

associated with the two groups. Sea turtles are highly charismatic and their consumptive use for food or trade is politically unacceptable in some countries. The Parties have not made a single significant decision that enhanced consumptive use or trade in sea turtles. Crocodiles, on the other hand, are seen to have no charisma and thus proposals involving consumptive use and trade have been regularly accepted by the Parties to CITES. This dichotomy in the way in which the Parties treat sea turtles and crocodiles does not appear to be based on the conservation needs of the two groups, although it is often argued on that basis. Rather, it seems to reflect the charismatic nature of sea turtles, and the non-charismatic character of crocodiles.

Chapter 10

Zimbabwe and CITES: Influencing the International Regime

Phyllis Mofson

INTRODUCTION

Over the last several years, Zimbabwe's attitude toward, and behaviour regarding, CITES has changed dramatically. A member since 1983 and brought into the debate by its opposition to the listing of the African elephant as an endangered species, Zimbabwe has emerged as a leader at the international level in promoting a sustainable-use paradigm within the CITES regime. The portrait of Zimbabwe's involvement painted in this chapter shows that multilateral agreements can be influenced significantly by Parties which feel unjustly treated, no matter how small these Parties may be in economic terms. Zimbabwe's approach to CITES has evolved from a position of angry protest, with threats of withdrawal, to the assumption of a leadership role, actively working within the CITES system to alter the nature and strategies of the organization. These efforts to initiate changes in regime procedures and principles have the potential to influence the future of CITES in far more permanent ways than the more visible and politically charged battles over individual species.

The examples of Zimbabwe and its neighbours in the Southern African Convention on Wildlife Management (SACWM) suggest that, rather than requiring the surrender of some degree of national sovereignty and power, membership in CITES can, in some cases, enhance sovereignty and the power to advance national interests in the international arena. Through learning to become an inside player in the CITES system, Zimbabwe has not only influenced CITES and its issue domain, but has empowered itself as an international actor.

CITES, ZIMBABWE AND ELEPHANTS

The African elephant was first listed under Appendix II in 1978, and a quota system on ivory was established in 1985. From 1979 to 1988, Zimbabwe exported about 100 tons of ivory to the international market. During the time the elephant was listed in Appendix II the illegal ivory trade swamped the legal trade in quantity, due to rampant poaching and smuggling throughout large parts of Africa. There is no real dispute that the population of African elephants continent-wide fell by as much as 50 per cent during the 1980s. Although herds in some southern African nations suffered, the range states of East Africa accounted for the majority of the elephants lost.

The discussion about moving the African elephant from Appendix II to Appendix I began in earnest in the 12 months prior to the seventh COP, which was held in Lausanne, Switzerland in 1989. It was prompted by the apparent failure of the ivory-export-quota system. This mechanism had initially been heralded with cautious optimism by the Parties to CITES and NGOs alike. After just two years, however, TRAFFIC concluded that the system had 'succeeded in controlling the movement of only 20 to 40 per cent of the total amount of ivory produced annually in Africa' (Thomsen, 1989, p 1). Furthermore, the quota system allowed for government-regulated trade in confiscated ivory. TRAFFIC estimated that because of this loophole, up to 70 per cent of the so-called legal ivory trade came from illegally hunted elephants.

In the autumn of 1988, in response to the failure of the CITES ivory-quota system to control the poaching of elephants, the US unilaterally adopted the African Elephant Conservation Act, which allowed it to impose a moratorium on imports of ivory from any country which participated in the ivory trade, or which was not a member of CITES. The US action, combined with an NGO-driven campaign in the US and Europe to change consumer attitudes towards ivory, resulted in a significant drop in the worldwide demand for ivory. Europe followed the US with a unilateral ban on commercial imports of ivory.

THE LAUSANNE COP

The Appendix I listing for the African elephant was proposed at the Lausanne COP by Austria, Gambia, Hungary, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and the US. The proposal, based on recommendations from

the CITES African Elephant Working Group and studies commissioned by the specially-convened Ivory Trade Review Group, was adopted over the objections of eleven countries, including the southern African countries, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Four countries, including Japan, abstained from the vote. The southern African objectors and the People's Republic of China registered reservations to the listing within the prescribed 90-day period (China subsequently withdrew its reservation). Zimbabwe officially entered a reservation to the listing even before the meeting ended.

