguished through this expansion of non-state actors.

TFCAs, the GLTP, and the consolidation of state sovereignty

Seemingly at odds with suggestions that TFCAs threaten or erode state sovereignty, other perspectives emerging especially in the early TFCA literature contend that these initiatives extend and firm up state power. Although unable to offer much concrete evidence, their analyses are nonetheless provocative. Focusing on TFCAs in southern Africa and Central America, Duffy (2001, p. 2) argues that even though in theory these projects may shift power

from the state, in reality they "assist in extending state power over areas that had previously been beyond the reach of law enforcement and other government agencies" and hence amount to acts of transboundary state-making (also see Wolmer, 2003). Duffy foresees this translating into the foreclosure of unsanctioned activities located at the international border, especially smuggling, poaching, and undocumented migration. van Amerom (2002, p. 266) comes to a similar conclusion, contending that African states may "*increase their sovereignty*" through these projects. While providing little detail, she proposes that this can happen through increased state policing as well as the development of infrastructure, which can facilitate state access.

These contributions reflect a larger scholarly concern with how environmental projects, including conservation projects, consolidate state power and amount to acts of state-making more broadly. For instance, scholars show how states discursively construct "vacant" or "ecologically sensitive" lands, claim ownership of them, delimit and declare "protected areas," physically reinvent them, and move in to control natural resources and populations within their borders. We see such practices unfolding in sites as diverse as forests, wildlife parks, urban parks, and even community-based natural resource projects where state power has presumably been devolved to the community level (Neumann, 1998, 2004; Rademacher, 2008; Schafer & Bell, 2002; Sivaramakrishnan, 1999; Vandergeest & Peluso, 1995). This vision of enhanced state power in the TFCA and critical conservation-environment literature stands in tension with observations above that TFCAs threaten state sovereignty. In fact, this friction is found in the work of Duffy (2001, 2006) and van Amerom (2002) who both argue at different times that these projects may strengthen and threaten state power, yet who leave the underlying tension largely unexamined. Building on the concept of articulated sovereignty and my own empirical research, I use this tension as a springboard to show that the Mozambican state is able to extend its power over the space of the LNP/GLTP precisely through many of the partnerships with foreign actors that in other respects seem to threaten its power. In short, I show how state sovereignty is built in and through the LNP/GLTP and examine the complexities and impacts of the underlying and unequal sovereignty negotiations.

Extending state power within and through the LNP/GLTP

To understand the extension of Mozambican state power through the LNP/GLTP, we must first turn back to the early assistance provided by the World Bank through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). While they determined that transfrontier conservation should be a high priority, one factor stood as a momentous obstacle: the profound lack of Mozambican institutional capacity especially at the national level to promote conservation and related development (World Bank, 1992). The reason, recognized by the Bank, was the war: it had decimated wildlife populations and destroyed state capacity to rehabilitate their numbers, let alone promote wildlife-related development. Most state-led conservation institutions and activities had collapsed, infrastructure was largely destroyed, and funding had nearly disappeared (Hatton et al., 2001; World Bank, 1992, 1996). In the face of such profound institutional weakness, in 1996 the World Bank/GEF helped develop and fund the USD$5 million "Mozambique Transfrontier Conservation Areas Pilot and Institutional Strengthening Project." As the project's name suggests, institutional strengthening, i.e., the strengthening of state capacity at the national level, was the *sine qua non* for the development of conservation areas within Mozambique, transfrontier or otherwise (World Bank, 1996).

Significant funding went to the project's institutional and policy development component, which enabled the state to engage in collaborations with international actors, including donors, and with the private sector, NGOs, and communities. This component, moreover, worked to:

> [b]uild the capacity (through training of staff, provision of technical advisory services and logistical support, including vehicles, equipment, office supplies and refurbishing and study tours and twining arrangements) of [the] national government (within the Ministry of Agriculture and later in the newly created Ministry of Tourism) to fulfill its mandate of policy formulation, planning and technical guidance, and provide support to provincial and local government (through training, technical assistance and logistical support) [in three TFCAs including the GLTP's precursor of Gazaland-Kruger] (World Bank, 1996, p. 2).

