Counter-poaching operations in South Africa’s so-called ‘rhino wars’ have seen increasing use of kinetic strategies and tactics. It can be argued that this follows the country’s historical tendency to react to threats with confrontation in the first instance rather than negotiation, as leaders invoke images of ‘backs-to-the-wall’ isolation. During the apartheid period the National Party strongly promoted patriotism and self-sacrifice, portraying South Africa as facing ‘total onslaught’; today, the rhetoric of ‘rhino wars’ is often framed in similar terms, not least because the person leading the rhinoceros counter-poaching campaign, Major General Johan Jooste (retired), was himself heavily involved in the ‘apartheid wars’ in the latter half of the twentieth century.

As part of his counter-poaching plan, General Jooste has fused a violent poaching narrative with broader issues of national security, such as concern over South Africa’s porous borders and transnational crime. The ‘Jooste war’ has thereby come to combine rhino counter-poaching with broader geostrategic interests in a process that might be described as the ‘rhinofication’ of South African security. The intensification of the counter-poaching strategy is clearly part of a trend that has witnessed the increasing militarization of wildlife management, the physical manifestation of this approach also bears resemblance to some notable developments in late-modern warfare. These developments have seen an emphasis on the close targeting of individuals or groups, broadly identified in the current military argot as ‘man-hunting’ or ‘targeted killings’. The combative language suggests that a policy of enhanced confrontation with the poachers is being ramped up.

Despite the hard-line rhetoric of the ‘Jooste war’, the year 2013 was the worst for rhino poaching since the latest surge in the activity began in South Africa in 2008.¹ Not only does this fact prompt severe doubt about the effectiveness of General Jooste’s plans,² but it also raises questions about the extent to which rhino poaching and counter-poaching might be more accurately regarded as a symptom of ‘civic war’—as opposed to a ‘civil war’. Here, the understanding of civic war conceives poaching, and poachers, as more expressive of the economic frustrations

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and anger felt by sections of South Africa’s large under-class who feel let down and not properly represented in the post-apartheid era.

What this study intends to reveal, then, is the complexity that lies behind the dramatic headlines and gruesome imagery that accompanies, and often over-simplifies, the rhino conservation debate. It will suggest that the graphic message presented to the outside world by conservation groups, which places an overwhelming moral urgency on protecting the rhino, frequently breaks down in South Africa itself into fractious arguments over the legalization of the rhino horn trade, and the role of wildlife hunting in the political economy of South Africa, as well as the wide-ranging socio-economic divisions within the country. Furthermore, buried within these controversies is how the control of the country’s wildlife, along with agriculture and land, functions within the context of the historic struggle over the ‘exceptionalism’ of the white population in South Africa. For many whites the management and conservation of wildlife, with its closely linked tourism industry, forms an iconic article of self-definition. Given that whites have both owned a very large percentage of South Africa’s land and controlled its wildlife management over the past hundred years, the black population’s relationship with wildlife has been almost non-existent in urban areas, and in rural areas any attempt to hunt bushmeat would be illegal. The result is that wildlife conservation has played little part in mainstream black consciousness, which over the past decades was in any event far more preoccupied with the anti-apartheid struggle. While the primary focus of this article is to examine the effectiveness of the ‘Jooste war’ and the ‘rhinofication’ of South African security, it will also be contended that rhino poaching is a highly visible indicator of the current condition of a country under pressure from a number of persistent issues, including a land restitution programme that is a long way behind schedule. In this respect, the intensity of the ‘rhino wars’ evokes an often unspoken political subtext which reflects the long shadow still cast by the years of apartheid and from which modern South Africa has yet to emerge fully.

The mot Jooste

When appointed in December 2012, General Johan Jooste threw down the gauntlet: ‘It is a fact that South Africa, a sovereign country, is under attack from armed foreign nationals. This should be seen as a declaration of war against South Africa by armed foreign criminals. We are going to take the war to these armed bandits and we aim to win it.’3 If General Jooste’s words sounded a refrain that might have had familiar echoes in military and political rhetoric in the past, what was much less familiar was the context of his remarks: rhino poaching.

General Jooste was put in charge of anti-poaching operations within the 22 national parks controlled by SANParks (South Africa National Parks). As South Africa’s counter-poaching ‘tsar’, General Jooste held a position that, arguably,

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made him the most important person countering rhino poaching in the country, if not the world, in a growing campaign that has become known as the ‘rhino wars’. General Jooste seemed to be an ideal figure to lead the counter-poaching effort, given his seniority as well as his ‘bush war’ and business experience.

In 2014 South Africa celebrates the 20-year anniversary of the ending of apartheid. Despite the remarkable achievements in that time—not least the degree of reconciliation and the construction of a relatively modern polity—the poaching of rhinos seemingly stands in violent contrast to such progress. Currently, the rhino poachers and horn smugglers have not only become a major challenge to the power of the South African state but are perceived as winning on their own terms. The killing of mega-fauna species has seen sharp rises, prompted by the booming demand for wildlife products in parts of Asia. According to Michael Knights of SANParks, ‘We’re losing animals like crazy’, yet ‘prosecutions are falling way behind’.

Given that trafficking in wildlife, dead and alive, along with selected by-products such as rhino horn, ivory and shark fin, constitutes the third highest category of illegal trading after drugs and guns, General Jooste’s characterization of South Africa as a country under attack from poaching should not be dismissed lightly. Such sentiments were echoed by US President Barack Obama in July 2013, with the launch of a Wildlife Trafficking Taskforce, and the previous year by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who declared that the illegal wildlife trade was ‘a global challenge that spans continents and crosses oceans, [one that] … we need to address … with partnerships that are as robust and far-reaching as the criminal networks we seek to dismantle’.

General Jooste’s rhetoric, however, points to a security conundrum posed by rhino poaching: should it be viewed as a crime and dealt with by the normal legal processes within South Africa, or more as a manifestation of war and insurgency waged against the state that might entail kinetic engagements beyond the strictly judicial realm? On one side of the conundrum, rhino poaching involves the penetration of poachers from outside the country, potentially suggesting that the problem should be framed in the warlike terms of external threat, which General Jooste’s rhetoric readily identifies. Yet the problem is also internal. Poaching involves the loss of, and/or damage to, property. The property in question, the

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rhino, is an extremely valuable commodity in both financial and natural resource terms. Clearly, this registers a criminal dimension that seemingly calls for traditional policing rather than military methods.