The Appendix I listing virtually ended what remained of the international commercial ivory trade. However, at the time of the listing the population of elephants in Zimbabwe and Botswana was considered stable or rising, with up to 120,000 animals in the contiguous population of the two countries. In light of these numbers and in view of their well-regulated trade in ivory, the southern African countries protested that the new listing was patently unfair.

Even before the Lausanne COP, it was acknowledged by many Parties and experts that a total commercial ivory trade ban would have adverse effects on conservation programmes in certain countries, and it was generally acknowledged that Zimbabwe had a legitimate and intractable problem. However, without a proven means either to distinguish legal from illegal ivory or to control legal trade tightly, the international consensus maintained that a total ban was necessary. Nevertheless, convinced by the arguments of Zimbabwe and other southern African countries that not all of Africa's elephant herds were endangered, the Parties adopted a proposal from Somalia to establish a review process for countries that wanted to have their elephants downlisted back to Appendix II.

In an attempt to gain greater control over their ivory exports, which they assumed would resume after the next COP, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, and Malawi formed an organization called the Southern African Centre for Ivory Marketing (SACIM). This was designed to be the 'sole exporting agency of ivory from members' (Ricciuti, 1993, p30). In August 1991, Zimbabwe hosted a SACIM workshop on the future of CITES. Although designed primarily as a forum for airing grievances, several influential documents emerged from the workshop, including a set of recommendations for new criteria for listing species in CITES Appendices and a report entitled *The Case for a New Convention on International Trade in Wild Species of Flora and Fauna*. This report contained a polemical argument to the effect that CITES is full of major defects, does not work, and

needs to be replaced. On acceding to CITES following its independence, Namibia took a reservation on the African elephant and joined SACIM. Zambia, in contrast, withdrew from the agreement following a change in its government.

THE KYOTO COP

At the eighth COP held in Kyoto, Japan in March 1992, the SACIM countries submitted a joint proposal to downlist their elephant herds to Appendix II; however only two, Zimbabwe and Botswana, met the Somali Amendment conditions set at Lausanne for downlisting their herds. Partly as a result of this, but also in an effort to allay the fears of other African Parties over the resumption of an ivory trade, the SACIM countries amended their proposal during the conference to include a zero-quota on ivory sales, a removal of their reservations, and an automatic return of their elephant populations to Appendix I at the next COP if they could not present acceptable plans for ivory marketing and elephant management by that time. Despite these concessions, however, opposition remained overwhelming, and the proposals were finally withdrawn. In his speech withdrawing the SACIM resolution, Botswana's Minister of the Environment said, 'We are extremely perplexed... It seems to us that the goalposts have been moved... We will review our participation in CITES as soon as we have reported to our respective governments'.

Most observers concede that Zimbabwe had a legitimate case for downlisting. Its elephant herds were not endangered and were being competently managed. So, its assumption that a downlisting would be adopted at Kyoto was logical and reasonable, based on the final outcome of the seventh COP and the adoption of the review process. As a result, Zimbabwean officials were extremely upset with what they considered the politicization of the elephant protection issue. However, the outcome was clearly not entirely unexpected. In preparation for the eighth COP, Zimbabwe and its SACIM partners had submitted a proposal to list the northern Atlantic herring in Appendix I. The proposal, which was weak in supporting data, was withdrawn after discussion allowed Zimbabwe to make its point that CITES listings were increasingly being used for political purposes and not grounded in any scientific criteria. The herring was chosen because it is an important commercial commodity for many European countries, just as, Zimbabwe argues, the elephant is for many African range states.