The project additionally helped identify, delineate, and zone protected areas including Coutada 16 (the LNP's precursor), develop initial management plans, rehabilitate infrastructure including roads and staff housing, enable community involvement, and finally monitor and evaluate the program. Given its success, at a cost of USD$36.7 million, the Bank instituted Phase II of the project to further strengthen institutional capacity (Interviews with Ministry of Tourism officials, 2004–2005, 2008; World Bank, 2004, 2006).

Keeping in mind the extremely limited power of the Mozambican state after the war, this project ultimately helped build a state capable of designating and making decisions about new land-use categories including TFCAs. In fact, the money along with assistance from the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) helped create the Transfrontier Conservation Areas Unit, an influential state institution responsible for organizing, promoting, and overseeing these projects. The Unit is housed within the Mozambican Ministry of Tourism, which itself emerged only in 2001 partially through these larger institutional changes. In short, the World Bank, seen by some as threatening the sovereignty of the Mozambican state, has built national-level state institutions and provided them with various resources—financial, technical, legal, and infrastructural—that have enabled the extension of state power over existing and potential conservation areas. This, however, is only the beginning of the story.

Other partners including donors and South African institutions, again criticized for threatening Mozambican power, have been working with and indeed strengthening Mozambican state institutions more locally within the LNP. Their assistance helps consolidate Mozambican state power over this new territory to regulate it and, more fundamentally, reinvent it as a (trans)*national* park, i.e., a state-owned conservation space. This assistance begins with the development of a park administration and basic infrastructure. The LNP Warden is backed by an administration heavily funded by the PPF, including two PPF-financed South African "technical advisors" who are high-raking officials within the administration.[4] This includes the LNP Project Manager who runs the day-to-day operations of the park and oversees much of its developments as well as an advisor who is effectively the head of wildlife and security (Interviews with LNP officials, 2009, 2012). They bring to the LNP expertise in how to create and regulate a national park and are closely involved with the sovereignty-extending activities I turn to below.

Key to the transformation of the LNP into a full-fledged national park is infrastructure development, including roads, fences, and administrative buildings. Although sponsored initially by the World Bank, these are now largely financed by KfW (the German Development Bank) whose €22 million investment, managed by the PPF,

makes it the LNP's largest single donor. These seemingly mundane types of infrastructure should not be underestimated when it comes to state-making and state-extending. The newly-built administrative complex at the LNP headquarters now houses senior park administration, teams in charge of community development, community relocation, buffer zone development, and wildlife and security, including rangers and anti-poaching specialists, all in one central location. This new office infrastructure both symbolically marks the presence of the state and enables state agents to inhabit the park and engage in the everyday decision-making, development, and maintenance of the park. In a very material sense, it allows for the consolidation of state power through the day-to-day micro- and macro-activities that turn the space into a (trans)national park.

The development of a road network within the LNP equally facilitates the extension of state power, reflecting a broader pattern in which roads are used as a means of state-making (Kezer, 2009). The location of roads in the LNP largely reflects tourist desires, namely desires for wildlife viewing, embodied in an expanding network of 4 × 4 roads, and desires for cross-border mobility, embodied in the new Giriyondo Road linking the LNP with Kruger (Fig. 2). This expansion, however, also facilitates the circulation of park staff, ranging from wildlife specialists and administrators to park rangers. It enables them to build new infrastructure, hence further transforming the space into a national park, and to engage in routine surveillance and regulation of both people and wildlife deeper into the park. Such infrastructure allows for the extension of state power in a more subtle manner as well. The LNP administration is currently developing a new 4 × 4 camp in a remote pan, despite the objection of several ecologists who see this as an important location for wildlife. A senior LNP official explained that not only is this what makes the space a prime location for tourists, but also that the presence of tourists will keep bush meat poachers away (Interview, 2012). Hence, the location of infrastructure, in this case a camp and the road leading to it, has the added benefit of increasing state surveillance and policing by enrolling the (unknowing) assistance of tourists.