A further aspect of the poaching conundrum to consider is the nature of the engagement, or combat, inherent in kinetic counter-poaching operations. Counter-poaching, in its militarized form, with its focus on hunting down the individual, follows a pattern of late-modern combat identified by political geographer Derek Gregory as ‘the individuation of warfare’. He argues that ‘targets are no longer whole areas of cities—like Cologne or Hamburg in the Second World War—or extensive target boxes like those ravaged by B-52 “Arc Light” strikes over the rainforest of Vietnam. The targets are individuals.’

Not only does this ‘individuation’ represent the most elemental and primal form of group violence, namely ‘the hunt’, it also touches deeply into an atavistic human desire to protect and control property, in the form of both the resource—in this case wildlife—and the land containing the resource. Given that poaching is essentially non-threatening to the human realm, with no implicit intention to murder, rape, kidnap or involve any other human-centric crime, the poacher might be viewed by sections of society not as a criminal but as an opportunist responding to the human necessity for economic survival. If that is the case, then counter-poaching, whether by state or private agencies, inevitably falls under greater scrutiny, illustrating how poaching and counter-poaching rest in a wider ‘grey area’ strategically, morally and legally.

The rhinofication of South African security

Sandwiched between the lines of the ‘Jooste war’ declaration was a tacit admission that the South African authorities had lost control of the poaching situation following enormous year-on-year increases in rhino deaths since 2008. The wider significance of rhino poaching in South Africa is that it is a highly visible indicator of the country’s brittle internal security and social divisions. The high levels of murder, crime and unemployment in South Africa possess a symbolic symmetry with the rising number of rhino deaths, posing searching questions of the ability of the state to secure the country’s borders and give appropriate protection to its citizens and the wider environment.

Such brittleness is evident in incidents of heavy-handed tactics by the South African Police Service (SAPS), such as in the Marikana mine massacre near Rustenburg, where 44 people were killed when the police opened fire on striking mineworkers in August 2012. Such incidents provide reminders of the historic

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The paramilitary role of the police under the apartheid governments. The aftermath of the massacre led to further accusations during the subsequent commission of inquiry that the police had lied about their actions during the strike. Furthermore, disputes in the armed forces over pay and discipline cast serious doubt on their state of preparation and operational capability, crystallized in the humiliating ‘battle of Bangui’ in 2013 when South African peacekeeping forces in the Central African Republic were overwhelmed by the Seleka rebels with severe loss of life.

In the background of these events is a continuously reinforcing feedback loop consisting of a faltering economy, growing environmental problems and declining agricultural yields, along with high unemployment levels, industrial unrest and political factionalism within the ruling African National Congress. In turn, these problems connect with the persistent challenge of widespread illegal immigration into South Africa; a large majority come from Zimbabwe and Mozambique through the porous borders, with the Kruger National Park being a particularly popular point of entry. As such, these borderlands can be seen as ‘ungoverned spaces’.

Angela Rabasa and John Peters discern levels of ungovernability by applying four conditions. The first is the overall level of state penetration of society, which also involves the management of infrastructure and the economy. The second is the extent to which the state maintains a monopoly on the use of force, encompassing the degree to which it can contain armed opposition movements and criminal networks as well as the accessibility of small arms. The third examines the state’s reach in controlling its borders. The fourth is whether the state is subject to external intervention by other states.

‘Ungoverned spaces’ do not axiomatically have to be violent, since some may be economically productive, either through tourism or agriculture, when the lack of human interference is beneficial, as in the case of the Kruger National Park. However, with the Kruger park far and away the world’s rhino poaching ‘hotspot’, this ‘ungoverned space’ on South Africa’s border is highlighted by images of gunned-down and hacked rhinos that in turn draw attention to the high levels...
of general violence in the country.\textsuperscript{19} In this way rhino poaching and conservation in South Africa have become enveloped within a larger security narrative, representing what might be termed the ‘rhinofication’ of national security that sees counter-poaching existing as part of a broad response to both external and internal threats to the state. ‘Rhinofication’ also has connections with the ‘war on terror’ in that the Al-Shabaab jihadist group in East Africa is suspected to be financing itself partly through ivory and rhino horn trading, though the evidence for this link is not conclusive. Additionally, British paratroopers training the Kenya Wildlife Service are at the same time presented with an opportunity to monitor the vast ‘ungoverned spaces’ of the Kenya–Somalia border region for potential jihadist insurgents.\textsuperscript{20}

A further example of the potential for overlap between state security and counter-poaching was the intervention in the early 1980s by the Botswana Defence Forces (BDF), which were sent to confront well-armed poaching gangs taking advantage of the widespread regional conflict. At stake was both Botswana’s internal security and the substantial wildlife tourism industry. Notably, the BDF deployed a specialized commando squadron to hunt down the gangs, employing small-unit foot patrols of skilled trackers from Botswana’s hunter-gatherer society backed up by helicopter-borne rapid reaction forces. Within months the poaching gangs had been beaten back.\textsuperscript{21}

In South Africa during apartheid, Nick Steele pioneered a strategy of integrating privately owned wildlife conservancies/reserves within a grand security narrative. Steele was a legendary conservationist with the old Natal Parks Board. He was not only a close friend of the then powerful Zulu chief, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, but also vehemently anti-communist. He was once described as having ‘spent his entire conservation career in uniform in a paramilitary “war” in defence of nature’.\textsuperscript{22} In the 1970s Steele developed the ‘Farm Patrol Plan’, in which he persuaded white ranchers to join forces and train up rangers in paramilitary style in order to protect farms from poaching, stock theft and political turmoil. In this way the ‘Farm Patrol Plan’ became aligned with the national security strategy of ‘pacification’, mimicking counter-insurgency’s classic policy of ‘inkspots’ by creating islands of stability that can expand over time.\textsuperscript{23}

Steele’s approach established the precedent in Africa and other parts of the world to both militarize and securitize conservation, with a growing number of park rangers being armed and trained to take on the poachers.\textsuperscript{24} Such militarization, increasingly regarded as appropriate to tackle well-organized and equipped


\textsuperscript{20} Aislinn Laing, ‘Futile slaughter of Kenyan elephants and how Britain is now fighting back’, Daily Telegraph, 10 Nov. 2013.