It has been observed that the charge of 'politicization' of conservation decisions within CITES is largely levelled against arguments and proposals that are counter to the interests and aims of the party so charging, and that it has been levelled against proponents and opponents of sustainable use alike. It is a somewhat disingenuous charge, in that the CITES regime – like all international treaty organizations – is inherently political. Parties use politics within CITES, as in any political organization, to promote changes that will serve the Parties' own self-interested visions for the future. These changes involve both the structure of the regime itself, as well as the domain over which the regime exerts regulatory and normative influence. In the CITES context, however, a charge of 'politicization' implies that the decision in question has been taken without regard for the scientific evidence. This implication, and its converse – that a decision based on scientific evidence is somehow devoid of political considerations – are not merely naive, but manipulative. As with most great environmental debates of our age, there is often sound scientific evidence available to support any reasonable position. Such decisions, however, are taken not only in the context of scientific research but of political and economic realities as well. Nonetheless, derogatory charges of 'politicization' began to multiply at the Kyoto COP, and in the coverage in the popular press and according to some NGOs, this seemed to herald the discrediting and potential downfall of the CITES regime itself. TRAFFIC's analysis of the eighth COP included the following assessment: 'Many conference decisions were made without regard for scientific data... with the results reflecting political expediency rather than practical conservation' (Hemley, 1992, p 1).

It was at the eighth COP in Kyoto that a number of underlying tensions in CITES were brought to a head and the dispute over the Appendix I listing of the African elephant became the trigger for a larger debate over the appropriate environmental conservation paradigm to be employed by the CITES regime: sustainable use or preservation. The southern Africans were vocal advocates of the view that in many cases wildlife can only be conserved by exploiting it for economic gain. A SACIM proposal calling for CITES to recognize the benefits of trade for wildlife conservation resulted in Resolution Conf 8.3, which acknowledges 'that commercial trade may be beneficial to the conservation of species...when carried out at levels that are not detrimental to the survival of the species in question'. The importance of this resolution was overshadowed by SACIM's defeat on the downlisting proposal, but it served as a precursor to bigger changes later on.

The southern Africans stressed that the economic profit that can be gleaned from the use of wildlife gives value to that wildlife and thus provides a genuine motive for people to manage and conserve the resource. Such use might range from eco-tourism to selling hunting rights to marketing products from culled wild or ranched animals. Some Americans, Europeans and members of the environmental NGO community, however, were suspicious of the appeal to the sustainable-use paradigm within the CITES context. They believed it was being used, in some cases, as a front for an economically driven pro-trade position, regardless of the effect of such policies on wildlife conservation.

Pushing the sustainable-use approach in CITES was one way Zimbabwe began to link its economic interests in trading ivory to an environmental idea that was gaining popularity elsewhere. For example, the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Brazil three months after the eighth COP, insisted that environmental protection and economic development must go hand in hand, if either is to be achieved. Sustainable use is a fundamental principle of the Convention on Biological Diversity, which was signed at UNCED by some 150 countries. Southern African delegations openly wondered whether that philosophy was compatible with the CITES regime, which they saw as taking a fundamentally different approach.

CRISIS AS A PRELUDE TO CHANGE

The Kyoto Conference initiated what can only be called a constitutional crisis for CITES. At Kyoto, CITES began to focus its attention on species which represented large-scale commercial industries for range states and consumer states alike. The African elephant was only one of these species; others included the bluefin tuna and several tropical timber species. In each case, member states with important economic interests in the species argued that it should be kept off the CITES appendices. When its downlisting proposal was rejected at Kyoto, Zimbabwe threatened to withdraw from CITES. Instead, it stayed and drafted a document known as CITES II which was floated informally to several Parties. The report, a rather radical denunciation of CITES, was drafted by Zimbabwe's Scientific Authority. Its stated purpose was to transform 'the present CITES to a new convention which rectifies some of the perceived defects and is more closely aligned with modern conservation concepts'. These 'perceived defects'

included claims that CITES' protection had not measurably improved the status of any listed species; that CITES is founded on outdated conservation principles that are inconsistent with the goal of sustainable development; and that it is an imperialist treaty, codifying 'the entrenched dominance of Western importing states... [which] is a source of political irritation to developing countries'.