The most explicit evidence of the extension of state power in the LNP rests in the newly-instituted ranger force. Funding from KfW and AFD has enabled the recruiting, hiring, training, and housing of rangers, and provided them with protective uniforms and gear. Formed, trained, and clothed via donor support, the responsibility for paying the rangers has now been transferred to the state, which also provides them with high-caliber firearms, mainly AK-47s, to use on patrol. Currently the park has 110 rangers—compared to none in the days of the *coutada* during the war—of whom 45 are guards and 55 field rangers. The latter move through the park to enforce rules and monitor the park's recently reintroduced wildlife (Interview with LNP officials and rangers, 2012; Peace Parks Foundation, 2012b).

Partially reflecting Duffy's (2001) prediction, LNP rangers spend significant time on anti-poaching patrols. These are related to bush meat trade and subsistence poaching but especially to rhino poaching due to unprecedented demand for rhino horn in Asia. While the actual killing of rhino takes place in Kruger, which houses the vast majority of the world's remaining population, LNP rangers run anti-poaching patrols in their own park, given that some poachers reside in communities inside the LNP and many more move across this space to enter Kruger. Aided by the Environmental Crime Investigation Unit of South Africa National Parks (SANParks) based in Kruger, LNP rangers work to prevent poaching-related activities including firearm acquisition, harboring and transporting poachers and rhino horn, and liaising with buyers (Interviews with LNP and Kruger officials and rangers, 2009, 2012).

State power has indeed been extended through the donor-supported and SANParks-assisted LNP ranger force. It has, for instance, made arrests tied to poaching, confiscated firearms and wildlife products, and prevented the unsanctioned use of natural resources (Interviews with LNP officials, rangers, and residents, 2004−2005, 2008, 2012). Success rates have recently dramatically improved due to an incentive scheme implemented in 2011 and funded by the Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa (WESSA) that gives rangers cash incentives for arrests tied to poaching and the seizing of firearms and ammunition (Interview

Fig. 2. The Giriyondo Road, which links the LNP to Kruger. The fences (made from branches) along the roadside have been built by communities to demarcate and protect their farms. Once relocation is complete, the farms will become prime grazing land and habitat for wildlife. Photo by the author, 2012.

with LNP official, 2012). Such extension of state power is not without consequence, especially for many people living inside the park. Residents, like Vicente as we saw above, have voiced concern that they have been abused by rangers, sometimes for seemingly minor infractions. Although acts of violence at the hands of LNP rangers have subsided, they have not disappeared: one man was recently beaten by park rangers for his continued involvement in killing lions and leopards for their skins, while another suspected poacher was shot and killed in early 2012 after an exchange of fire with rangers (Interviews with LNP officials, 2012). The ability to inflict violence and ultimately take a life with state protection and sanction, setting aside the question of justification, shows in no uncertain terms the extension of state power through the park as well as its impacts (also see Neumann, 2001).

Less severe examples concerning ranger-enforced restrictions on the use of natural resources also show evidence of the consolidation of state power. Many residents, for instance, have voiced concern that they face stiff penalties and jail time for killing the park's animals, even those that are invading farms or stalking cattle. Such prohibitions, and the larger consolidation of state power enabling them, have left some residents uneasy to discuss the subject. These concerns converge in the words of Noémia:

> I am not satisfied with the park because the animals eat our crops… [and] make us suffer. We have no right to speak about this. A long time ago, we mounted traps to hunt animals… It's very dangerous to kill an animal [today]. Even when we take a small animal, it's a problem. It's best we don't speak of this subject (Interview, 2008).

Other residents have expressed concern that the government has consolidated power over and limited access to land needed for grazing cattle and collecting forest resources, especially wood needed for cooking and construction (Interviews, 2004–2005, 2008, 2012).