\textsuperscript{23} Draper, ‘Zen and the art of garden province maintenance’, p. 817.

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poaching gangs, represents another growing international trend of fusing wildlife conservation issues with wider security concerns.25

From a counter-poaching and security perspective, rhinos and other large fauna can be categorized as ‘mega-poaching’, being in a supra-category distinct from other wildlife because of their iconic status and the extremely high value of rhino horn and elephant tusk. The strong and rising demand from the Far East for body parts from these species has increased the involvement of sophisticated crime syndicates.26 Here the intense focus on rhinos in South Africa stems from the ever-expanding ‘commodification’ of the animals, lying at the heart not only of illegal horn-selling networks but also of the tourist industry, whether for ‘sport hunting’ or wildlife viewing, on which parts of the South African economy are heavily dependent.27

Furthermore, the term ‘rhino wars’ has become a global brand itself, supporting and harnessing a vast array of organizations, synchronized with graphic media representations ranging from the adrenaline-pumping TV series Battleground: rhino wars,28 filmed in the Kruger National Park with former United States ‘special forces’ personnel intercepting poaching gangs, to books such as the award-winning reportage of Julian Rademeyer’s Killing for profit (see below) or Deon Meyer’s gritty crime thriller Trackers.29 The whiff of combat and high-octane action in rugged terrain has attracted both former soldiers with experience in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq,30 and veterans of South Africa’s own apartheid ‘bush wars’.31 These operatives work across a wide counter-poaching spectrum, touting fieldcraft courses, high-tech equipment and active patrolling.

The extent to which the ‘rhino wars’ have penetrated South Africa’s security discourse was illustrated by the discovery of a bogus rhino counter-poaching camp in the north. The camp had been created for an attempted coup against Joseph Kabila, President of the Democratic Republic of Congo. This highlighted just how much the militarization of rhino counter-poaching through the use of non-governmental organizations has filled the security void in South Africa, and the degree to which paramilitary vigilantism and mercenary activities can still flourish in the continent’s semi-ungoverned spaces.32

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The ‘rhino wars’ further demonstrate how attempts at the conservation of natural heritage highlight socio-political fault-lines and weaknesses in the provision of security for both humans and non-humans alike. The complex social interactions between conservation and poaching were forensically examined by the veteran South African journalist Julian Rademeyer in his *Killing for profit: exposing the illegal rhino horn trade*. According to Rademeyer’s thesis, rhino wars comprise three interlocking ‘wars’: one relates to the protection of a high-profile animal, even though the incentive of individual involvement in anti-poaching may span a variety of motivational aspirations including conservation, combat, political and economic reasons; the second sees competing groups and individuals engaged in a brutal, cynical and logistically complex strategy to cash in on a valuable resource; and the final one comprises an increasingly bitter ‘war of words’ between supporters and opponents of the legalization of the trade in rhino horn.

What also emerges from Rademeyer’s analysis is the existence of an almost limitless number of people offering their services as ‘shooters’ for comparatively little pay. The demographic profile of the individual rhino shooter is almost always that of an impoverished black from South Africa or Mozambique. It is they who function as the principal trigger-pullers. They are organized by middlemen, some of whom are white, often with a sport-hunting background and occasionally even one in veterinary science. Against this murky background the political economy of the ‘rhino wars’ merges with a legal process that would seem capricious and erratic at best, aided by corruption and incompetence in officialdom, along with self-serving interests like the pay strike by the Kruger park rangers in February 2012.

‘Rhino wars’ have become a useful semiotic ‘floating signifier’. While the moral case against rhino poaching is clear enough, the reasons behind the practice and its wider implications, along with the range of outcomes and strategies employed, as well as how all these mesh into the ‘rhino wars’ narrative, are exceedingly opaque. As such, the phrase ‘rhino wars’ is buffeted by myth and reality, fact and fiction.

**Rhinofication and the apartheid wars**

The criminal structures underpinning the modern rhino poaching crisis in South Africa can be dated from the era of the so-called ‘apartheid wars’ of the 1970s and 1980s, when elements within the former South African Defence Force (SADF) used the fighting and the draconian security laws promulgated by the National Party as cover to organize a vast smuggling network involving ivory, rhino horn, drugs and diamonds, particularly in conjunction with UNITA, the former Angolan resistance organization led by Jonas Savimbi. Colonel Jan Breytenbach,
conservationist and commander of the renowned 32nd 'Buffalo Soldiers' Battalion, witnessed the resulting slaughter of wildlife in Angola.36 According to Breytenbach, ‘the hundreds of thousands of elephants became thousands, the thousands became hundreds and the hundreds only a very few’.37

An integrated southern African smuggling trade that was effectively sanctioned by the state, with Johannesburg as the hub, had even wider strategic implications, the most notable of which was that the smuggling enabled South African military intelligence to leverage influence over both friends like UNITA in Angola and enemies such as FRELIMO in Mozambique who were also involved in the illicit trade.38 Over the longer term, however, the state’s involvement in smuggling had two even more powerful consequences. First, the lengthy period of fighting allowed the smuggling cartels to establish themselves with little fear of disruption, claiming that they were allied with the security forces in the fight against communism. Over time the roots of the smuggling networks grew deeper and wider, spreading corruption, evasion and non-compliance. The second consequence was that no senior military figures were indicted for their part in this enterprise, despite a major investigation carried out after the end of apartheid. Soon afterwards, a rebranding and reorganization of the defence forces from the heavily compromised SADF to the current South African National Defence Force (SANDF) put further closure on the past.39

Through this process rhino horn and ivory smuggling became institutionalized within the fabric of the South African state through the collusion of the defence forces, both in their smuggling activity and in the subsequent evasion of prosecution. This was to send a powerful political message in the post-apartheid era when the poaching networks began to take root, namely, that the agencies of the state could be compromised and would likely be ineffective in the face of forceful vested interests.