In responding to a questionnaire about CITES in October 1992 (about the time CITES II was being floated), a Zimbabwean CITES representative wrote:

- Q. What have been the advantages and disadvantages for Zimbabwe in participating in CITES? On balance, which dominate?
- a) *Advantages: It is very difficult to think of any. In a nihilistic sense we have needed to be members of CITES to ensure that some wildlife products (eg crocodile skins) find their best markets. Certainly, there have been no conservation advantages.*
 - b) *Disadvantages: They are legion. Without considering the obvious case of listing elephants on Appendix I (to which it could be argued that we would be no worse off as non-Parties), there are a number of cases where the bureaucracy surrounding CITES business seriously prejudices our attempts to promote wildlife as a general form of land use in Zimbabwe...*
 - c) *Without a doubt, the disadvantages of CITES totally outweigh any benefits attached to being Parties. It would be accurate to state that we are forced to remain in the CITES forum if only to protect our interests.¹*

This is clearly an unhappy and disillusioned view of CITES, but it does indicate the beginning of a shift from total rejection to a decision to remain within the organization and to attempt to change it from the inside.

THE FORT LAUDERDALE COP

Only two proposals relating to elephants were brought to the ninth COP, held in 1994 in Fort Lauderdale. South Africa proposed downlisting its elephants to Appendix II, to permit trade in hides, hair, and

¹ Anonymous Zimbabwe official, written response to questionnaire by author, October 1992

meat only, with a continued ban on ivory trade; and Sudan asked for a one-time downlisting of its elephant population to allow it to sell its ivory stockpile. Zimbabwe and the other SACIM countries did not offer any downlisting proposals, probably because they believed that there was no chance of success at a meeting held in the US. The South African proposal was opposed by virtually all other African range states, including Zimbabwe and its SACIM partners. The US delegation, while finding the proposal scientifically sound, said it could not support it in the face of range state opposition. South Africa later withdrew its proposal when it became obvious that it could not garner sufficient votes for its adoption.

It is critical to understand why Zimbabwe did not support the South Africans in their effort. First, they believed that the South African proposal did not go far enough and therefore did not deserve their support. Moreover, they feared that the adoption of South Africa's proposal and a trade in elephant hide could cause the ivory trade to be banned permanently. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Zimbabwe was changing its strategies for dealing with CITES. Zimbabwe had begun to combine its protests and denunciation of CITES with increasingly successful efforts to increase its power within CITES and to change the way the organization works. As one official put it:

[We have discovered that it is] better to work on CITES from within. It doesn't end with elephants; once you are an outsider you have no input or involvement..... We realize we will benefit from staying in [CITES], and now we are hosting [the next COP].²

THE HARARE COP

The 1997 Harare COP represented a swing back of the pendulum from the period of the Kyoto crisis towards a less polarized approach both to the African elephant question and to the general issue of the place of sustainable use in conservation. Although the discussions at the conference were often heated, in the end the COP accepted the proposals of Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia to downlist their elephant populations from Appendix I to Appendix II. The conditions of the downlisting are:

² Nhema, Claudius, Counsellor, Embassy of Zimbabwe. Interview with author, October 1994

- only these populations will be downlisted and all other African elephant populations will remain on Appendix I;
- the ban on the ivory trade continues until at least 21 months after the end of the tenth COP (March 1999 at the earliest) and the conditions are certified to have been met;
- Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia agree to withdraw their reservations to the Appendix I listing of the African elephant;
- a series of trade control and management mechanisms are certified by the CITES Standing Committee and Secretariat to be in place in the exporting countries;
- international law enforcement cooperation and reporting and monitoring systems have to be put in place; and
- the trade must begin with an experimental quota for legally held and registered ivory stocks, which can be shipped in one shipment each from Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia to Japan only.

Continued trade in ivory after the one time shipments would require new proposals to be submitted and approved at the next COP in early 2000.

Unlike at the Fort Lauderdale COP, where range state opposition to the South African downlisting proposal was responsible to a large extent for its failure, the range states were united in support of the downlisting proposal from Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia. This regional consensus was instrumental in garnering the support of other states and international wildlife organizations for the proposal.

An additional outcome of the Harare COP was the establishment of a new mechanism to generate funds for elephant conservation. Range states will declare their government-held ivory stocks, which will then be made available for a one-time purchase for non-commercial purposes. The revenue from these sales will be managed for elephant conservation through conservation trust funds. The issue of whether such stockpiles would be required to be destroyed after the purchase is unresolved and potentially highly controversial, as the release of large new quantities of ivory may pose security risks for range and consumer states alike.