Such examples reflect a larger pattern in which conservation spaces enable an extension of state power over natural resources (Neumann, 1998, 2004; Schafer & Bell, 2002). The LNP, however, adds an additional element, showing that policing capabilities inside the park are enabled not merely by the state but by the state in partnership with and empowered by extra-territorial backers. Without such assistance, this extension of state power would simply not be possible. I do not, however, want to give the impression that the extension of state power via a ranger force amounts to a seamless control over the park. One of the biggest current interruptions is that rangers on both sides of the border have been involved in rhino poaching given how lucrative it is (Interviews with Kruger and LNP officials and rangers, 2009, 2012). The expansion of state power is thus incomplete, yet it is nonetheless an expansion as the examples above convey.

Partnerships with extra-state actors have also enabled the most contentious aspect of the development of the LNP: relocation. Financial assistance from KfW is enabling the resettlement of approximately 7000 people living in what is seen as the park's prime wildlife habitat. Further assistance comes from AFD, which has provided €11 million to develop the park's buffer zone where most of the displaced communities will be relocated (AFD, 2011; Interviews with LNP and AFD officials, 2012; Salas, 2011). Relocation is justified on the grounds that it is too dangerous for communities to live in close proximity to wildlife, that they interfere with anti-poaching efforts, that their presence potentially disrupts the "wilderness" feel of the park, and that, with communities gone, wildlife will further populate the park. While relocation is technically voluntary, both communities and scholars have questioned this given threats posed by an increasingly-dense population of dangerous animals (Interviews, 2004–2005, 2008, 2012; Spierenburg & Milgroom, 2008).

Resettlement, again funded by international donors, is firmly implicated in the expansion of state power. Put simply, with communities gone, it becomes much easier for state offices and actors to further transform the LNP into a functioning national park and stand as the key decision-makers over this space. Resettlement allows them to act less hindered by residents who often have a different vision of the purpose of this space, a different sense of to whom it belongs, and who subsequently obstruct the realization of the park's vision, in many ways through their very presence within the space. These differences and evidence of the consolidation of state power are expressed by Madalena:

> [The park administration came] and said they wanted us out of here… We refused and said we did not want to go because this is our country and we know the way of life here… They brought the elephants and left here and said, "This is a park and it no longer belongs to Massingir. We will build for you elsewhere" (Interview, 2008).

Once residents are gone, in fact, the park administration can complete a final installment of the wildlife translocation program to further increase wildlife numbers, a program itself supported by SANParks and the PPF (Interviews with LNP, PPF, and Kruger officials, 2012). Somewhat ironically, wildlife will be particularly attracted to spaces communities have already cleared for their farms, as these will enable prime grazing land as opposed to dense forested land (Interview with LNP official, 2012) (Fig. 2).

The ways in which relocation enables the extension of state power have become more obvious in recent years with the upsurge in rhino poaching. With people still living in the park, it is simply easier for community members involved in poaching to cross the border to hunt rhino in Kruger and to escape easily back across the border into Mozambique. Relocation will ensure they are farther from Kruger, with the LNP acting essentially as a buffer zone to Kruger's rhinos. Furthermore, the sheer number of people living in the LNP makes it difficult to regulate and monitor human movement, some of which is tied to poaching. Relocation solves this problem too (Interviews with LNP and Kruger rangers and officials, 2012). In short, a space empty of human communities—especially potentially "unruly" communities—translates into a space in which the state has much more secure control and one it can further transform into a (trans)national park.

While relocation does show the extension of state power, especially as evidenced by the already-relocated community of Nanguene, it also shows the messiness and precariousness of such an extension. We see this in two respects. First, in 2009 KfW put a hold on its funding, which interfered with many of the park's plans, including relocation. KfW's decision was motivated by the fact that the same land promised to the Ministry of Tourism for relocation had been given by the Ministry of Agriculture to Procana, a private (and now-defunct) biofuel project, which placed LNP communities in limbo. KfW hence insisted they be given a DUAT (Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra or Title for the Use and Improvement of Land), a document that would legally protect their rights and preclude another Procana-type debacle (Interview with KfW and LNP officials, 2012). This illustrates how precarious state power so thoroughly dependent upon extra-territorial partners and articulations can be and, more broadly, shows how contingent sovereignty is in practice—contingent on the practices and relationships that produce it. Nonetheless, with funding now resumed, so too has the relocation program and the related consolidation of state power.