The political subtext of ‘rhino wars’

In October 2010, after two years of soaring rhino deaths and a gathering international outcry, the South African government held a crisis meeting in Pretoria, convened by Buyelwa Sonjica, Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs, and officially described as a ‘rhino summit’.40 President Jacob Zuma relieved Sonjica of her position a few days after the Pretoria meeting and Edna Molewa was sent

in as the replacement. Nevertheless, two important decisions were made at the Pretoria meeting: first, that two reports should be undertaken, one into the South African internal rhino horn market and another into the international rhino horn market; second, that the Biodiversity Enforcement Directorate would be established within the Department of Environmental Affairs to spearhead and bring cohesion to the government’s counter-poaching efforts. Since then, the overarching governmental response to rhino counter-poaching has come under ‘Operation Rhino’, the title name-checking a successful operation in 1960 that involved a mass translocation and distribution of white rhinos from the Umfolozi Game Reserve in today’s KwaZulu-Natal.

Modern-day counter-poaching in South Africa officially began in 1994 when Ken Maggs became the Kruger National Park’s one-man anti-poaching operation. Within four years Maggs had built up a team who were responsible for all SANParks’ counter-poaching. Today, while General Jooste directs the SANParks counter-poaching strategy, other regional organizations that control parks and reserves, such as Ezemvelo KZN in KwaZulu-Natal, have started their own counter-poaching teams. All these official counter-poaching teams lean heavily on private organizations for additional support.

Currently, all crimes related to rhino poaching are investigated by the Endangered Species section of the SAPS elite Directorate of Priority Crimes Investigations unit, known as the ‘Hawks’, and the National Wildlife Crime Investigation Unit (NWCIU), which together are overseen by the National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NatJoints), South Africa’s highest authority for the coordination, joint planning and implementation of high-priority security measures, including cooperation against smuggling across national borders. NatJoints consists of senior members of SAPS, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the SANDF. Meanwhile, security in the Kruger National Park is split into 22 different sections, each managed by a Section Ranger who is supported...
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by a staff complement of Field Rangers. Counter-poaching in the park is led by SANParks Corporate Investigation Services (CIS), which was developed to provide support to the Section Ranger and the Park Manager.50

With such a disparate group of counter-poaching forces, General Jooste’s role was to bring greater coherence to the effort. This included the task of integrating the role of the South African Army, which had been brought in from 2009 to assist ‘Operation Rhino’, though its counter-poaching activities were mostly restricted to patrolling the problematic border areas around the Kruger National Park.51 Underlining the scale of the task confronting General Jooste, during his first full month in charge (January 2013) 42 rhinos were killed in the Kruger Park, which had been earmarked by General Jooste as the main priority of focus.52 General Jooste’s appointment had been supported by declarations of ‘war’ against poaching made by Dr David Mabunda, former chief executive of SANParks,53 who warned the poachers that their ‘days are numbered’, and declared: ‘we are on their trail and closing quickly on them’.54

What these gestures amounted to was political messaging. The intention was to send signals, particularly for international consumption, that conservation was being toughened up. At the same time, it also held the ring for the campaign to legalize sales of rhino horn to gather momentum; the escalating death-count of rhinos was used as justification for legalization, as outlined by Environment Minister Molewa: ‘South Africa cannot continue to be held hostage by the syndicates slaughtering our rhinos’, and rhino poaching could be curbed by the ‘establishment of well-regulated international trade’.55 This legalization campaign bore fruit for in July 2013 the South African cabinet announced that it would support rhino horn sales.56 Proposals included permitting a one-off sale of confiscated rhino horn in order to lower the price and make poaching less economically attractive,57 or seeking a regulatory mechanism similar to the Kimberley Process

57 It is estimated that the South African authorities possess 16,400kg of rhino horn. Another 2,000kg is in the hands of private owners who would also benefit from any sell-off. As has been pointed out by commentators, much of the rhino horn in the possession of the authorities has been removed from live animals in order to remove them as targets for the poachers. See Platt, ‘As rhino poaching surges South Africa proposes legalized trade in precious horns’.

At the same time, it was felt necessary to signal the heightening of the ‘war’ against rhino poaching. Consequently, the appointment of such a senior figure as General Jooste seemed to represent a coup de main: the message was that whatever happened to rhinos and rhino horn legalization there would be no lack of effort, commitment and expertise in the meantime to crack down on illegal poaching. Legalized hunting, on the other hand, was another matter entirely.


There were several other politically coded messages contained within General Jooste’s appointment. First, while both the conservationist and ranching lobbies in South Africa are white-dominated, given their extremely low percentage within the country’s demographics Dr Mabunda could claim that he had made a significant gesture of conciliation by appointing General Jooste. Second, some conservation groups, and people within SANParks, had the previous year been alleging widespread mismanagement and corruption that had permitted poachers to gain access to the Kruger Park by bribing rangers.\footnote{Fiona McLeod, ‘SANParks tenders probed’, Mail and Guardian, 17 Feb. 2012.} The choice of General Jooste as someone who had been at the very top of the South African security establishment was therefore a forceful signal and response to growing accusations against SANParks’ ineptitude over rhino poaching.

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General Jooste had been an intensification of the counter-poaching rhetoric with the repeated use of militarized phraseology including an emphasis on words like ‘war’, ‘fighting’ and ‘insurgency’.64 Dr Mabunda described the campaign against poaching as a ‘low intensity war’, while General Jooste himself suggested that poaching constituted an ‘insurgency war’.65 Such language accords with the time-honoured mantra throughout recent South African history that the very fabric of society was under dire threat.66

Arguably, Dr Mabunda was progressing the rhino counter-poaching strategy along classic counter-insurgency lines by expanding the political element of the campaign along twin tracks, supported by the ‘Jooste war’. It would seem that on the one hand there was the chance that General Jooste’s efforts might reduce the rhino-poaching tally. If that failed to materialize, however, then the concurrent government campaign to open up debate about legalizing rhino-horn sales could turn into outright support, citing that the ‘hard power’ solution had been tried and had failed. Indeed, this would seem to be the line that Environment Minister Molewa has been steadily pushing. ‘Our rhinos are killed every day and the numbers are going up,’ she stated in March 2013: ‘The reality is that we have done all in our power and doing the same thing every day isn’t working. We do think that we need to address this issue of trade in a controlled manner so that we can at least begin to push down this pressure.’67