ZIMBABWE'S INFLUENCE ON CITES

Due to the high visibility and political volatility of the elephant downlisting issue at the eighth COP in Kyoto, it appeared that the southern African elephant range states left that meeting very much as losers,

with only the sop of a much compromised resolution on the potential benefits of commercial trade. However, on a number of less obvious issues, these countries saw several of their resolutions accepted by the Parties. Some of these, including new listing criteria for species, had the potential to influence the future of CITES in more fundamental and permanent ways than any downlisting of the African elephant.

One of the most important documents to come out of the 1994 Fort Lauderdale COP was Resolution Conf 9.24: Criteria for Amendment of Appendix I and II which, adopted against the initial wishes of a number of economically powerful Parties including the US, laid out new procedures for listing, downlisting and removing species on CITES appendices. The adoption of the new criteria can be traced to the previous COP, where Zimbabwe introduced a new set of listing criteria, which were referred to as the 'Kyoto Criteria'. Zimbabwe's proposal was rejected by the Parties, but a resolution was adopted (Resolution Conf 8.20) which directed the Standing Committee to draft a revision of the 'Berne Criteria' for listing species. Among the new listing criteria that Zimbabwe presented at Kyoto was the requirement that the Party proposing the listing must consult with the range states prior to introducing the proposal to the Parties. This was an important theme in Zimbabwe's charges – elaborated in the CITES II document – that the convention is imperialist and dominated by wealthy wildlife consumer countries who do not take the views of the range states into account. The new criteria adopted at Fort Lauderdale refer explicitly on two separate occasions to the importance of consulting with range states, and require that details of range state management, monitoring, and conservation programmes for the species in question be provided before listing is considered by the CITES Parties.

Other new factors that must be taken into account include biological data concerning population status and trends, distribution, habitat and threats. In addition, data about utilization and trade in the species must be provided. Many observers believe that the net result of the new criteria, which are more scientific and objective than listings based on the Berne criteria, will be to make it more difficult to list species on Appendix I, and easier to downlist from Appendix I to Appendix II, which would clearly be of benefit to Zimbabwe and other pro-trade countries.

Southern Africa was also instrumental in changing the committee and power structure of the CITES regime itself so as to accord more weight to the input of developing countries and range states. For

example, the CITES Standing Committee is the most powerful constituent organ of the convention. Prior to the Fort Lauderdale COP, the membership of the Standing Committee was composed of one Party from each of six geographical regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, Oceania, and South and Central America and the Caribbean. The host countries of the previous and upcoming COPs are also Standing Committee members. This formula gave disproportionately high representation to regions with fewer Parties – such as North America, with three, and Oceania, with four – at the expense of the larger Asian and African regions. Zimbabwe certainly viewed the Standing Committee's composition as further evidence of the 'imperialist' nature of CITES. At Fort Lauderdale, Malawi introduced a proposal to more fairly reapportion representation on the Standing Committee. The proposal met with great support from the majority of developing countries and was adopted by the Parties. The new Standing Committee provides for approximately one representative for every fifteen Parties, allowing Africa three, Asia two, Europe two, South and Central America two, and North America and Oceania one each. The African representatives are Namibia, Senegal, and Sudan.

In addition to composition changes, the Fort Lauderdale COP also resulted in an unexpected change in the Standing Committee chairmanship. When New Zealand's term ended, the position did not go to the UK, as expected, but to Japan. Although Japan is a large industrialized country and a major consumer of many CITES-listed species and products, it tends not to share the views of some other consumer states, such as the US and many EU states. Instead, it supports a pro-use paradigm, particularly regarding elephant ivory, of which Japan was the world's largest importer before the 1989 trade ban. Leading up to the Fort Lauderdale COP, Japan had taken a record number of reservations to listed species in CITES, and it had received a less than favourable assessment by the CITES secretariat for its record in implementing CITES regulations at the national level. In 1994, internal changes and global dynamics were converging to change Japan's approach to, and role in, CITES. Japan's agreement with southern African range states on the ivory trade issue, as well as on broader questions about the role of CITES, served Zimbabwe well as Japan came to assume a leadership role in the organization. The Standing Committee changes that came out of Fort Lauderdale did much to bring CITES more into line with Zimbabwe's 'pro-trade' and 'anti-imperialist' visions.