Second, relocation has not gone uncontested. While some residents are more amenable to the idea and see it as a means of securing better opportunities and even leveling power relations within the community, others are less convinced, arguing that it

amounts to stealing their land and to betrayal at the hands of the state. While early on many residents outright refused to leave, more recent opposition seems to amount more to "foot dragging" to delay the process rather than resist it altogether (Interviews with residents and LNP officials, 2004–2005, 2008, 2012). So while the state via the LNP administration can and very likely will empty the park's core of villages, it does not do so entirely on its own terms and along its own timeline. Hence, the state, even heavily backed by its various partners, does not have absolute control over the park. And if we think of sovereignty as a process that is actively built, we see that this process of articulation is indeed unfolding although not smoothly.

Examining processes ranging from the development of legal and technical capacity, park administration and infrastructure, a ranger force, and community relocation reminds us of not only how thoroughly constructed sites of "wilderness" like the LNP are but also that their creation is intricately tied to the extension of state power. Neumann (2004, p. 203) reinforces both points in his discussion of Tanzanian game reserves and national parks as "artifactual wilderness." The "wilderness" of these sites, he explains, is "artifactual in the dual sense that it is wilderness produced not by nature, but by human hand, and that [it] is an artifact of the state's assertion of territorial ownership and control." The LNP, however, departs from Neumann's insightful analysis in two ways. First, as we saw above, the Mozambican state is only able to engage in these "wilderness"-producing and state-extending practices to the extent that it is backed and empowered by foreign or extra-territorial partners. Second, seemingly unlike the spaces discussed by Neumann, the LNP has never been a viable national park on its own (Interviews with GLTP ecologist, 2004 and KfW official, 2012). This suggests that the Mozambican state has been able to extend its power over and through the LNP, drawing on extra-territorial partnerships to do so, only to the extent that the park is integrated into a larger transnational conservation space, i.e., only to the extent that the LNP is *more* than a national space.

Articulated sovereignty: working through the sovereignty tension of the LNP/GLTP

The foreign assistance and partnerships that have helped enable the consolidation of Mozambican state power over the LNP suggest a tension in which these partnerships simultaneously threaten and empower the Mozambican state, as illustrated above. Understanding sovereignty as articulated can help us resolve this tension and in the process shed light on the more general functioning of sovereignty. As developed above, articulated sovereignty understands sovereignty as a heterogenous set of gained powers and competencies that allow a state or other body to make and enforce decisions over certain spaces and the resources and populations residing therein. These powers emerge from negotiations and interactions with other actors and institutions: state, non-state, and extra-state alike. Sovereignty, as this set of powers, flows from these interactions. It is articulated through them.

Furthermore, partially because these negotiations involve multiple actors with different interests and because the negotiations rarely if ever unfold on a level playing field, the powers that do get articulated are neither necessarily consistent nor reducible to one another. Building from Krasner's distinctions, although his interests lie elsewhere, helps us grasp that what we see with the LNP/GLTP is a "sovereignty exchange," one in which the Mozambican state, through its various conservation and tourism institutions and engagement with external actors, is giving up a degree of Vattelian or Westphalian sovereignty in order to consolidate domestic sovereignty. More explicitly, the state is giving up the right to refuse or exclude certain sources of authority coming from these external actors. It is doing so in return for assistance in consolidating its internal decision-making and decision-enforcing capacity over a particular space, that is, the LNP, and the communities and natural resources contained within. By taking apart the concept of sovereignty in this way, we can begin to see its complex spatiality: here a type of internal sovereignty—within the nation-state over national territory and populations—is gained or articulated by compromising sovereignty externally—that is, with extra-territorial actors. This also helps us see that the sovereignty tension of the LNP/GLTP exists neither merely in transfrontier conservation nor state practices more broadly. Rather, the tension rests in the concept of sovereignty itself and in particular in the assumption that it is internally consistent. Put simply, it is not. Rather, sovereignty consists of powers and competencies that are not necessarily reducible to one another and that can be built precisely by compromising or negotiating other powers, all of which are subsumed under the general rubric of sovereignty.