Moving towards a legal trade in rhino horn would certainly satisfy the economic interests of the white ranchers, the hunting lobby (such as the Professional Hunters Association of South Africa) and park managers.68 It would also address the concern of those few conservationists, like Duan Biggs, who believe that an outright ban results in ‘a situation where rhinos are being killed unnecessarily’. Biggs argues that anti-poaching efforts are ‘taking resources away from other conservation efforts, and … leading to the situation where there’s a pseudo-war taking place in the Kruger National Park’.69 Biggs proposed the legal farming of rhinos and the regular trimming of their horn, which would then grow back. If one accepts this line of thinking, then legalization of rhino horn would constitute a safe and humane response, as the animal would be able to live normally rather than left to bleed to death.70

Legalization might also provide a convenient political screen to finesse the vexatious issue of cross-border security with Mozambique, for which one

66 See e.g. Larson, ‘Kruger National Park steps up war on poachers’; Strauss, ‘Kruger National Park steps up fight against poachers’; Helfrich, ‘Anti-rhino poaching “war” to take on new intensity’.
solution would be the complete restoration and upgrading of the existing border-
line fence. However, to do this would not only be very expensive; it would counteract the rebuilding of regional collaboration post-apartheid. Currently, according to Dr Mabunda's own reckoning, cooperation between South Africa and Mozambique over poaching is 'dismal'. 'A poacher will run across the border and fire victory shots,' Mabunda claimed; 'He will sit in sight of the ranger and smoke because rangers dare not cross that line.' He continued: 'Should a SANParks official or a soldier shoot a poacher across the border it would create a serious international incident and might be seen as an act of war.'

During the last key meeting of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), known as the Conference of the Parties (CoP), held in Bangkok in 2013, Minister Molewa asked for the legalization of rhino horn sales to be discussed. The outcome of these discussions resolved to defer any decision until the next CoP meeting, to be held in Cape Town in 2016. Whether the timing of General Jooste’s appointment in advance of the Bangkok meeting was deliberate or not, it suggested nevertheless that Minister Molewa’s remarks were not made in isolation but were part of a revamped grand plan to deal with the scourge of rhino poaching.

The complex contending arguments over legalization

At the 2016 CITES meeting the question of legalizing rhino horn sales will loom large and is likely to provoke stormy debate. At one level the South African cabinet’s decision to propose that rhino horn should be sold on a controlled basis might be a candid reflection of the ‘rhinomics’ at stake: the economics being not only the rising costs of rhino protection but also the enormous financial rewards accruing from rhino horn, which can reputedly fetch between US$10,000 and US$40,000 per kilo. Both the South African ranchers, who are heavily reliant on rhinos for sport hunting and wildlife tourism, and the park authorities, who have already been raising funds through auctioning off captured rhinos, have seen the ever-increasing financial rewards being amassed by the illegal poaching networks. Anticipating the global ban being lifted, the South African ranchers have also diversified into extensive breeding and selling programmes as well as ‘horn harvesting’ to create stockpiles, spurred on by reports of impending competition from rhino-breeding programmes in China.

There is no doubt that by suggesting that the ban should be lifted the South African government is courting huge controversy. Against the advocates of legalization,

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72 Quoted in Helfrich, ‘Anti-rhino poaching “war” to take on new intensity’.
74 Platt, ‘As rhino poaching surges South Africa proposes legalized trade in precious horns’.
75 Platt, ‘As rhino poaching surges South Africa proposes legalized trade in precious horns’.
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conservationist critics point out that little evidence exists to indicate that legalizing the trade or permitting a one-off sale to glut the market would do anything except encourage poaching. A one-off sale of elephant ivory was sanctioned by CITES in 2008. Far from thwarting the market, it sent both demand and prices for ivory soaring, leading only to further pressure on endangered elephant populations. A primary concern, then, would be that a legalized trade, even one based on the humane farming of rhinos, would almost certainly not be policed effectively and that criminal networks of illegal poaching would continue to flourish, given that it would still be far more cost-effective to kill a wild rhino than farm one.

The most fundamental moral objection, though, is that a legalized trade would, in John Platt’s words, be giving spurious credibility to the ‘misconception that this keratinous body part has medicinal qualities’. For Peter Knights of the charity WildAid: ‘Legitimizing and promoting demand for rhino horn would inevitably create a far larger consumer base and once this genie is out we could never re-cork the bottle if the experiment went wrong.’ That rhino horn is widely touted in Asia as a cure for cancer is particularly harmful, as Will Travers, of the Born Free Foundation, observed:

So what are they saying by legalizing the rhino horn trade? Here is a product that every sensible scientist says has no significant impact and they are going to sell it at huge cost to a public that is ill-informed. I wouldn’t go to sleep at night if I thought I was selling something like that to a Vietnamese family who have scrimped and saved every cent to buy rhino horn for their dying grandmother, who then goes and dies.

Thus, should the trade in rhino horn be put on a legal footing some conservationists will rage, and there may even be calls for tourists and the sporting world to boycott South Africa. South African goods might also be subjected to boycott campaigns, which would be redolent of the apartheid years. There could even be attacks on rhino horn stockpile locations and on ranchers and their families, whether by committed wildlife supporters or criminal opportunists. These possible outcomes would further underscore South Africa’s history of political instability and current uncertainty that are woven into the country’s ‘rhino wars’: economic insecurity for both the white ranchers and rural blacks—though for differing reasons—against a background of varying degrees of violence. Domestic insecurities and instabilities are coupled with external threats, whether on the border or from foreign organizations embedded within South Africa, which today are the transnational crime networks lying at the heart of the ‘rhino wars’.


Platt, ‘As rhino poaching surges South Africa proposes legalized trade in precious horns’.

Quoted in Platt, ‘As rhino poaching surges South Africa proposes legalized trade in precious horns’.

Quoted in Rademeyer, ‘South Africa pushes for legal trade in rhino horn’.

In response to rhino poaching the South African authorities have resorted to the state’s customary response of increasing levels of ‘hard power’. The use of force—or the threat of its use—increasingly underpins the ‘rhinofication’ of South Africa’s politics through greater weaponization and a counter-force approach on the part of both the police and army. Accompanying this development is the greater ‘securitization’ of selected areas, such as the use of ‘citadel’ core wildlife protection zones and priority national security areas, especially along the border with Mozambique. Additionally, the heightened rhetoric of threat has traditionally resonated with the white population, with fears of ‘total onslaught’ both politically and racially. Historically, this has engendered the trope of the ‘laager mentality’ of ‘backs to the wall’ isolation that was perceived as having prolonged the life of the apartheid regime into the late twentieth century.