The ninth COP provided further evidence that southern African positions were supported by other industrialized nations. Document

9.18, entitled *How to Improve the Effectiveness of the Convention*, was a very general call for a study of the regime's overall effectiveness by an independent consultant, with findings to be reported to the next COP. The document was adopted in committee by a vote of 62 to 4, with no opposition voiced in plenary session. The proposal was widely believed to be a direct descendent of the CITES II document circulated by Zimbabwe. The widespread support for its adoption was, at least in part, the result of four years of behind-the-scenes coalition building on its part. The US was among the four opposing votes because of concerns regarding the measurement of regime effectiveness, elaborated below, and because it felt the money could be better spent on improving CITES implementation. The effectiveness proposal is not radical or critical in tone, as was the CITES II document, but several themes from CITES II appear in it. One is CITES' age. CITES II argued that the regime embodied outdated principles and goals that have since been discredited. The new proposal states, with a similar implication, that 'during that period [since 1973] the number of conservation conventions has multiplied many times', thus supporting the need for review.

CITES II claimed that 'there is only one measure [of the success of CITES] and that is the extent to which species populations have increased as a result of CITES'. Along the same lines, the effectiveness proposal directs the consultant doing the study of CITES to provide information about the extent to which the conservation status of a representative selection of species listed in each of the three appendices of CITES has changed, and the extent to which the change can be attributed to the application of CITES.

It is extremely difficult to assess the effectiveness of a regime. Effectiveness may take the form of increasing public awareness, education, strengthening domestic conservation structures and procedures through economic assistance or technical support, decreasing demand in consumer countries, or deterring potential behaviour that is prohibited by the regime. As international trade usually represents only a tiny fraction of the pressure on threatened and endangered species, a narrow assessment, such as that outlined in the effectiveness proposal, was always likely to conclude that CITES is doing little or nothing for its listed species. This could theoretically make it easier for Zimbabwe and others to steer CITES away from listing species, particularly on Appendix I, and toward a pro-use stance. Although this study had the potential to influence CITES more strongly in the long run than any other outcome of the Fort Lauderdale COP, the results of the study presented in Harare did not meet anyone's expectations

or needs, and, overshadowed by the African elephant issue, the study anti-climactically played a minor role in the proceedings.

Finally, at Fort Lauderdale, Zimbabwe was designated the host of the tenth COP, a role which it intended to use to 'educate delegations about the real situation'.³ Based on the outcomes of the Harare COP, it can be argued that Zimbabwe was successful.

It is difficult to determine whether these changes to CITES are a direct result of Zimbabwe's strategies and actions, or whether Zimbabwe is helping to facilitate trends originating elsewhere. Such larger trends may emerge from within an informal coalition of like-minded countries, or may represent underlying outside forces such as the sustainable development rhetoric that came out of the 1992 UNCED. Most probably, the changes within CITES result from all those dynamics simultaneously. In any case, Zimbabwe has become increasingly effective in both facilitating change and using it to forward its national interests within the CITES regime.

THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION

To understand Zimbabwe's shift from emphasizing its opposition to the Appendix I listing of the African elephant to its more recent efforts to promote a sustainable use paradigm within CITES, it is essential to grasp the domestic politics of wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's position in CITES has been shaped by the emergence of a coalition of groups within the country favouring sustainable use. Before Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, wildlife conservation was largely under the direct control of the colonial state. One change to this came in 1975 when rights to use wildlife were conferred on white landowners. This enabled them to profit from wildlife ranching and safari hunting. But it was still the case that the black majority had no rights over wildlife and that they were often hostile to the state's conservation policies.

After independence and the advent of black majority rule, there was a growing awareness that this situation could not continue. Although Zimbabwe's conservationist NGOs were predominantly white, they recognized that the cooperation of black communal farmers was essential to the success of conservation policies. In order to secure this cooperation, officials within the Department of National

³ Nhema, Claudius, Counsellor, Embassy of Zimbabwe. Interview with author, October 1994

Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM) and the NGOs in the environment and development sectors agreed that these farmers must have a vested interest in the value of the wildlife on their land. Indigenous communities should be given the same sort of rights that white farmers had acquired in the 1970s. This resulted in the development of the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). This programme got underway in 1988 and it resulted in bringing more Africans into the field of wildlife conservation. It gave rural communities a greater degree of control over wildlife and it provided hard evidence that wildlife conservation can provide revenue and jobs to communities, whether through tourism, selling select hunting rights, or selective exploitation for food and other products. The DNPWLM says that CAMPFIRE has been successful in many communities where it has been implemented. For example, the Nyaminyami district, which was the first to implement CAMPFIRE, raised \$458,000 in 1992 by selling hunting permits, meat and hides. This money has been put towards community health-care, schools, water systems, and arming wildlife protection rangers.