At the same time, however, we need to be careful not to read this extension of sovereignty as absolute. Especially as the examples of rhino poaching and relocation show, the process is messy and incomplete. In this sense, the Mozambican state certainly does not have indivisible, absolute control—or *de jure* sovereignty—over its territory. Yet in reality absolute control is never possible. What is possible, and what we see in the LNP/GLTP, is the building of *de facto* sovereignty, or the actual ability to exercise power, even though this extension is uneven and contested (even from within as with ranger involvement in poaching).

There is a second way of addressing this tension that also draws on articulated sovereignty but one that is rooted more firmly in the historical specificity of the Mozambican state. If we think of sovereignty in purely abstract terms as a state's unlimited and indivisible rule over territory and populations, then this does seem to be violated by extra-territorial actors. Yet if we look at the type and extent of sovereignty the Mozambican state actually possessed at the end of the war and the years leading up to the LNP, we see a very different dynamic. Due especially to the war but also to a longer history of colonial underdevelopment, the state at the national, provincial, district, and village level had little if any substantive power over large areas of the country, including the area now located within the LNP (Lunstrum, 2009). So the state may have had *de jure* sovereignty in terms of being recognized as such by other states, but it lacked *de facto* sovereignty. Taking this into account, if we think of sovereignty as a set of real and gained—i.e., articulated—powers, then the Mozambican state in the context of the LNP/GLTP is not giving up or losing anything it had actually possessed. Yet it has arguably given up the potential, although never realized, ability to exclude certain forms of external influence.

None of this, however, is to imply that concerns over foreign influence are not legitimate, especially given the reality of patently unequal power relations. In fact, even though these state institutions have been fundamentally strengthened through these partnerships, the type of powers they have and, importantly, the constitution of the Mozambican state itself in the realm of conservation and the LNP as national territory have been shaped partially in the image and interests of these foreign partners. To better grasp this, we need to return to sovereignty in its relation to state and territory.

Creating states, creating territories, and complicating the sovereignty-state-territory triad

It is only recently that scholars have turned a critical eye to the assumption that sovereignty is necessarily state-based and territorial, arguing, for example, that states are not the only entities exercising sovereignty and that the latter is not necessarily

confined to rigidly bound territorial blocs. As Agnew (2005, p. 440) points out, part of the reason sovereignty is seen as necessarily state-based and territorial is that the state is:

> treated as a "given." It is rooted in a grammar of fixed boundaries and identities. As a naturalized abstract individual, the state has acquired a personhood that then underwrites its special status as the locus of sovereignty…[But i]n fact statehood and personhood alike are not the pre-given phenomenon this story suggests. Rather they are both subjectivities formed out of social interaction and mutual recognition.

Building from Agnew's insight, we see with the LNP/GLTP that the Mozambican state, as a political authority capable of making and enforcing decisions over this space, has only come into being as such via interactions with other actors, necessarily including extra-territorial actors. As we saw above, it is through these negotiations that the state has been able to develop capacities that enable it to exercise *de facto* sovereignty across particular spaces, especially set against its evisceration during the war. It was only through the partnerships, as uneven as they may be, with foreign partners that the state was able to re-build capacity and build a national park, in the process effectively consolidating its recently-built power over this newly (re)invented national space. Hence, like the "sovereign powers" they may come to possess through these interactions, states as effective decision-makers and decision-enforcers do not pre-exist these negotiations; they emerge from them. States, like their sovereignty, are effects of these negotiations. This both reinforces Mitchell's (1999) argument that the state is an effect of the practices through which it is produced and extends our understanding of how conservation spaces amount to acts of state-making. Neumann (2004, p. 202), in his study of state-making through conservation, explains that "… proprietary claims [over conservation areas] and the processes of mapping, bounding, containing, and controlling nature and citizenry are what make a state a state. States come into *being* through these claims and the assertion of control over territory, resources, and the people." Building from here, the sovereignty complexities of the LNP/GLTP demonstrate that these processes and assertions of control can be enabled by foreign assistance and partnerships, providing evidence of *extra-territorial* state-making through conservation.