Despite well-publicized murders and attacks on individuals, the main threat to the white rancher population is economic. While current yields in products like wheat have been rising slowly at about 2.4 per cent per annum, data showing an increasing ‘desertification’ process of land that was never fertile and requiring either intensive irrigation or large areas for cattle to roam and feed makes the cost-effectiveness of agricultural production a progressively marginal business. Increasingly the ranchers have turned to harnessing wildlife as their key economic resource, for differing types of tourism and for breeding. In both cases the role of the rhino is pivotal, with rhino horn an added bonus.

The role of the rhino in the political economy of South Africa

The killing of wildlife, especially the elephant and rhinoceros, has always loomed large at the crosshairs of politics and history in South Africa. Here the fortunes of wildlife have been closely bound to a battle of protective legislation versus

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hunting, raiding and poaching, set against a backdrop of political change and the use of violence. To understand the complexity of rhino conservation, one must appreciate the importance of the rhino in the political economy of pre- and post-colonial South Africa. In the past, rhinoceros hide was used in South Africa principally for a variety of leather goods, such as the all-purpose sjambok whip (used for cattle driving but also synonymous with the South African police under apartheid). Today Vietnam has overtaken China as the main market for rhino horn, though horn is still widely exported to satisfy the traditional Chinese medicine market, while the trade to Yemen, for handles of the jambiya ceremonial daggers, has dwindled significantly.90

The point here is that the rhino has long held a role in the economy of southern Africa. Traditionally regarded as a major resource, in pre-colonial days hunting was an important part of the local economy and diet. Hunting could be loosely categorized as defensive, in order to protect humans, crops or stock; as a domestic resource, to supply meat, skins and receptacles; or for trading purposes, to supply mainly ivory but also horns, hides and pelts. Furthermore, the large-scale hunt was a fundamental element in establishing social and political relations. In Natal, for example, the Nguni tribe traditionally placed great emphasis on hunting, on both a small and a large scale, which the chief or king would additionally appropriate as a way of keeping his regiments employed in peacetime.91

With the arrival of colonial rule the use of wildlife by indigenous people for quotidian purposes was replaced by the ‘store’ or itinerant traders, while the colonists harnessed the killing of wildlife as a crucial resource in their expansion across Africa, for food, for trade and as a means of paying for labour. Hunting also gave colonizers the impetus to expand frontiers, but as the encroachment on the land increased so the land became a wasting asset for both the indigenous people and the wildlife. Entwined with these developments came a debate about whether the wildlife was res nullius (nobody’s property) or res publicae (the property of everyone). ‘Few regions of the world’, according to John Mackenzie, ‘had richer and more exploitable game resources than southern Africa. Even fewer witnessed such a dramatic decline in the space of half a century.’ Mackenzie added that the exploitation of game resources was ‘the essential concomitant of missionary endeavour and the initial survival mechanism of the frontier’.92

The Dutch East India Company introduced the first game legislation in South Africa as early as 1657. By the mid-nineteenth century both the Orange Free State and the South African Republic had also introduced game laws.93 With growing concern about the decline in wildlife populations, a split began to emerge at the end of the century between the ‘preservationist’ supporters, who wanted to preserve

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wildlife for sport, and the ‘conservationists’ who wanted to conserve wildlife for its own sake. This struggle gave rise in Britain to the Society for the Preservation of the Fauna of the Empire (SPFE), a powerful, socially and politically well-connected group, and predecessor of today’s Cambridge-based Fauna and Flora International, which spearheaded two fundamental pieces of legislation: the 1900 Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa signed in London, followed in 1933 by the Agreement for the Protection of the Fauna and Flora of Africa. The London Convention was broadly a ‘preservationist’ document and the Agreement ‘conservationist’: the former ushered in ‘reserves’ as areas for game management and hunting to the exclusion of humans, while the second initiated ‘national parks’ that encouraged visitors with no hunting allowed.

Overall, the legislation handed over the administration and enforcement of wildlife management to white settlers or the colonial authorities. It also turned wildlife economically from a direct resource for trade and food into one based on sport and tourism, and thereby stopped indigenous Africans from hunting. This process not only had a highly negative impact by turning hunting into poaching but was also another way for white settlers to establish control over land, which over time became inalienable, as well as a ‘code’ that established western attitudes and etiquette in hunting as appropriate and correct.

For South Africa’s white population nature created a sense of authenticity, both ecological and political, in the development of a distinctive white tribal nationalism that also helped to bridge large cultural differences between the Afrikaners and English-speaking whites. This was reflected in the Kruger National Park being named after Paul Kruger (1825–1904), President of the Transvaal, who first suggested the idea of a park, while the venerable former Prime Minister of South Africa, General Jan Smuts (1870–1950), was both an expert botanist and naturalist who lived simply on a farm outside Johannesburg. The evolution of this distinctive white ‘exceptionalist’ identity would also help to explain the involvement of a number of white professionals in rhino poaching: with backgrounds either in ranching, veterinary services or professional hunting, these whites were expressing their cultural inheritance of unfettered control of wildlife management.

By the end of the nineteenth century the range of the white and black rhino in South Africa had been reduced to a relatively small area at the junction of the Black and White Umfolozi rivers in Natal, an area that was later turned into the Umfolozi and Hluhluwe Game Parks. In South Africa today, most rhinos inhabit privately owned land. A survey undertaken by the Department of Rural

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Development and Land Reform in 2013 found that 79 per cent of South African land was privately owned in a variety of forms, as opposed to 14 per cent owned by the state. In the Northern Cape province, for example, 1.8 million hectares were in state ownership, with 35.2 million hectares being in private hands. Of the private land in South Africa a sizeable proportion is owned by the white population, which constitutes 8.9 per cent of the overall population, according to a 2011 census. Consequently, it was calculated that the majority black population is concentrated in only 13 per cent of land (approximately 16 million hectares) in a country that comprises 113 million hectares.