There have been tensions within CAMPFIRE, however. There are disagreements about the proper distribution of revenues between district councils on the one hand, and local communities on the other. Nevertheless, the coalition supporting the sustainable use of wildlife is a broad one in Zimbabwe. In contrast to the US and Europe, where NGOs often play the role of opposition to government, it incorporates the positions of both government officials and most NGOs. It also includes rural communities who benefit from CAMPFIRE schemes and white landowners who engage in wildlife ranching.

The existence of this coalition provided a powerful impetus for Zimbabwe to pursue changes within CITES. The policies of CITES have not generally been favourable to the development of sustainable use. Yet, Zimbabwe has come to feel it must be part of CITES if it is ever to earn the goodwill of the international community and to secure the important development funding and trade benefits that come with it. Hence, Zimbabwean officials have sought to change CITES policies towards ones more compatible with Zimbabwe's practice of promoting sustainable use. Zimbabwe's advocacy of sustainable use has met with scepticism from some within CITES. The success of CAMPFIRE has been questioned and the problems with district councils highlighted. International NGOs have pointed to Zimbabwe's failure to control rhino poaching. It is suggested that this does not bode well for the reopening of the ivory trade. There have also been allegations of corruption and the distortion of data. While not all

these charges are well founded, they do indicate the difficulties of determining the validity of various conservation strategies, including sustainable use, within CITES.

CONCLUSIONS

Zimbabwe's behaviour as a CITES member points to two conclusions. First it shows that CITES membership has made a difference in policy decisions taken by Zimbabwe's leaders. The decision to adhere to the ivory trade ban, while working to overturn it, was in accord with CITES rules, and in direct contrast to the state's previous conception of its national interest.

Secondly, this case study shows that Zimbabwe, as a Party to CITES, has learned to use the regime and has been instrumental in bringing about – and taking advantage of – profound changes in the intent, the structure, and the power relationships embodied in the CITES regime. Zimbabwe's relationship to the regime has evolved from being the recipient of regime dictates to being the creator of some of those dictates, often in a form that serves the state's self-calculated national interest. It also shows that international cooperation efforts to protect natural resources are re-defining traditional notions of wealth and power. For many species, the CITES range states tend to be poor in traditional economic power terms, but rich in the resources in question. As value is assigned to newly acknowledged forms of wealth (eg endangered species), countries rich in these resources are learning to derive power through the leverage they provide in the context of regimes like CITES.

CITES, which was created to regulate international trade in threatened wildlife species, is now tackling the issues of habitat conversion and wildlife management. In part, it is increased scientific knowledge which has led species protection efforts in this direction. However, it is also the result of Parties learning to forward their individual economic interests through the regime. As Zimbabwe has learned how to influence the CITES regime it has empowered itself, giving it more input in important multilateral issues than it would have had in the absence of the regime. Other range states within CITES have also fundamentally improved their ability and willingness to speak out. The regime–state relationship is neither static nor unidirectional. Rather, the relationship is dynamic and reciprocal; it develops over time as states learn to work within the system to advance their interests.

REFERENCES

- Hemley, G (1992) 'CITES 1992: Endangered Treaty', *TRAFFIC USA*, 11 August
Ricciuti, E (1993) 'The elephant wars', *Wildlife Conservation*, March-April
Thomsen, J (1989) 'Conserving the African Elephant: CITES fails - US Acts', *TRAFFIC USA*, 9 January

Part IV

THE FUTURE OF CITES

ENDANGERED
SPECIES
**THREATENED
CONVENTION**

THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF CITES,
the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

Edited by JON **HUTTON** and BARNABAS **DICKSON**



~~AFRICA RESOURCES TRUST~~

EARTHSCAN

Earthscan Publications Ltd, London