


IMPERIAL SUDAN

*The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium,
1934-1956*

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The Sudan (showing present-day borders)

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later discontinued, and efforts devoted to cotton culture. These included all areas of importance: soils, rotation, weed and pest control, crop diseases, plant breeding, and other crops for rotation in the Gezira Scheme.⁴⁵ From 1938 land at Shambat was allocated to the new School of Agriculture. Serious experimental work began in the Nuba Mountains in 1926-7, and by the late thirties there were three stations there. These experimented mainly with cotton but also with dura, sesame, and groundnuts. A new site was chosen in 1938 near Talodi for the Dam Gamad Scheme, to produce cash crops. Experimental work in the Nuba Mountains concentrated on pest control, introduction of new crops, and establishing proper rotations.

In the south research was undertaken mainly at Kagelu and Maridi. At Kagelu, near Yei, rubber was tested during the first world war but later abandoned. Various food crops were tried, apparently without sustained effort. Coffee was planted after renovations in the mid-twenties; this was extended in 1930 but cancelled in 1931 owing to retrenchment, and the farm was closed. A British district commissioner and Egyptian forest ranger nonetheless continued cultivation there, extending it to hardwoods and fruit trees. In 1937 official work resumed, and in 1939 Kagelu was used for experiments with new crops and for training agricultural officers. Because of better growing conditions, Maridi became a centre for research in cotton from 1928.⁴⁶ Not until the late 1930s was a botanical survey of the south undertaken, by one man. His work, largely ignored at the time and cut short by his death in 1942, formed the basis for planning the Zande Scheme in the forties. Thus in this as in other areas the pioneering work of one or two people stands out in the absence of sustained government effort.

ANIMAL PRODUCTION

A 1900 ordinance created a wild animals preservation department, from 1902 called the game preservation department, to regulate hunting. The department was hopelessly under-financed and under-manned, and indeed was seen as properly a profit-making enterprise: money should be made by licensing big-game hunters and selling wild animals abroad. This it failed to do to the extent desired: departmental expenditure, though slight (only £E3,386 in 1934) routinely exceeded revenue (£E1,955 in the same year). Although there was a steady stream of European and American hunters, most game by far was shot by British officers and officials on leave. Following the Sudan's accession to the international Convention for the Preservation of Flora and Fauna in Africa, a new Game Preservation Ordinance in 1935 called for control of elephant-hunting by Sudanese and new licences for the hunting of rarer species.⁴⁷ The Sudan nonetheless continued to export ivory, hippopotamus hides, crocodile skins, and other wild-animal

products. Their contribution to the overall economy was, however, much reduced from that of earlier days. In 1913, for example, some 113,636 kg of ivory had produced over £E113,000, almost 10 per cent of total export earnings. During the 1920s an average of about 31,000 kg a year were exported, but the trend was definitely downwards, only 3,636 kg being exported in 1930. In 1933-9 the average export was 4,655 kg, while an average of 4,653 kg of hippopotamus hide was also exported. The hunting of rhinoceros was by now illegal, and the government sold abroad the rhinoceros horn it confiscated, 15 kg in 1935, 14 in 1939.⁴⁸

Much more important to the economy and the livelihood of many Sudanese was production and sale of animals for domestic consumption and export. Attempts to exploit this resource had been hampered by woefully inadequate veterinary services. Recognition of the problem came only on the eve of the first world war, during which the veterinary service lost most of its trained personnel. A boom in foreign demand after the war was followed by a recession, and the pre-war promise of great expansion in the veterinary service was not realised. By 1933, after retrenchment, its budget of £E29,480 was only about 20 per cent more than in 1913. It was cut again in 1934, after which it rose by small annual increments to about £E38,000 in 1939, when it represented a mere 0.78 per cent of government expenditure. Unwillingness to invest in veterinary services, including education, research, immunisation, transport and stockyard facilities, was seriously shortsighted, illustrating general emphasis on the Gezira to the exclusion of other areas of the economy, and the failure of 'economic development' under Symes. Trade figures reflect this neglect. In 1933-9 export of cattle averaged about 9,200 head per year, of sheep and goats about 13,100. This accounted for only 1.5 per cent of total exports, or less than 1 per cent omitting 1936, when an extraordinary export of camels to Abyssinia was stimulated by the Italian invasion. The market for skins and hides developed similarly, accounting for 1.9-3 per cent of exports during the period. Statistics on internal trade are few, since only the number of animals slaughtered for food in the ten largest towns was regularly recorded.⁴⁹

Failure to expand a livestock industry should not obscure the effort expended to maintain one. Cattle diseases in the Sudan were endemic, and cattle-plague, contagious bovine pleuro-pneumonia (CBP), and others spread rapidly in Sudanese conditions. Constant vigilance and quick action were required to control them. The government's laboratories at Malakal and Khartoum were often hard-pressed to meet demand for serum and vaccine. In 1935-9 an average of 112,000 doses of cattle-plague serum were administered. In 1934 a vaccine against the disease was made available, and following expansion of laboratory facilities was administered from 1935. An average of 111,000 doses a year were administered in 1935-9. A high

their homes.⁵⁷ Workers were reported more concerned about rations than pay; so was the government: when in December some 3,000 Latuka and Azande were paid off in paper money ('owing to shortage of silver'), northern merchants 'were the gainers as the . . . men made haste to exchange their paper money for goods and silver in the local shops'.⁵⁸