One further implication of this extra-territorial web of relations is that its foreign partners and backers have had a say in what the Mozambican state, its priorities, and powers have come to be, underscoring the stark reality of uneven power relations. Ramutsindela (2007) and Büscher (2010) both convincingly show that NGOs like the Peace Parks Foundation have worked through state offices to attain their goals and that states have been transformed in the process. We can assert this more strongly: the Mozambican state in the realm of conservation is *fundamentally* strengthened and rebuilt in the process and is rebuilt partially in the reflection of these actors and their priorities. This underscores the impossibility of fully disentangling the state from these external actors, what Harrison (2001) refers to in a different context as a post-conditionality regime. While it still makes sense to talk about the state, we must do so while recognizing that it is not a fully autonomous, self-created, self-driven, self-contained entity. Nonetheless, it is powerful, especially as it has been rebuilt as such. Furthermore, because the state—in terms of its power and its interests—changes depending on its alliances, partnerships, backers, and their interests, what we are left with is a non-essentialist understanding of the state, of one that is in flux and in a constant state of becoming.

It is not, however, just that the state (re)emerges from these negotiations, so too does national territory. As we saw earlier, scholars have effectively challenged understandings of both sovereignty as inherently territorial and territory as merely the container of the state. Building from here, we can begin to see that territory as national space itself is actively created through the same extra-territorial processes and partnerships described above. With the LNP, the Mozambican state is only able to define, regulate, and reinvent this space, giving rise to territory as such, through the transnational partnerships and sovereignty negotiations examined earlier. In addition, the scholarship on sovereignty often treats territory as the geographically undifferentiated space of the state or nation-state. Yet as Ong (2000) reminds us through her analysis of graduated sovereignty, states and their partners actively produce different types of territories with particular qualities, in her example special economic zones, that are defined and regulated by different actors for diverse ends. With the LNP, the newly-empowered Mozambican state and its partners have produced a new type of territory: a (semi)bound and tightly-regulated national park. Furthermore, this is a space designed for the mobility and leisure of tourists as opposed to the livelihood activities and movement of resident communities (see above and Hughes, 2005). All of these are made possible through extra-territorial partnerships. By moving beyond the undifferentiated container model of territory, we can begin to grasp that territory—or particular territories—are effects of these larger sovereignty negotiations between multiple actors: state, non-state, and extra-state alike. In other words, articulated sovereignty helps us grasp that it is not only sovereignty as a set of powers that is articulated through these external "sovereignty-threatening" negotiations; so too are states and their varied territories.

Conclusion: articulated sovereignty beyond transfrontier conservation

Given the paper's broader interest in how sovereignty functions in practice, I would like to close by reflecting briefly on the utility of articulated sovereignty beyond transfrontier conservation, looking at regional integration projects and postcolonial (African) sovereignty. What makes the concept particularly useful in both cases is that they are characterized by sovereignty complexities tied to extra-territorial actors. Much scholarly debate concerning sovereignty in the 1990s was focused on the impacts of regional integration projects, especially the European Union (EU), on state power and the functioning of sovereignty more broadly (Anderson, 1996; Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996). More recent contributions have attempted to grasp further complexities of EU-related sovereignty through the development of concepts like shared sovereignty, which highlights the ways in which states agree to multi-level governance to share or pool resources and decision-making capacity. Such a process opens doors to the foreign influence of supra-national institutions and other states but with hopes of improving domestic control (Mamudu & Studlar, 2009). Articulated sovereignty works similarly to grasp what is effectively a sovereignty exchange but pushes further to underscore the ongoing presence of power disparities, and even coercion, between the different actors, something problematically elided in the language of "sharing." The concept also extends its purview beyond "official" actors in multi-level governance, namely states and the supra-national entities of which they are members, to include actors such as NGOs, international financial institutions, and private capital/investors that shape decisions behind the scenes.