Today, rhinos in South Africa are protected under both internal and external legislation. Domestically, the protection of the rhino is enshrined in the National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act (NEMBA), which stipulates a maximum penalty for illegal possession of rhino horn of five years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both. Externally, any trade in rhinos, alive or dead, has since 1975 been controlled by CITES. The convention is voluntary to join but legally binding on its 179 signatories.

Counter-poaching, counter-insurgency, policing and man-hunting

It is on this complicated, combustible backdrop of history, politics and economics, both national and international, mixed in with the social and racial undertones of South Africa’s past, that the ‘rhino wars’ are etched. This matrix dominates the current debate over the best way to protect the future of the rhino, especially how to resolve the policing roles with more militarized approaches to counter-poaching. Here, part of the significance of General Jooste’s appointment was the implicit suggestion of an increase of ‘hard power’ tactics in counter-poaching, drawing on General Jooste’s military background, as well as South African counter-insurgency experience during the ‘apartheid wars’.

Prior to General Jooste’s appointment as SANParks Commanding Officer (Special Projects), he held the commercially significant position of director of International Business Development for BAE Systems (Land Systems South Africa). Swapping his salesman’s suit for olive-green fatigues and an office in the Kruger National Park was a change that General Jooste seemed to relish. In 1971, in his early twenties, General Jooste joined the SADF, just as South Africa’s war with neighbouring ‘front-line states’ was entering its bloodiest and most bitter phase as apartheid’s ‘total strategy’ operated by the National Party mixed classic

103 See Johan Jooste’s profile on http://www.linkedin.com/.

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counter-insurgency field tactics with a policy of destabilization both internally and externally, alongside a home-front mantra of ‘total onslaught’ that portrayed white society as under siege.\textsuperscript{104} It is this jagged historical landscape that reverberates through the ‘Jooste war’, which is not surprising given that General Jooste was for over 20 years closely involved in the ‘apartheid wars’, fighting largely in the combat cockpit of South West Africa/Namibia.\textsuperscript{105} With the end of apartheid General Jooste continued in the newly constituted SANDF until his retirement in 2006, broadening his experience by gaining a degree in Commerce as well as a Master’s degree in Business Administration applied to military and strategic leadership.

During apartheid, the Malaya Emergency and the British response heavily influenced the counter-insurgency strategy of South Africa and neighbouring Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. Both General Peter Walls, commander of the Rhodesian Army, and one of his top commanders, Lieutenant-Colonel Ron Reid-Daly, founder of the Selous Scouts, fought in the SAS ‘C’ Squadron in Malaya. The most influential South African soldier with experience in Malaya was Lieutenant-General Charles ‘Pop’ Fraser, a veteran also of the Second World War. Fraser’s influence came both from his operational rank, first as Chief of the South African Army in 1966 and then as General Officer Commanding Joint Combat Forces (1967–73), and from a series of key writings. Fraser’s text, \textit{Lessons learnt from past revolutionary wars}, was published in the early 1960s and was followed by another study, \textit{Revolutionary warfare: basic principles of counter-insurgency}.\textsuperscript{106} These works distilled lessons both from the Malaya experience and the more hard-line ‘French school’ of counter-insurgency as articulated in works by soldiers-turned-scholars like David Galula and Roger Trinquier.\textsuperscript{107}

Modern counter-insurgency thinking emphasizes a distinction between ‘enemy-centric’ measures, which call for hard kinetic operations aimed at eliminating insurgents, and ‘population-centric’ approaches to deter the civilian population from supporting the insurgency, showing them that their best form of protection and social advancement lies in supporting the government. David Kilcullen called this latter form of counter-insurgent activity ‘armed social work’. For Kilcullen, the crucial point was that “hearts” means persuading people [that] their best interests are served by your success; “minds” means convincing them that you can protect them and that resisting you is pointless. Note that neither concept has to do with whether people like you. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts.”\textsuperscript{108}


\textsuperscript{105} For an assessment of the ‘total onslaught’ strategy, see De Wet Potgieter, \textit{Total onslaught: apartheid’s dirty tricks exposed} (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2007).


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One of the key difficulties confronting any ‘hearts and minds’ approach to counter-poaching is not only how to make a distinction between enemy-centric and population-centric operations but also the separation of the law enforcement role of the police from the harder-edged operations of the army. In South Africa’s case this blurring process follows a long history of punitive counter-insurgency, border wars and suppression of internal civil disturbance. During the height of the ‘apartheid wars’ these roles sometimes became interchangeable, or even reversed, as demonstrated in Namibia/South West Africa. While the army was mounting ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns alongside combat operations, the paramilitary Koevoet ‘Crowbar’ force of the then South African Police followed a separate agenda of ‘hit and run’ raids, interrogation with torture, and generally sowing discord.109

Policing in contemporary South Africa is underpinned by the tactical interchangeability of domestic policing and paramilitary roles. Increased operational integration between SAPS and SANDF includes joint ‘security operations’ and the exchange of equipment. Also bridging the gap between the police and military are paramilitary SWAT-type units, most notably the Special Task Force (STF) and the Tactical Response Team (TRT). Police forces in Africa today reflect their colonial heritage, their principal modus operandi being to provide law and order, protection of property and pacification of the local population. These are still the defining elements of policing in Africa: post-colonial rulers of all stripes have maintained a powerful grip on police operations, and in return the police have been allowed generally to operate with considerable autonomy. For the South African police, the inherited pacification tradition, combined with a lack of training to deal with both complex criminal issues and large ‘ungoverned spaces’, encourages a reaction to use brute force in tense situations such as the Marikana mine massacre. Consequently, public confidence in the police force is low.110

A graphic illustration of the public’s lack of faith in the police has been the phenomenal growth of the private security industry in South Africa, which is the biggest in the world with some 9,000 registered businesses employing 400,000 registered security guards—more than the combined strength of the South African police and armed forces.111 According to the Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa, private security firms increasingly perform ‘functions which used to be the sole preserve of the police. This has, and will continue to have a serious influence on the functioning of the criminal justice system as a whole.’112 Developments such as these take place against the backdrop of daunting crime statistics for murder, robbery and sexual assault.113
Jasper Humphreys and M. L. R. Smith

To summarize, in ‘classic’ interpretations of counter-insurgency a line is drawn—however oblique—between counter-insurgency and policing, according to the precise calibration of the use of force and legality. The former is predicated on the application of hard military power, often outside the constraints of civil law, whereas in the latter this is not sanctioned—or not supposed to be—given that it is not only the law that is intended to check the power of the police but also the need to maintain the support of the population. However, with the erosion of distinctions, in terms of both defining conflict and the application of armed force, come new patterns of violence—as can be seen in the evolving counter-poaching dynamic in South Africa.