Notwithstanding reports of willing service, there is much evidence of labour trouble.⁵⁹ At Juba, where AFLOC required much labour, the position was difficult. There was never enough labour at the rates offered. The official attitude, that southerners had no interest in money, alternates ironically in government reports with news of current or incipient food shortages, even famine. Since at Juba labour was virtually never voluntary, the government took steps to spread the burden. In late 1945 new tax rolls were prepared, and attempts made to check 'the movement of Chiefs' subjects into neighbouring chiefs' territories . . . to avoid Government demands for labour and grain in Juba'.⁶⁰

As in other ways, the old central and western districts of the Bahr al-Ghazal most closely approximated critics' impressions of colonial administration at its worst. In Wau in 1939 poll-tax 'defaulters' were arrested and 'made to work as prisoners at PT 1 per day until their accounts were cleared'. But the usual rate for unskilled labour was 1.5 piastres, and Wau's poll-tax rate of 30 piastres was the highest in the Sudan (except for Renk and Malakal, where it was 35 piastres). Service was deeply unpopular and strictly enforced. What was meant when an official report noted simply that 'production' of carriers 'was undertaken by direct means',⁶¹ is illustrated by a visitor's private account in 1941:

When the Company went on trek . . . carriers were required. . . . The Mamur at Wau . . . would impress the carriers by riding a horse into the Suq . . . and force all able-bodied males to adjourn to the gaol, where they would be locked up until required. . . . A word about defaulters. There were a lot of these, and they would be paraded, with witnesses, at Company Office. Summary punishment would [*sic*] be meted out by the Coy. Commander, or the British Officer then in command. Punishment ranged upwards from an admonishment, through a reprimand and confined to Barracks to an ultimate corporal punishment of lashes. These were administered . . . watched by an officer, and the Company drawn up in a square. The prisoner lying flat on his stomach, had his back and buttocks bared, and these were lashed by a Senior N.C.O. using a kurbag [*sic*] (Rhinceros hide whip).⁶²

These 'defaulters' were not insubordinate soldiers but private citizens.

Concern about the effects of the war on the south was muted. There was a contradiction between keeping out 'Northern influences' while forcing labour for wages and taxes. In 1939 the district commissioner in Western Equatoria commented on 'the departure from their tribal areas of large numbers of able bodied members of a communal society to look for work as individuals, and the metamorphosis of a high proportion of those who

remain at or near their homes into wage earners, a process which throws quite out of balance the traditional cooperative machinery for provision of the necessities of life'.⁶³ Even in the 1930s, as northerners and westerners were barred from the south, the emigration of southerners was already a problem. Many went north, to find work during the war-time boom, at good wages.

EDUCATION

At the outbreak of war the Sudan had embarked upon a programme of educational expansion called for by the De La Warr commission in 1937 and refined by Christopher Cox in 1938. The war nearly coincided with the life of that plan and inevitably affected it. While the goals of 1938 had not been reached by 1946, neither had they been abandoned. Spending on education had surpassed planned levels, although mainly because of increased costs rather than expanded provision. Education remained subordinate to general administrative policy, but was liberalised through greater opportunities. Girls' education was expanded; post-elementary education increased; more places were awarded for higher study abroad; reawakened Egyptian interest provided alternatives to government education, both in Egypt and in the Sudan; and private schools proliferated. Thus, despite a general retardation of pre-war plans, the period witnessed uneven but important educational development. Political changes ensured, however, that progress fell short of what the post-war Sudan needed. Goals were outdated before they were fulfilled. A visitor from the Foreign Office wrote in early 1945 that the 'main difficulty' confronting political progress was 'the dearth of fully educated Sudanese to take over technical and administrative posts'.⁶⁴ Thus education and administrative policy remained closely connected, as the rate of educational advance was related to, even seen as determining, the rate of political progress.

The 1938-46 plan sought to raise spending on education from about £E150,000 to about £E300,000 a year; to expand and improve both boys' and girls' elementary schools and boys' intermediate schools; improve the lone secondary school; and take steps towards creating a university college in Khartoum. Goals were set which, in the event, could not be met. The number of boys' elementary schools rose from 106 in 1939 to 127 in 1946, as against 150 envisaged in the plan. Girls' *kuttabs* increased from 34 to 69; the target had been 82. The number of boys' intermediate schools rose from 11 to 13. Student numbers were even less impressive. The number of boys in government elementary schools increased from 15,519 in 1939 to 22,015 in 1946; of girls from 4,235 to 7,747; of boys in government intermediate schools from 1,317 to 2,027; of girls from 52 (in 1940, their first year) to 183.