Moving from Europe to its former colonies, many popular and scholarly accounts understand African sovereignty in terms of its lack. This deficiency presumably rests in the region's *dis*connection from the world (Bayart, 2000) or from the unyielding intervention of foreign actors (Plank, 1993) and is routinely showcased in the seeming proliferation of weak or failed states (Sidaway, 2003). Such assumptions have not gone uncontested. Bayart (2000) shows that

Africa has long been connected to global flows and processes and suggests, more controversially, that "… sovereignty in Africa is exercised through the creation and management of dependence" on foreign actors (p. 228). Following an equally critical trajectory, Sidaway (2003) shows how the apparent weakness of states like Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo rests not in their lack of authority or their disconnection from the West but rather from a surplus of these types of connections. Much like articulated sovereignty, both analyses move us beyond the idea that sovereignty is a capacity a state clearly possesses or lacks and also interrupt the idea that foreign connections simply erode state power, suggesting rather that it can be built through these linkages.

While much aligned with these arguments, articulated sovereignty compliments them by, first, moving beyond a primary focus on "weak," "precarious," and "conflicted" states to analyze the sovereign negotiations underlying the rise of "success stories" like Mozambique. It can show how states like Mozambique and their relative (and even non-democratic) stability, themselves built largely through donor-funded increased capacity, can be articulated through these extra-national negotiations. In addition, articulated sovereignty highlights the complex spatiality of sovereign articulations. It does so by drawing explicit attention to ways in which especially postcolonial states agree to external intervention into domestic policies and spaces in exchange for the tools to consolidate power internally. At a more fundamental level, the concept helps illustrate how national territory or territories emerge from these interactions. In the case of postcolonial states, these routinely involve extra-national actors since they provide the means to consolidate control over space (as well as people) and effect national territory as such. We see this clearly in the development of postcolonial national parks, heavily funded by international donors, but also in foreign-backed, postcolonial state development projects like large dams, large-scale transportation infrastructure, and state-led oil, gas, mining, and agricultural projects, all of which not only transform space but produce national territory. In short, as with the LNP/GLTP, even as states allow foreign influence, they have been able to tap these resources to help consolidate power, often reinvent themselves, and in the process bring national territory into being.

Acknowledgments

Endnotes

[1] This paper draws on research conducted in 2004–2005, 2008, 2009, and 2012 in Mozambique and South Africa. Five research assistants/translators and I conducted approximately 175 interviews with residents in two villages in Mozambique's Massingir District, with a smaller number of interviews conducted in two additional villages and the district seat of Tihovene. While initial interviews were set up with the help of village-level leaders, we recruited most informants by approaching them directly in public spaces and in their yards or farms, explaining the study, and inquiring whether they would be interested in participating. We attempted to ensure wide representation by interviewing a mix of women and men, younger and older residents, recent migrants and long-term residents including village-level leaders, wealthier and poorer families, and residents working in various sectors including agriculture, construction, mining, conservation, and tourism. In addition, we conducted 56 interviews with officials/administrators at the LNP/DNAC/Mozambican Ministry of Tourism and Kruger/SANParks; LNP and Kruger park rangers; funders including the Peace Parks Foundation, AFD, KfW, and the German Embassy; private business interests; and GLTP/LNP project consultants. In addition,

we engaged in detailed participant observation of park planning and policy-related meetings and the daily tasks of LNP staff and Kruger rangers, which also allowed for sustained informal discussion. Interviews were conducted in Shangaan, Portuguese, and English. To protect anonymity and encourage participants to speak freely, respondents' names have been withheld or changed to pseudonyms.

[2] Krasner (2001) refers to the principle that states should not intervene in the domestic affairs of other states as "Vattelian sovereignty," rather than the more commonly used "Westphalian sovereignty," to reinforce that this principle was introduced not at the 1648 Peace of Westphalia but a century later.

[3] Differing from my assertion that all sovereignty is contingent, Elden (2006) critically analyzes the concept of "contingent sovereignty" pushed by the Bush Administration after 9–11, which specifies that under certain conditions, such as when a country is harboring terrorists, the norms of sovereignty no longer hold.

[4] As explained by an LNP administrator, the official title of "technical advisor" derives from the fact that a foreigner cannot officially hold a high-ranking management position, drawing attention to a further sovereignty tension within the park (Interview, 2012).

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