Most notable in this respect is the emphasis on the ‘hunt’ and, more specifically, ‘man-hunting’. Political geographer Derek Gregory suggests that the widening use of drone strikes in anti-terrorist operations indicates both the ‘individuation of warfare’, as reflected in a strategy of ‘man-hunting’ which in turn is ‘a new form of networked (para) military violence’. According to Marks, Meer and Nilson, ‘man-hunting’ departs from established practices in war in that there are no battles and no need to meet the enemy face to face, except briefly. ‘In the competition between two enemy combatants, the goal is to win the battle by defeating the adversary—both combatants must confront to win’, whereas, the authors continue: ‘a man-hunt scenario differs in that each player’s strategy is different. The fugitive always wants to avoid capture, while the pursuer always wants to engage and capture the target—the pursuer must confront to win, whereas the fugitive must evade to win.’

In 2009 George A. Crawford published a paper that proposed to make ‘man-hunting a foundation of US national strategy’. Crawford’s report, which was widely circulated, referenced not only drones and ‘targeted assassinations’ but also the wider implications of operations specifically focused on human beings. For Crawford, the aim of ‘man-hunting’ is ‘to detect, deter, disrupt, detain, or destroy networks’. Here the threat, for Grégoire Chamayou, ‘is not determined by the seriousness of an act committed, but by the estimated danger of an individual’. The most striking example of ‘man-hunting’ was the killing of Osama bin Laden by American special forces in May 2011, suitably choreographed as ‘the hunt for bin Laden’.

www.saps.gov.za/resource_centre/publications/statistics/crimestats/2013/downloads/crime_statistics_presentation.pdf, accessed 19 May 2014. However, the levels of aggravated crime remain alarmingly high. During the period April 2011 to March 2012, 15,609 murders, 64,514 sexual offences and 101,203 aggravated robberies were reported in South Africa. See Eastwood, ‘Bigger than the army’.

117 Crawford, Manhunting, p. 12.
119 e.g. ITV1’s documentary The hunt for bin Laden, 1 May 2012. See David Blair, ‘The hunt for bin Laden, ITV1’ review’, Daily Telegraph, 1 May 2012.
Thus, the essential ‘hunting’ element within counter-poaching in South Africa has been ‘legitimized’ by developments in modern military tactics as well as relentless media coverage. However, when examining this legitimization it is worth bearing in mind Eric Hobsbawm’s classic distinction between ‘bandits’ and ‘social bandits’. While the bandit ‘simultaneously challenges the economic, social and political order by challenging those who hold or lay claim to power, law and the control of resources’, the latter ‘are peasant outlaws whom the lord and state regard as criminals, but who remain within peasant society’. Hobsbawm adds that in rural areas these figures were often seen as ‘men to be admired, helped and supported’. In relation to poaching he pointed to the case of Mathias Klostermayr: an eighteenth-century ‘social bandit’ in Bavaria who terrorized hunters, gamekeepers and anyone associated with game. For Hobsbawm, while Klostermayr’s own poaching was ‘an activity peasants always regarded as legitimate, he was admired and helped’. What Hobsbawm’s observation enables us to see is not that current-day rhino poachers should be admired, but that in order to counteract them, the social circumstances that produce them should, at the very least, be understood, and where possible their life options improved to provide alternatives to poaching.

Through their actions, the poachers clearly present a security challenge, albeit one with no overt political agenda, to established interests belonging to both the state and the private sector. Unlike Klostermayr, rhino poachers in themselves are unknown to the wider world—expendable cogs in a massive global trade. Yet the unscripted political element within the poacher’s identity is highlighted in Hobsbawm’s evaluation of the ‘social bandit’, for it is the poacher who exposes not only the vulnerabilities of the state’s security but also its faltering governance. From that perspective, if rhino poaching is condoned by the rural inhabitants then counter-poaching runs the risk of being seen as not only without popular support but also as a strategy that supports the interests of a minority elite, which in the case of South Africa is the predominately white-run ranch and tourism industry. Despite powerful external factors outside General Jooste’s control such as the insatiable demand for rhino horn, ineffective international anti-wildlife trafficking strategies and corruption, the enhanced ‘hard power’ approach of General Jooste is in danger of reprising the historic mistake made by South Africa during the ‘apartheid wars’: the failure to show commitment towards a meaningful programme of social and economic redress.

Conclusion

Few would disagree that the rhino needs and deserves better protection from the predatory activities of poaching gangs and that part of that effort must necessarily encompass the use of force to deter and punish the poachers. If, however, a

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counter-poaching strategy is to have any prospect of long-term success, it must also embrace a plan to persuade both poachers and the wider population who might be tempted to poach that there are better alternatives on offer. In the context of rhino poaching this calls for a high-profile and widespread programme predominately focused on South Africa’s rural population. Such a programme would involve, among other things, land reform, housing and social aid, but above all it would have the integration of biodiversity conservation as its centrepiece.\textsuperscript{122}

Without such a commitment all the talk of ‘war’ that surrounds ‘Operation Rhino’ actually amounts to an inward-looking, ‘more of the same’ mixture of paramilitary patrolling and policing, much of the rhetoric of the ‘rhino war’ being bluster for media consumption. In effect, the ‘Jooste war’ replicates Nick Steele’s ‘Farm Patrol’ plan during apartheid, representing an extension of the time-honoured ‘pacification’ dynamic in South African history for the protection of minority interests. This dynamic negates the efforts to gain popular support for counter-poaching within the poor black rural population, who instead see it as part of the historic tradition of white ‘exceptionalism’, which always precluded meaningful black involvement with wildlife management and conservation. From that perspective it is unsurprising that rhino poaching in South Africa has soared with counter-poaching instead being viewed by the large underclass as another strand in the ‘war on the poor’, making the depressing possibility of increased rhino poaching even more likely, if not certain.